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Acknowledgements

THIS book addresses the issue of authentic hu­man development. My attempt at a comprehen­sive argument is indebted to the creative work of many others. My primary indebtedness is to the life-work of Bernard Lonergan. More than any other, he has revealed to me the challenge of contemporarily adequate, theological reflection.

This does not mean that I write as one who claims to have done for myself that to which Lonergan's work invites us: that is a radical self-appropriation which tends to be a life-long task. I write from where I am in the search.

Mention of the thought of Lonergan may con­stitute a mental block for some. It should not. Gregory Bateson wrote of what was to be his final work, "this book will tell you nothing un­less you know nine-tenths of it already."[[1]](#footnote-1) In re­lation to Lonergan's breakthrough, I believe that people do know the requisite nine-tenths. It is to nothing other than our consciously questing selves that he would draw our attention. There is nothing mystify­ing here, simply a challenge to live with greater awareness. Still, getting there could well take a life-time.

If achieving the self-appropriation to which Lonergan invites us is so difficult, what realistic hope can be entertained for the reader of this book? The answer calls for a distinction and an anal­ogy may help. Nobody today questions the pervasive impact Newtonian science had on everyday cultural process. While only a very few people became scientists, all participants of that particu­lar culture came gradually to live within what we can call a "post-scientific" form of common sense.[[2]](#footnote-2) Analogously to the manner in which this happened in the post-Newtonian world and is begin­ning to happen in the post-Einsteinian one, we can anticipate com­ing to live in a "post-interiority" form of common sense, with sig­nificant consequences for the ways in which we live our lives and shape our world. While there can be no short-cut in the task of self-appropriation to which Lonergan invites us, mediating his break­through to the world of common sense can be furthered in a way accessible to all. This book is devoted to such mediation.

The main acknowledgment occurs through the footnotes but I have been so greatly helped by the works of some people who have taken Lonergan's challenge to heart that it would be un­thinkable not to mention them here: my thanks, then, to Robert Doran, Matthew Lamb, Fred Lawrence, and Phil McShane. What may seem an excess in the footnote area if acknowledgment were my sole intent is due to another concern: I wrote with an eye to my stu­dents' needs and in the fond hope that they will wish to pursue in greater depth the many themes that are touched on. I owe much to the students who over the decades have pressured me to keep searching.

# Prologue/ Interview

SINCE the single most difficult theme of this book is the putting-in-question of the understanding of development that is so massively in place, I thought I could usefully begin by presenting as simply as possible my reasons for problematizing what seems to many to be too obviously right to question. The following formulation was elicited by interviewer Mary Curtin and broadcast basi­cally as it now reads. [[3]](#footnote-3)

Mary Curtin: *Brendan Lovett is an Irish Columban who has worked for many years in the Philippines. He was the keynote speaker at a recent conference in Galway organised by the West of Ireland Theological Association on the subject of Marginalisation, Secularism and the Gospel. In his address, he surprised many people there by questioning the value of Development, and the Development Process which for so long has been central to our relations with countries in the Third World.*

Lovett: It has become such a cliché, I mean such an uncritically accepted term over such a long period, that for somebody to put a question mark over it sounds scandalous and even stupid. But it is intensely problematic: this is what I have been discovering through struggling with it in trying to serve people over the last twenty years.

The point is, it is a self-serving definition: this is the first thing to be said about it. In other words, we are automatically accepting ourselves as the norm of the humanly desirable when we invent this language in the first place.

We then, having set ourselves up as norm, undertake to make other people in our own image and likeness, but we remain the norm, so by reference to us, they are underdeveloped. But we don't see anything wrong with this word because we are only using it with a view to developing them, so of course there is nothing negative about it as we use it. But it is almost like a missionary term: we are articulating our responsibility for peace in the world in terms of taking responsibility for helping other people to develop, meaning, become like us.

What is never questioned is whether the historical project, the social project that we are involved in, is, in fact, so desirable and wonderful and so obviously the way forward for humankind.

So what I have been discovering is that this will only work if it be the case that there is just one culture in the world that is valid, and all the other thousands of human cultures, mediations of the human, were invalid. And the more I have lived with the implications of that outlandish proposition, the more I have come to see that the grossest injustice that has been perpetrated in the name of good by this concept of development by the Western World has in fact been a travesty of the truth of people, meaning it could only work if we took from them their right to name themselves in their own way.

It could only work if we actually imposed upon them our definitions of what it means to be human and forced them to reject their own traditions, their own tested mediation of the human, through their meanings, values, languages, and so on. I have come to the conclusion that it's obvious what the economic injustice is that is being done to the greater portion of peoples on the face of the earth. Even while we use the language of development, they have been systematically exploited, deprived of their own – well, we say "raw materials" – but actually as it turns out to be their very earth, in many cases their very livelihood, through the destruction of their forests, and so on. That is obvious to everybody, I think; nobody has a question mark about that.

But there is a deeper level of injustice, and for me this is the radical level that I would hope to draw to people's attention: the deeper more radical level beyond the economic injustice is that of the marginalisation of people precisely as people, and by this I mean the undermining of their cultural integrity.

I always have trouble communicating what I mean by that expression, because culture, precisely through the processes I have been talking about, over the past fifty years has become an innocuous word. It no longer means anything very vital. But for me it refers to that which is constitutive of human beings as human. In other words, culture refers to the constitutively human task of determining for ourselves the meanings by which we will live our lives and shape our world. That's what a culture means for a people, it is how they are human on their own terms, and to deprive people of that is to take away the only genuine meaning there is for freedom.

I would say that in practice the ideology of development hides from us the truth of the deepest injustice we have been perpetrating worldwide for the last, well certainly the last half century, but long before that too, and it is the destruction of people's true humanity by our insistence that they will be made in our image and likeness. Of course, what blows this totally apart is the discovery, even if it is still only incipient, that the way of life on which we in the West are embarked is suicidally wrong.

Q.  *I must take you up though on your point that we are imposing something. I accept there's been massive exploitation as you say, that's not in dispute. But surely what development at its best is trying to do, is to provide water, food, shelter, in other words basics of living for people, not to culturally impose anything on them. For you, where's the problem in that?*

A. Would that what people were trying to do were to provide the very basic things you talk about! In fact the opposite is what has been happening. These very things, absolutely essential things, water, food and so on, which prior to our efforts at modernisation were abundantly available to people, precisely through our efforts at helping people to develop, have become scarce commodities.

I remember reading a study once in relation to Tribal People of Southern Philippines and Mindanao, and I discovered that prior to their being subjected to the Market System, these people had access to 109 different food stuffs, in other words, their menu throughout the year had that richness attaching to it through what was available to them from the Tropical Forest surrounding them and what they grew for themselves in subsistence fashion. Imagine the richness and the complexity of the diet and the just fascinating variety - 109... You know, in our vaunted Westernised system, I doubt if people have access to even half that variety of foodstuffs.

So it isn't as though, oh, here were these helpless people, you know, who obviously were starving or something, or really knew nothing about the richness of life as we experience it, and we were going to help them to develop. In fact, by any criterion the opposite is what is happening, we actually take from them the richness –– and I mean at all levels –– the richness of their way of life, and force them to participate in a market system which makes them market dependent, which they formerly never were. This means that no longer now are they masters over their own destiny because, lacking control over the food chain and all that pertains to that, they now have to play their part within the market system and if they refuse to do so, in almost every case that historically you can choose to study, they will undergo violence.

In other words, it isn't as though people have an option as far as accepting our Western way of life is concerned. If people refuse to leave their subsistence way of life, then there are ways and means whereby they can be forced to do so, and the destruction of such ways of life becomes a necessary moment in the spread of the market. Basically, we don't need guns to do this. All we need are schools.

People may wish to object that we are surely going to enhance freedom by giving them education, but it just turns out that education under our system is dominated by subservience to the economy and therefore is only preparing people to move into the market system, and therefore is geared towards denying the validity of a non-market dependent way of life. So human beings are being schooled out of their own innate sense of what makes for human dignity and freedom in terms of market independence and forced into our mould but always to their detriment: they're always the losers.

Q. *So you're actually saying that people were better off then before, say people in your case in the Philippines, or perhaps in Latin America, that they were better off before they met people from Europe, or before the Europeans became part of their lives?*

A. Well, it sounds a dreadfully sweeping thing to say but a market system that is wholly uncorrected by institutions of justice or of sharing or of solidarity, makes the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Now in spite of the rhetoric of development, and two development decades under the United Nations and all of these things, back of the rhetoric is the reality, the poor are actually becoming poorer in relation to the process of accumulation in the world, so I say, Yes, we mean well, but what difference does that make in terms of the logic of the processes to which we are wedded, to the extent that they even control ourselves and our thinking anyway? What difference does it make in terms of what is actually happening to the majority? It's good to mean well, but you have to do more than that, you have to check out whether the meanings which we are involved in are bringing life or death to people, and I'm suggesting, quite seriously, that people are worse off for our coming. And this is not to be Luddite, this is not to condemn everything that has belonged to the Western process.

There has to be nuanced critique. You have to affirm the genuine marvellous breakthroughs in knowledge about our world, about our universe; the flowering of human intelligence in and through the empirical sciences over four centuries is something for the whole world to be able to rejoice in and appropriate.

But you have to differentiate that from the values it was made to serve, because it is the technological implementation of the scientific breakthrough that is of real significance in terms of social history, in terms of what has been done to human populations and continues to be done to human populations and that nuanced judgement is what people have to grow to make. It calls for critical capacity to differentiate always between a genuine breakthrough in knowing and the values that cause us to put that invention at the service of what can be horrific disvalues. And that is what has to be analysed.

If you take seriously the suffering of people, the majority in our world, then you cannot allow what has been going forward in the last few centuries in terms of Westernisation to be uncritically affirmed as progress, as development, because it could not be that genuine progress would bring misery to such a proportion of the human family.

I have reached a point now where I find myself confronted every day with a staggering fact and no matter how I twist it around or read in other directions I still end up with the same staggering fact, and it dominates my thinking: I know it does, but I cannot get beyond it.

It is that, what we in the West have defined as humanly desirable, what justifies our speaking of other people as under-developed or undeveloped, is in fact a way of life that can only be had at the present moment by half the population living on the face of the planet, and if we persist then we are defining the humanly desirable way of life in terms that excludes at the moment half the human race, and for the foreseeable future even more of it, and if you want the bottom line, we are defining the humanly desirable in terms that can only be had at the expense of the death of the earth itself, and this is suicidal. And if it is suicidal then clearly it must be wrong.

And so we are confronted, in terms of our most cherished way of life, with the possibility that we have misdefined our own deepest need, we have misdefined what is truly of benefit to the human. So this is our predicament as I see it, the evidence that is coming in from paying attention to the victims and to the victimisation of the earth itself has put a question mark over our cherished project and I feel we have no option but to put ourselves in question, to allow ourselves to be put in question by this multible victimisation of people and of the earth itself.

Q. *How can that questioning even start? I mean, it seems to me that there is a very strong resistance.*

A. There is a monumentally strong resistance. I experience it within myself and have been struggling with it for a long time now. I experience it as soon as I try to talk about this to anybody else, and I have no difficulty in understanding why the resistance is there. I feel that the meanings into which we have been socialised through our education ever since our childhood have been uniform, have always been more of the same in this direction, and for somebody to come along and put a question mark over all of that is quite shattering.

It is really emotionally disturbing, to say the least, because our identity is tied up, as I said earlier, with our meanings and these happen to be *our* meanings in the West: you know, this is my sense of who I am, and what I am is in fact being defined by the categories of possession, categories of status, whether I am professional or what position or job, etc. but it's being defined in and through a relationship to the wage system, so all of that is a unity and so when somebody comes round and says, well the whole thing in its interconnection is questionable, we feel bereft of a place to stand, or even to begin to address this problem, and that's why I feel it is necessary to resurrect the more basic category that has been suppressed all this time, the category of cultural process.

Cultural process refers precisely to people's capacity to raise deeper and deeper questions about everything that is going on in our world, since it is the work of our hands. We cannot reply, ‘Oh no, this is just the way things are in the world.’ The way things are is the result of our creativity, or lack of creativity. We shape the world. We can’t escape by saying, well, this is the way it is. That is always ideological. Everything that exists in the human world, in the historical world, is the result of human choices, human decisions that this might be meaningful or it might not, and therefore we have to take responsibility for the whole thing.

When people with vested interests want to perpetuate a particular meaning in the world, especially an institutionalised meaning, a social meaning that has institutional form, as in the form of an economy or political power structure or whatever, then they communicate through their schooling and through everything else to people that this is not a human construct, not something that we have devised, but the way it is. And so at its birth the science of economics, if it is a science, took the way things were in the world at that time, and unquestioningly absolutized that. People were already, at the time of Adam Smith, living out patterns of individual greed that were shaping the emerging system, and he just took that as normative. Just as the political thinkers of that earlier period, Hobbes and so on, defined the whole meaning of social relationship in terms of the alienation that was already there, but they named the alienation as normal, so also exactly the same thing happens with the presentation of how economics is supposed to be. So if everybody follows out their greed, somehow, in some mysterious fashion, it will work.

I am simply drawing attention to the fact that the obligation on people, if we are going to really exercise freedom, is to accept responsibility for the on-going historical process and that means we do not allow anybody or anything to absolutize particular historical meanings, or the meanings of particular systems, simply because they exist and have been moving forward in apparently inexorable fashion. Our difficulty comes from the fact that they have been moving forward with that massive force, and they have succeeded in doing it by displacing the cultural moment.

What I mean by that is, human beings have been made subservient to the workings of economic system, even politics has been made subservient to economic interest, therefore the central exercise of our freedom as human beings has been taken from us because now there is an unquestioning reality that actually dominates all of our lives which has marginalised the cultural process, so even in everyday language to use the word culture is to talk about something that is trivial, folk habits or art that has nothing to do with politics, or various activities that are all seen as essentially marginal to the *real business* of living which is of course your involvement in the market system, your function and your role and your position within that.

But that is the very thing that we have to break out of. We will all feel, individually, completely helpless in the face of the challenge that our world is throwing out to us in the data that is coming through from the victims and from ecology, until such time as we begin to support one another in regaining our capacity to determine for ourselves what is humanly desirable –– even if it means curtailing the global reach of an economic system that over centuries has gotten totally out of hand.

Q. *But in a sense, aren't you calling for a complete human conversion. The system we have, surely, has come from our desires, our wants. We want goods, we want a comfortable life. Nobody, surely, is going to willingly say, I don't want this. So how do you reach that point of conversion?*

A. No, nobody is automatically or by themselves, of themselves, ever going to say, I don't want this. Take the recent resurgence of capitalism. I think that's the expression people use to talk about the collapse of the Eastern Bloc which, especially in America, was greeted in triumphalist terms as "the victory of our-way-of-life" business. It just may be a little bit more complicated than that but they choose to see it as self-vindication: There, the enemy has collapsed, therefore we win; showing once again that what we are on about is the only way forward for people.

Now this kind of response, this kind of reaction, I find frightening but understandable because after all, this is what we have been immersed in so deeply, and the real strength of capitalism, as people have been analysing it now in recent decades, derives not from its brutal coercive power — you know, that it has guns at its disposal, that we can take care of people who try to stand against it or in any way try to stay outside its reach and refuse to be co-opted into its workings — no, the real strength of it, the more frightening strength, is its capacity to manipulate our life of desire and I think this is what your question really is drawing attention to.

We experience ourselves as hopelessly caught because not only are we structurally involved in the workings of the system so that taking care of our family, meeting our obligations towards the present generation and future generations, is already being controlled by our participation within the system but at a deeper level, our life of imagination, our life of feeling is being controlled and this is a more deadly form of control because, if you have control over people's imaginations and their life of feeling, now you control what they can think.

And our deepest pain, I believe, when we are confronted with this hard data that puts our whole world in question, is that we know deep down that we don't have the resources to think alternatives, we emotionally are not free to do so, we experience the data as a terrible painful confrontation because we say, Oh my God, if I lose what I have been working for all my life and what I hoped for for my children, what life is there possible for me, and that's the trap. It is painful, and it is real, precisely because we have been controlled at this deep level. The worst injustice done to us, just as it has been done to the people I was speaking about earlier in other parts of the world, the worst injustice done to us here in this country also is the fact that our capacity to imagine alternatives, to raise more ultimate questions, to reassert our freedom in terms of redefining what might be humanly desirable, all of that has been taken from us, and that is our deepest poverty and pain in the face of the present challenge. So I would agree, left to ourselves, simply confronted with this data as data, we feel totally helpless, and wonder how anybody can do anything, and it's a very painful situation to be in.

The issue then becomes, what will help us, or empower us, enable us to make this breakthrough, to make this move out of our present helplessness. And my suggestion is that it is opening our minds and hearts to the pain of the victims. At first blush that might not appear such a powerful suggestion, but if our problem is that our emotional life, our life of desire, is constrained, constricted and controlled, then only an experience that enables a more powerful emotion or desire to be experienced by us helps us to break out of the whole pattern. I am convinced that alone there is no way forward, but if I am present to the savaged humanity of others to the point where it becomes intolerable to me, in that moment I am restored to myself, at least a little. In that moment I experience what I will not any longer tolerate being part of, no matter what the cost. And if many people do this together, in other words, support one another in having the courage to expose themselves to the horror that is being perpetrated on others, then our imagination comes alive in that moment.

That's what I meant in the course of the talk by stressing that suffering is epistemic, it changes your capacity to know, it enlarges your imaginative power and in that very moment enables you to transcend the prison into which we have been put by the extraordinary devious and complex workings of capitalist system.

So I think there is hope. It is, then, coming to us from the victims. We cannot regain our humanity by picking ourselves up by our own boot straps. It is going to be given back to us: our humanity is given back to us by the very people whose humanity has been denied by what we have embraced as humanly desirable. So if we are prepared then to reach out to them, this is the gift we will receive. We will be given back to ourselves at a deeper level of humanity and freedom than we ever knew and that is the way forward.

I

Introduction

IN THE pre-Christian Greek tradition dragons were to be slain. A certain lingering doubt about the wisdom of this policy gave rise to the convic­tion that in slaying the dragon one sowed pesti­lence, trouble for the future. A slain dragon might be more dangerous than a live one.

Despite such doubt, Christian tradition in­herited the policy. St. George came to be ven­erated as the great dragon-slayer.

According to one version of his legend, St. George was born in Cappadocia. He was al­ready a young, self-consciously Christian man, handsome and brave, at a time when, in far off Libya, a terrible fire-breathing dragon had laid a city and its surrounding countryside under hard carnivorous bondage. To appease him, the people, to begin with, gave him two sheep a day. When their stock of sheep was running low they altered their offering, giving him now a human being and a sheep every day. At last the king's daughter, bridally arrayed, was exposed. And that's when St. George, armed with spear and sword and shield, rode to the rescue. Byzantine icons of this event show St. George spearing the pest, but the Golden Legend has it that, merely by making the sign of the cross to­wards him, St. George overpowered him. Unmolested and re­leased, the king's daughter led him, meek and docile now, into the city and there, in front of all the people, St. George be­headed him. So impressed by what they had seen were the people that they converted, there and then, all of them, to Christianity.[[4]](#footnote-4)

So, what is the content I hoped to hint at in my title? Clearly, I stand with those who believe that killing the dragon is a mis­take. Why I do so will be intelligible to those who know that dragons, along with all other theranthropic (animal/human) and theriomorphic symbols, belong to one irreplaceable mode of the human search for the meaning that can be found or missed in the movement of life. This cosmological mode of the search for meaning which seeks for order exclusively in relation to all-encompassing cosmos was al­most completely suppressed in the Western world in favour of the anthropological mode of the search which turns on discovering the mediating role of the human mind in our pursuit of truth. It is arguable that our present ecological crisis is due in large part to this suppression. At any rate, when contact eventually occurred, Christians from the West systematically misunderstood the meanings of Chinese people whose culture had not been shaped by such wholesale suppression of the cosmological mode of the search.[[5]](#footnote-5) In, 781 c.e. the Nestorians raised a monument to Chinese toleration but some nine centuries later Rome found Ricci's tolerance intolerable.

The author of the above quotation goes on to say that there may be a better way to cope with dragons than by St. George's method which would lobotomize the earth and our human minds.

I believe there is. In this work I hope to indicate the form an appropriate Christian presence to contemporary China might take. In service of this goal, I attempt to develop and apply the con­structive critique of modernity with which I have been concerned for more than a decade.[[6]](#footnote-6) Along with extensive historical writings on Christianity and China in recent decades, there has been re­newed interest in the philosophic problems that attach to commu­nication between religious and cultural traditions such as Confu­cianism and Christianity.[[7]](#footnote-7) My concern is with the resolution of such theological and philosophical problems. However, I treat them, not as past historical issues, but as relevant to pressing critical issues facing all peoples in our times.

Why China? One will not have to read very far to discover that I am no Sinologist and am clearly dependent on the work of others in that vast field for my understanding of what historically has been going forward. So, why China? In the first place, China covers such an enormous segment of the human family that no­body who cares about the human could possibly be indifferent to the directions it may take. Present policies give little ground for hope. Given their constituting 36per cent of the world's popula­tion, a refusal by China and India to change present direction would render totally ineffective any attempts in other parts of the world to promote sustainability. A second reason is more personal. My own presence in Asia is the result of my being part of a mis­sionary society which originated in 1916with the exclusive con­cern of an evangelically-motivated presence to China. By 1954all the surviving members in China had been expelled. Caught up in forces which neither they nor anybody else understood at the time, these good men and women lived out a faithful presence in the midst of ambiguities that were not of their making. At a time of immense social upheaval, they shared the misery of people sub­ject to great natural and historical cataclysms. They made lasting friendships and enriched the lives of many. If 1949in China is customarily seen as marking the definitive closure of the modern period of mission, I am interested in exploring the new thing that is to be born with that ending.

Still, I owe it to prospective readers not to pronounce on what lies beyond my competence. It will, I hope, rapidly become clear in what follows that my own judgments focus primarily on the critical reading of my own Western background and the issue of adequate contemporary reflection on faith. These are the areas in which I can claim some limited competence. Any resulting in­sights are then offered to a Chinese context deeply marked by the struggle with modernization. My hope is that what I see as our historical mistakes can be avoided in their shaping of their own future.

The core judgment underpinning this work is that we are faced with insurmountable contradictions in what has been promoted as development in our times. The primary challenge to intelligence is to clarify exactly where oversights have occurred and most of the book is spent in reaching for that clarity. Some initial back­ground is provided in the remainder of this chapter while the sec­ond chapter looks at current attitudes towards cultural process and ecological crisis in East Asia.

The third chapter attempts to probe the secularization hypoth­esis.[[8]](#footnote-8) In a recent historical study, Andrew Ross claims that Europeanism is still alive at the end of our present century in those western intellectual circles who with earnest political cor­rectness reject European political imperialism and Christianity, "yet still unquestioningly assume the experience of western European humanity to be definitive, and that since secularism followed industrialisation and urbanisation in western Europe, it will inevita­bly do so in Africa and Asia."[[9]](#footnote-9) I make no such assumption. But while I hope for a different outcome in the case of the great Asian cultures, it would be irresponsible to fail to highlight the danger to any authentic cultural process that is involved in drifting towards economism. The presentation in the third chapter is shaped not by any presumed normativity of the western experience but by the desire to uncover the specific manner in which justice and its demands are side-lined by the demands of an economistic cul­tural process, one derailed towards the demands of short-term practicality. This can happen anywhere unless steps are taken to prevent it. I find the substantive issue to lie in injustice that has become global in extent rather than in any assumed, inevitable law of progress.

This is followed in the fourth chapter by an attempt to de­velop yet further what was centrally at issue in my earlier works, the needed explanatory perspective on development. The word "explanatory" is a clue here to the relative difficulty of this fourth chapter. There is a shift here in the kind of intelligibility sought. Explanatory perspective involves a move away from understand­ing things in their relation to us (things as they affect us) to under­standing the relationships that hold between things themselves (in the present case, the relation between the different levels of value that belong to the human good).[[10]](#footnote-10) The shift in the kind of intelligi­bility sought is inevitably reflected in the language used, although I have tried hard to avoid all unnecessary technical expressions. Sustaining this shift calls for effort but I hope readers' involve­ment in the argument will be sufficient to carry them through. Finally, this perspective provides the background for the final chapter on the issue of an appropriate Christian presence to China.

Perhaps some initial explanation should be given for taking so long in getting to the focal point of the book. There are, indeed, many writers on the mission of the Church (missiologists) who see no need for such elaboration of context in pursuing their task. They are seemingly unaffected by the fact that, since theol­ogy is not the full science of human being, it has to enter into collaboration with the human and social sciences if it is to per­form its task of mediating between its faith tradition and the cul­tures in which it is or wishes to be embedded.[[11]](#footnote-11) For my part, I can see no alternative to travelling the collaborative path.

**How New is the New World Order?**

Not too many people were convinced by "the end of history" thesis[[12]](#footnote-12) or came to believe that the need for critical analysis died with the end of the Cold War. For me, the need has become all the more urgent. From Third World[[13]](#footnote-13) perspective, the post-Cold War scene looks very unpromising. Neither superpower ever had any intrinsic interest in the Third World as such. The freedom of action of regional clients of the superpowers was directly related to their ability to confer on their respective patrons a competitive advantage in their global rivalry. This strategic leverage is gone and with it the small degree of freedom of action of client states.[[14]](#footnote-14) The gloomy expectation of the poorer nations of the South is that they will return to their pre-Cold War status as "trivial impedi­menta to the designs of the large and rich".[[15]](#footnote-15)

From a situation where one was forced to choose between monopoly controlled states and state controlled monopolies as ri­val systems, we are now deprived of choice. Some think that the world must be a safer place with the collapse of the one-time Soviet Union. This is not necessarily so. There is a striking imbal­ance in the present international system: while the economic or­der is tripolar, involving Europe, Japan and the U.S., the military order is unipolar. Military power not backed by economic might is forever under temptation to compensate for economic weak­ness by leading with its strength. It could well lead to militaristic adventurism with catastrophic consequences.[[16]](#footnote-16)

But the end of the Cold War may help us to focus on a deeper malaise unacknowledged by both of the superpowers, even as they furthered it. Redressing the wrongs of the last fifty years in Eastern Europe is as nothing compared to redressing the wrongs perpe­trated globally in the last five hundred years. Since this vaster evil was furthered by both of the so-called superpowers, the challenge now is to critique *what they had in common.*[[17]](#footnote-17)

I have seen people watching helplessly as their means of life went down the road on the backs of logging-trucks. Equally help­less, I have watched them slaughtered by security forces for dar­ing to protest the outrage. I have been privileged to be present to all this over the past two decades.

All the judgments to which I have come have been made from the standpoint of the victims. Throughout, I shall be insisting on experienced injustice as the standpoint from which to judge truly. I make no apology for this stance of reading all from the point of view of the victims: I accept that presence to the suffering of others can be epistemic, that is, conducive to true judgment, and suspect the claims to objectivity of those who have not undergone the suffering and would yet defend the process which caused it. The basic critique to be made of our technologised world and its systems is a moral one. The issue is whether we are prepared to take responsibility for our lives, our world, and our common humanity.

All my thinking revolves around one staggering fact: what we in the Western world have been defining as the desirable human life cannot be sustained by the only earth we have and could never be extended to more than half the people alive on our planet today.[[18]](#footnote-18) A way of life which can only be had on such terms — at the expense of half the human family and, ultimately, of the Earth itself — shows itself to be suicidally wrong. We have misdefined the humanly desirable. As always, the greatest evil in our world flows from what we have chosen to define as good. We dwell in tragic enclaves, we who claim to enjoy 'goods which paradoxically cannot be goods because cut off from communication, from universal resonance.' [[19]](#footnote-19)

I see us as faced with two tasks. The first is to accurately name what has been going forward in recent centuries. The sec­ond is to create desperately needed alternatives. I hope to con­tribute something to the first task, but human communities, taking their destiny firmly into their own hands, can alone creatively achieve the second. Some have already begun to do so.[[20]](#footnote-20)

II

Ambiguities in Cultural Transformation

THIS chapter treats of two points. In order to provide some initial context for the later chap­ters, I attempt, first, to describe prevailing atti­tudes towards the issue of cultural process on the part of those in power in East Asia at the present. This is relevant to the argument of the succeeding chapters in that cultural process is there seen as central to promoting the integral human good, the key issue of authentic development. Secondly, I focus briefly on East Asian attitudes to the ecological crisis. I take this crisis to be the clearest indicator of our current Western failure to understand what constitutes true de­velopment.

**Attitudes towards Culture in East Asia**

The difficulty of access to current Chinese perceptions on the themes of culture and devel­opment was in part overcome by the timely publication of the Asian Perspectives Project of the United Nations University. The East-Asian sub-program concentrated on the theme of the State and cultural transformation. It was the first time that scholars from both North and South Korea worked to­gether, along with scholars from China and Japan. Part One of this valuable collection of papers documents and evaluates as­pects of the Chinese experience of cultural change under modern­ization.[[21]](#footnote-21)

There is a significant difference, remarked on by the editor, between the stand of the South Korean and Japanese contributors and that of their Chinese and North Korean counterparts. The South Koreans and Japanese tend to look critically at the state's inter­vention in culture, while the stand of the Chinese and North Ko­rean scholars is to view this active role affirmatively. The South Korean contributors, in particular, focus on the conflict between the state and society. The Chinese and North Korean contributors tend to see cultural intervention by the state in frankly instrumen­tal terms: culture has to be made to serve policy goals. This em­phasis does not sit easily with their insistence on the importance of preserving cultural identity, an insistence shared by all the con­tributors to this study. There are ambivalences and contradictions here which I will address in the third chapter.

In the brief but perceptive introduction, Hirano draws atten­tion to the relevance of the long shared history of the three Con­fucian countries. Confucian teaching laid great stress on tradition and saw the state as carrying prime responsibility for maintaining the culture of society. Whereas modernization originated in West­ern societies and was in some historical continuity with their past, it came suddenly and devastatingly from the outside in the case of the three countries under study. It was thought that the modern state had to be built on the negation of the old state: the great Qing empire in China, the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan and the Yi dynasty in Korea. The imperative of survival in a new interna­tional community forced a choice for changes that would inevita­bly involve the drastic transformation of their cultures.

But the categorization of the three countries as Confucian should not obscure the deep differences that existed among them in the pre­modern era. The traditional Chinese international system, including other countries such as the Kingdom of Ryukyu (Okinawa) and Viet Nam, was ordered by the principle of Confucian moral virtue, naked military power being relegated to second place. Within this system, "Korea was close and loyal to the centre, sometimes even claiming cultural superiority to it, whereas Japan was more recalcitrant and peripheral."[[22]](#footnote-22) It might appear that Japan presented the least resis­tance to the rapidly expanding Western system, launching with the Meiji Restoration into a programme of social change modelled on the West. And, indeed, it was roundly criticized at the time by Korea for the shamelessly rapid "Westernization" of its culture. But this was to fail to advert to the 'Herodian' nature of the Japanese re­sponse.[[23]](#footnote-23) While the debate in both China and Korea was whether they should completely discard their long-cherished culture, the Japa­nese simply resolved to Westernize themselves *whenever* *it was nec­essary to do* *so in order to resist Western encroachment*.

With extreme rapidity, between 1884-1905, Japan first broke with and then broke down the Chinese international system. The first *international* treaty was forced on China by Japan in 1871 while Korea's first international treaty was likewise forced on it by Japan in 1876. Moving into imperialist mode after the Sino-Japa­nese war in 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Japan was the force against which China and Korea most needed state power in order to be able to defend themselves.

Considering the state as a transformer of culture, Hirano sug­gests that it employs two methods: the indirect, which is the re­sult of political integration and economic development promoted by the state, and the direct — "employed more often than not in the non-West" — which is a naked attempt to change the culture with a view to bringing about political integration and economic development.[[24]](#footnote-24) School education was the key means by which the state could change culture in the direction it considered desir­able. This is always done at the expense of local languages and cultures. The extent to which the state can be a destroyer of cul­ture is not missed by the editor:

Each of these societies seems to have lost the opportunity to nurture an independent culture of its own, succumbing instead to state-sponsored cultural transformation.[[25]](#footnote-25)

The irony of this was not lost on the nationalists of the three countries: in order to maintain independence, i.e. preserve the cultural identity of the nation, they were being forced to take on a foreign culture.

It is by no means clear to me that the other contributors would share the positive judgment on cultural process implicit in Hirano's words although he clearly wishes to include them.

The modern state tried methodically to eradicate traditional culture. Yet it is our hope that in some areas a traditional culture will have survived and that it will be revived once the state's role has reached its zenith and has begun to decline.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Of the five Chinese contributors, Sun Yue-sheng comes clos­est to articulating the dialectic of the social and the need for a creative tension to be held between people's intersubjectivity and the systems created by practical intelligence.[[27]](#footnote-27) He is critical of bureaucratic control but his tendency here is to trace all bureau­cratic negativities to "feudal bureaucratism", the curse of "tradi­tional bureaucracy", implying that there is a pure and faultless form. He attributes highly centralized bureaucracy to the Chin re­organization: it was an extremely resilient and flexible pattern of centralization/decentralization. He is insistent on the value of cul­tural tradition but shows a certain ambivalence, fluctuating be­tween pride in a millennia-long civilization and criticism of the "weight" of such a tradition.

Writing on the national minorities, Lin Yueh-wha draws at­tention to the disruptive effects of a high level of production on communities. He trots out the customary linkage of "socialist atheism and scientific knowledge" as the means of overcoming people's "spiritual enslavement". One seeks in vain for a positive evalua­tion of the cultural uniqueness of the minorities. The stance is pragmatic:

So long as national characteristics and national differences ex­ist, we must take them into account as a part of our general policy if we want to do our nationality work well.”[[28]](#footnote-28)

Nor do I find much hope for the autonomy of the cultural in the reflections of Wei Zhang-ling. In the past in China, he tells us, people bore children for the purposes of perpetuating the family and clan, and to provide for their old age.

Now, the necessary norm of society is to rear successors to the socialist cause of the government and to accelerate the process of modernization.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Wei Zhang-ling has perceptive things to say about the nega­tive aspects of the One-Child Family Policy, instancing an unbal­anced sex ratio, heightened incidence of divorce, and social and psychological maladjustment and pressures resulting in a wilful, arrogant and unsociable generation. Such negativities can, he thinks, be overcome only by abandonment of the policy.[[30]](#footnote-30)

***Christians and Chinese Culture***

What should be the stance of those who wish to live out an appropriate Christian concern toward China at this time? It has been suggested that a prime need is for Christianity to address the full truth of its past in China and to decide whether it wishes to remain a minority culture or to engage Chinese culture more com­prehensively.

A second need is to understand the rather startling and grow­ing acceptance of Christianity and, in particular, of the biblical narrative in contemporary China. What is the meaning of this phenomenon?

Finally, there is a need to explore the universal significance of elements of Chinese culture and to ask what it might contrib­ute to Western culture in general and Christianity in particular.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Michel Masson sees this agenda as dictated by the manner in which Chinese culture has been affected by recent centuries of contact with the Western form of Christianity. I restrict myself to an attempted summary of the three points which Masson devel­ops in valuable detail.

On the first point, the past still haunts us. The experience of what seemed defeat “(brought) about a general sense of failure and, with it, feelings of guilt, resentment and anger. We became refugees, holding on to our right to be allowed back into China, there to resume our mission”[[32]](#footnote-32). Masson points out that although 1949 brought disaster to 1,000 Jesuits, there has been no attempt to recapitulate the story, no beginnings even of an oral history. This must be understood.

Here is the verdict of the first Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Francis Hsu:

The church that has received from its divine founder the man­date to teach all nations was mute when my country, having broken with its own past, looked beyond its horizons for light and guidance. I was born the year after the May 4 Movement when anti-Confucian iconoclasts finally won the day and pro­jected science and democracy as the new gods almighty. Less than thirty years later, communism had conquered the country. In between there was a long, tormented period of disenchant­ment with Western civilization followed by cynicism, war-wea­riness, decadence and moral collapse. The spiritual vacuum that appeared in the wake of the dissipation of Confucian influence became wider and deeper until communism filled it by default. The church was a helpless spectator to all of this. I do not mean that the missionaries were not aware of the danger or did not preach the Gospel with zeal. No, I mean that faced with a desire for a change and a new order of things, the church failed to make its message intelligible and obviously relevant. The tra­ditional way of preaching, even if it had been extended and enlarged a thousand times, would have remained ineffective. Given to pagan Chinese as it had been given by Christ to the Jews, the Sermon on the Mount must have sounded like roman­tic escapism. "Is that all you have to offer us?" incredulous Chinese intellectuals asked the sons of Matteo Ricci. China was going through a phase of soul-searching agony and the church in China could offer no help.[[33]](#footnote-33)

Masson fairly remarks that no one succeeded in making their message heard in those times, because no one had the answer. No one could judge the magnitude of the crisis. Even if Christians had been interested in it, the crisis of the breakdown of Chinese culture was beyond their understanding and resources. In such a situation, the inevitable result of the Church's work was to establish small pockets of "Catholic culture", a minority culture unin­telligible to the wider world about it. Even so, he suggests that given a few decades this phenomenon might have been able to train theologians and philosophers able to address the global is­sues of society. But time was not given. The Japanese War and then the Civil War put paid to that. The 1949 transfer of the mi­nority culture to Taiwan did not encourage people to explore the larger issues.

The minority culture model is not very upset at its lack of knowledge of the wider culture. The common sense observation of a Chinese nun from Hong Kong to her foreign colleagues: "How can you come to 'teach' us, as you know nothing of our culture and history?" leaves such a community unmoved. The minority culture was also marked by an enduring theological backward­ness. As a 60 year old Chinese Jesuit communicated to Masson, at the time when Mao Zedong was entering Beijing "we were memorising a Latin-taught philosophy and theology. Many of us developed psychological problems; a good many of my friends were to leave the Jesuits later on.”[[34]](#footnote-34)

Contemporary rejoicing at the level of Church growth on the mainland pays little attention to the experience of a like "boom" in the little-developed Taiwan of the fifties and early sixties. With the economic development of that island, the wave subsided. No one is asking if the same may not happen on the mainland. What does it mean to serve the local Church in China? *How central is the* issue of *culture?* As far as the church is concerned, is China first of all the local church or is it a huge society in search of a new culture?[[35]](#footnote-35)

Addressing the second item, Masson uncovers an extraordi­nary burst of Chinese interest in the biblical narrative as a cul­tural fable. One startling novelty on the cultural scene in recent years has been the publication by *Readings,* a Chinese monthly dedicated to the study of broad comparative cultural issues, of articles on books by foreign theologians and Christian thinkers.[[36]](#footnote-36) It has not been the only publication to move in this direction. The reason for this radical reversal on the treatment meted to theology seems to be that these works are now adjudged to be intellectu­ally relevant to the cultural modernization of China.

Just how this relevance is seen is illustrated by Masson[[37]](#footnote-37) by reference to the themes of journey and of hope. The biblical view of life as a journey is contrasted with the Confucian vision of the goal of life as moral growth and nurture.

The Confucian person stays at home, as it were, in the garden, like a tree which patiently throws down deep roots; but in the Bible men and women are driven out of the Garden on to the byways of history. They attain their moral stature only through the dangers and the windings of a lifelong journey.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Related to this is the sub-theme of sin. Again, the assumption that all that was involved was a superfluous myth needed to jus­tify a saviour who would restore human nature[[39]](#footnote-39) is overthrown.

Comparing Tolstoy's *Resurrection* with the Ming period Beijing opera *Spring in the Jade Hall,* another reviewer comments that the two works have similar plots and characters, but the author of the opera, lacking as he did the experience of sin and repen­tance, could produce no more than a melodrama in which nothing happens, whereas Tolstoy's sinners keep breaking new ground as they discover the ways of repentance and forgiveness.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Connected to the theme of journey and sin is that of hope. Faced with what seems to be a dying culture, some intellectuals are finding relevance in the idea that rebirth is possible if people are willing to accept the responsibility of fulfilling its promises and to shoulder the cross of its sins and shame. Moltmann's theme of Christian hope as the radical criticism of all utopias is finding a welcome by Chinese intellectuals who are aware of the extent to which they endorsed the dreams of the past decades. Liu Xiaofeng, reviewing Moltmann's work, says that in China "more than any­where else, intellectuals and their utopias are still the main ob­stacle to modernisation ". [[41]](#footnote-41)

Of course, Christian respondents in China were not slow to point out that the relevance of a cultural fable was something quite other than believers' understanding of the God who tran­scends all cultural forms created by people. The intellectual quest for a new cultural orientation is fraught with ambiguities and misun­derstanding if it attempts to by-pass the deep issues of faith and prayer.

And, although there is a much more positive view of Chris­tianity present than formerly, recourse to it, as to all other West­ern sources, is solely to provide ingredients which might be part of the process of modernising Chinese culture. Such an instru­mental interest in their religious tradition is not likely to enthuse believers.

But Masson cautions us that the phrase "cultural fable" has two meanings. One is that God's revelation has been reduced to its cultural significance in the history of the West. Even here, it must be said, this secular reading provides Christianity with an intellectual respectability it never had in China. The second meaning, however, lies in the assertion that the Christian experience of the West is no blueprint for China in the eighties and nineties. Since the experience cannot be reproduced, it can only be a fable from another world.

Weber, with his account of the role of the Christian tradition in the making of the modern West, has become a best-selling author. But the more his account of the complex interplay of Christian values with other forces in Western cultural history is studied, the clearer it is that this is a non-repeatable story.

At best, Weber is telling China that modernisation has to come from within one's own tradition; at worst, Weber is telling China that it could happen just "once upon a time" and that China can learn from him only about what she has lost.[[42]](#footnote-42)

To test how the cultural fable is being understood, Masson looks at recent Chinese readings of Max Weber on the themes of freedom and happiness.[[43]](#footnote-43)

Huang Kejian sees free individuality as constituting the es­sence of modernity. From his reading of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, he draws three conclusions: the tran­sition to modernity was presaged by a transformation of the value system; the major difference between the old and new value systems can be expressed as that between being group-centred and being individual-centred; in the transition to the new value system, the individual was emancipated but at the same time economic rationalism put the individual's liberated aspirations under constraints.

Focusing on the economy, China has attempted modernisation since 1840. But, Huang claims, the modernisation of the economy needs the new values which can produce the new rationality de­scribed by Weber. Economic development is a cultural problem. How can China arouse not only independence and the vital im­pulse, but also devotion towards one's individual vocation and the corresponding rational behaviour? Nor is Huang blind to a complication of the basic issue: Westerners themselves are discovering that their economy is producing alienation. Nobody wants to buy into that but China has been operating for some seventy years on the delusory hope that she can both win the benefits and not pay the costs.

Huang sets the priorities as follows: China must establish and identify what value orientations, in the context of world history, represent the best of our times, and he identifies these as "inde­pendence" and "free individuality". The ideal of individual free­dom must be promoted since this is basic to the cultural transfor­mation of China. Without it, any appeal to traditional values is vain, remaining a function of the old, authoritarian patterns. "A *hard-working slave still remains a slave.”[[44]](#footnote-44)*

Jin Guantao maintains that the essential structures of a culture *cannot* be *tampered with at all.* His concern is to discover how needed specialisation can be fused with the traditional mission of the intellectual which was always linked to society. The attitude of a younger generation is that the traditional emphasis of the social responsibility of individuals has stifled individuality and creativity. Specialization and professionalism is seen as one of the driving forces of modernization in the West. Jin Guantao is convinced that with­out a sense of mission intellectuals turned specialist cannot succeed in their attempts at modernizing Chinese culture. What intrigues him is how ultimate moral commitment, traditionally always linked to society, can be fused with needed specialization.

The third and final issue was that of the universal significance of Chinese culture.[[45]](#footnote-45) China has not yet departed from the main trunk of cultural devel­opment in the history of civilisations, and this may prove to be a chance for humanity to discover a new path of development in a world shaken by the contradictions of modernity.[[46]](#footnote-46)

There is a living tradition in China and it may very well have kept alive values once common to humanity. From such a tradi­tion can spring a new modern philosophy which could be of sig­nificance not only for China but for the whole world in meeting the ethical challenges of the next century.

On the agenda of Chinese socialism, traditional culture is meant to be nothing more than the servant of the socialist commodity economy. But there has been a significant achievement of scholarship in the realm of Chinese cultural and intellectual history in the last forty years and research done elsewhere has been studied by Chinese scholars. The result of this is a markedly changed attitude towards the potential of tradition from the negative manner in which it was conceived vis-a-vis development in the fifties. Enduring val­ues are being discovered in the Confucian tradition. This discov­ery is perhaps facilitated by the economic success of Japan which did not go in for a violent rejection of its traditions in order to modernise.

Outside the mainland, Liu Shuxian of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Tu Weiming of Harvard are two proponents of a feasible hermeneutics of the Confucian text. They take their in­spiration from Gadamer and Ricoeur. The project is not without inherent difficulties. Unlike Confucianism, Christianity can recognise modernity as at least the illegitimate offspring of its own text. And Gadamer is part of a living congregation who celebrate the text in their lives.

The fact that Liu Shuxian and Tu Weiming are not mainlanders is not in itself a valid objection. Masson points out that the socio­political situation in China at present makes it impossible for Chi­nese intellectuals to engage in a modern re-reading of the Confu­cian texts. There are 'too many cadres around, too many ghosts from the old society, too much ideological pollution.' Almost of necessity, the thinking must be done by the Chinese outside.[[47]](#footnote-47)

At this point, Masson introduces Chung Chai-Sik, currently teaching ethics at Boston University, a Korean Christian with a strong Confucian tradition in his family. In Korea both traditions are alive in the context of a developed society. Chung asks seri­ous questions as to whether Christianity, so deeply involved in the shaping of modernity, can of itself articulate the ethical prob­lems of the contemporary world. Does Confucianism have needed resources for inspiring respect for nature, for example, in the world of tomorrow? Can the universal values which the Christian West stands for, value of the person, "human rights", ever be inculturated in a wider world if they are not couched in the language and symbols of other traditions like Confucianism? Can Christians pur­sue their own agenda for the world without learning from and cooperating with other traditions?

The human condition on this endangered Planet Earth demands a radical shift in our understanding of human nature and val­ues. Individualism and rationality which Christianity and espe­cially Protestant cultures have been historically associated with are now ever more questioned. We must explore a view of the human person that sustains both a balanced respect for indi­vidual autonomy and a genuine respect for the person-in-com­munity. We must come up with a new perspective to see the value of human life in view of the greater interdependent eco­systems of Heaven, Earth and all forms of life. Re-appropriating what is the best in the received traditions, whether Confucian or Christian, we need to articulate and explain what it means to live a good human life and to achieve a good society here and now.[[48]](#footnote-48)

How about China's only native religious tradition: Taoism? From being despised by both Marxists and Confucians alike, the volumi­nous work of Joseph Needham[[49]](#footnote-49), showing the compatibility of this tradition with scientific experimentation over many centuries, and its serious study in Japan and the West has made it easy for this tradition also to be re-evaluated in the service of socialism.

What such research has effected is a radical re-appraisal of the rituals from being considered 'superstition" to being under­stood as the manner in which people "re-actualize the founding moments in the history of the Chinese *koinonia".[[50]](#footnote-50)* To what extent do "the deeper structures of Chinese culture" perdure and what is their possible significance for China and the wider world?[[51]](#footnote-51) On the instrumental approach to culture, what is stressed is courage, self-reliance, patriotism, discipline and self-sacrifice as traditional values which can serve the needs of the socialist commodity economy. Masson comments that religious Taoism has so far made no attempt to modernise. But what might this mean and who will judge that it is happening? Sun Longji asserts that in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China modernisation has not altered the style of social relations: it has simply allowed a growing number of Chinese to do better than ever what they have always done best — from dinner parties to pulling connections. The claim is that despite the breakdown of the traditional system of values many of the values perdure as an unconscious code of behaviour and interpersonal relations. Of course, this can be exaggerated. One can still question the transformative strength of this tradition.

We must give due consideration to a code which is followed by one billion people and has so long a history; but one must remember that no-one kept to the code. One billion people may think that they are right simply because they all follow the same code; but the code did not protect them against them­selves at the time of the Cultural Revolution.[[52]](#footnote-52)

Nevertheless, I would argue that, given the sheer size of its population that finds guidance in these values shaped through a vast pre-modern past, and given the uniqueness of the Taoist and Confucian text, creative recourse to this "text" — both Confucian and Taoist — will be of world-historical significance in shaping our future. What constitutes creative recourse is, of course, the all-important question. The instrumentalist strategy of some con­temporary Chinese intellectuals falls lamentably short of the mark.

**The Issue of Ecological Limits**

Not one of the writers in the U.N. University study passes comment on the environmental consequences of the development process they unquestioningly accept. This is remarkable because China is already the world's largest producer of particulate mat­ter, sulphur dioxide and untreated waste water and the second largest emitter of green-house gases (carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, nitrous oxide from fertilizers and methane from coal seams and paddy fields).

Vaclav Smil's preliminary research[[53]](#footnote-53) shows that the annual cost of environmental pollution and ecosystemic degradation is equal to at least 15 per cent of the country's G.D.P. Concentration of particulate matter and sulphur dioxide, especially during winter in northern cities, are now commonly more than ten times higher than in Western or Japanese urban areas.

More than eighty per cent of major rivers are polluted to some degree, and twenty per cent to such an extent that it is impossible to use their water for irrigation. More than five per cent have no living fish. I preface the reflections below by stressing that whether or not China can cope with its environmental problems depends largely on what we in the affluent West choose to do. Chinese degrade and pollute their environment because of rising population and a desire to lift themselves from widespread poverty. We in the West do the same thing in different ways because of our excessive con­sumption and unnecessary waste. This must lead to differentiated responsibilities.

***The Link between Biodiversity and Cultural Pluralism***

There is, I believe, a perfectly intelligible reason for this si­lence on the part of the experts. They too are affected by the "obviousness" of the category of development. For forty years now our world has been dominated by the myth of development. Much more than a socio-economic endeavour, it is a way of seeing re­ality, a myth that comforts societies and a dream fantasy that un­leashes human passion. It has captured our imaginations and hearts to the extent where it makes sense to speak of our being addicted to it. The few peoples who remain free of its influence — they would include some of the Chinese national minorities mentioned above — are negatively perceived by us and suffer consequent oppression. If, in the face of their suffering, we feel outraged and wish to defend their human rights, we do not thereby feel com­mitted to the furtherance of their way of life, their culture. We do not allow ourselves to be put in question by their values. Thus, we who are an intrinsic part of the cause of their suffering, would wish to be a part of the solution to their suffering without chang­ing *our* values. This cannot be.

What we have to consider in our times is not just the death of species but "the end of birth" — the elimination of what has been termed the "womb of life", ecosystems that include coral reefs, ancient lakes, tidal zones and tropical rainforests. With their loss evolutionary process comes to an end**.[[54]](#footnote-54)**

The proximate causes for the daily loss of species in our time are many but the basic one is the loss and fragmentation of natu­ral habitats. South of the Sahara, 65 per cent of original ecosys­tems have undergone major ecological disturbance, and for South-East Asia, 67 per cent of natural habitat has been lost. In Western Europe the percentage is even higher.

An important factor in habitat destruction is the over-exploita­tion of plant and animal species: this is seen as the decisive factor in the impending destruction of two out of five threatened verte­brate species.[[55]](#footnote-55) Also important is the introduction of exotic spe­cies to local ecosystems, a fact which is ignored in current dis­cussions about the release of genetically manipulated organisms. Products of industrialization, pesticides, tropospheric ozone, sul­phur and nitrogen oxides, play a decisive role in the degradation of natural systems.

But the above-listed proximate causes cannot be responded to or reversed unless we understand that which generates them. To blame humans indiscriminately for the crisis is simply wrong. In recent times the destruction can be linked to governmental and international support for industrial forestry, agriculture and energy programs over and above traditional usage patterns. Thus, the enormous fires in the Amazon have been driven by two main sources: state subsidies for the cattle industry that allowed totally uneconomic beef ranches to be carved out of the jungle[[56]](#footnote-56) and the taking over of the fertile lands in the North-East and the South of Brazil by agribusiness operations to grow export crops.

It was this policy of promoting cash crops in the South that destroyed one of the most well-adapted, healthy and ecologi­cally sane peasant cultures that we had in the South of Brazil. Hundreds of thousands of people, maybe a million, lost their lands or lost access to land, and these are the people that are now being driven into the rainforest.[[57]](#footnote-57)

In South-East Asia, it is the *tropical timber industry* that is cutting down the last primary rainforests, against the will of local people. The industry is condoned by the military in Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines. As in Brazil, the traditional practices and rights of local communities are violated and the destruction of environment for the benefit of the few is justified in the name of national development and the generation of foreign exchange. Mention of the foreign destination of what is cut down leads us to the last step in the search for underlying causes, the role of west­ern culture in this process of the usurpation of the control of local communities.

It is the throw-away culture of the industrialized world, now avidly embraced by Third World elites (and not only by the elites), that is leading to the throwing away of the world.

Just as the introduction of an exotic species can wreak havoc on a particular ecosystem because the delicate checks and bal­ances were not designed to cope with it, so the introduction of foreign capital and technology into a traditional socio-economic system undermines the checks and balances that keep the activi­ties of local communities at a sustainable level. Without the wis­dom of local communal decision-making, without appropriate tech­nology and satisfaction with a simple standard of living, exotic capital and technology can rapidly destroy whole patterns of sus­tainable livelihood, channelling profits to a few beneficiaries.

**Development Assistance within this Model**

In its workings, development assistance can be likened to the AIDS virus: a pathogen that destroys the *ability of the host coun­try to resist the invasion of a foreign socio-economic* system. Through­out the Third World, the result of large scale aid has been the displacement of traditional cultures and sustainable patterns of land use, along with the rapid liquidation of forests and agricultural lands for the benefit of the industrial elite.

Green capitalism sees the solution to the world's environmental problems as arising from an alliance with the market economy. You can both save the planet and make money. Some environ­mentalists feel caught: they think market forces are necessary to drive the rehabilitation and conservation of the biosphere. This is a recipe for disaster for both cultural and biological diversity. It is in the wrong direction. If, for example, indigenous and forest peoples are destroyed in order to ensure the profitability of the rainforest, they can never be brought back again. And it is *their* way of relating to the environment that must be furthered if we are to have a future.

Social ecology sets local people at the centre of the solutions to the threat facing the environment. The protection of indigenous people's rights encourages and facilitates future work with envi­ronmentalists on conservation matters. We cannot mix these two positions as if they were genuine alternatives.

Up to the present, no international group, including U.N.E.P., has thought to include indigenous peoples as participants in their Biodiversity Conservation Strategy.[[58]](#footnote-58)

**Ethnic Rights and Human Rights**

Minority/ethnic rights as a legal and political concept are at the juncture between individual and collective rights. Many coun­tries recognize both kinds of rights in their constitutions. Even the most liberal countries, where emphasis is so squarely placed on the individual regardless of racial, linguistic, or ethnic factors, make allowance for minority rights.

Minority rights are group rights. They are asserted as a result of membership in a group that seeks a measure of differential treat­ment distinct from the majority of the population. Equal treatment is not the basis of the rights. Equal treatment necessarily subjects everyone to the value system of the majority. Thus, while minor­ity rights may include individual rights as in the principle of non­discrimination found in the U.N. documents, they are not to be reduced to them.[[59]](#footnote-59)

**Cultural pluralism: a doomed vision?**

Whether cultural pluralism will survive depends in large part on the extent to which people come to realize what is at stake here. Aimé Césaire knew the danger and the meaning of thinking imposed by the European "centre", it involves the habit of doing for people, thinking for people, in fact the habit of contesting the right to initiative which is the essence of the right to personality.

They demand of us: 'Choose... choose between loyalty and with it backwardness, or progress and rupture.' Our reply is that things are not so simple, that there isn't an alternative. That life (I say life and not abstract thought) does not know and does not ac­cept this alternative. Or rather that if this alternative presents itself, it is life that will take care of its transcendence.

In the face *of* the myth *of* progress with its negative counter image *of* the primitive, he insisted on the 'organic' nature *of* all real advance:

The wheel is the most beautiful discovery of man and the only one

there is the sun which turns

there is the earth which turns

there is your face which turns

upon the axle of your throat when you cry ...[[60]](#footnote-60)

**Technocratic Ecology[[61]](#footnote-61)**

At present a team of over 60 of the world's top economists is struggling to establish if humankind *can afford to* halt global warming and prevent a climatic catastrophe.[[62]](#footnote-62) They are comparing six dif­ferent ways of responding to global warming by comparing the costs and benefits of each so that national governments can choose between them. The range of options moves from doing nothing i.e., relying on unfettered market forces to determine the level of greenhouse gas emissions, to reducing the emissions to the point of stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of such gases.

**Discounting the Future**

In a timely study, Colin Price has drawn attention to the im­plication of the economists' reliance on cost-benefit analysis in this context.[[63]](#footnote-63) It is completely inadequate to the task. Even if weknew — which we do not — what exactly is going to happen as a result of global warming, (whether it will mean a new ice age for the temperate areas of the world, for example), how do we put a monetary value on the loss of a species, the submergence of an archipelago, the loss of life? In regard to the latter, our econo­mists have come up with an answer: they valued a European life at $1.5 million and an Asian and African life at one tenth of that. Further, we would need to be able to assess costs and benefits which will occur at different times to each other. This is patently impossible since we would have to be present to the two different time frames and in fact we are only present to one within which we can make informed choices. This fact does not deter our econo­mists. They believe they can discount the future.

The accepted way of doing this is to reduce the monetary value of the expected future benefits to their present values; this is done by estimating the sums of money which, invested now at compound interest, would yield the designated amounts at the relevant time in the future. Crucial to any such calculation is the interest rate that is assumed: the higher the rate, the more the future is devalued. At the normal industry rate of 10 per cent, half the present-day value of a perpetual fixed stream of income is contributed by the flow in the first seven years; after year 40 to infinity it is worth almost nothing at all.

Using a high rate of interest could thus provide the economic justification for a decision to hunt whales to extinction or show that it is more "valuable" to catch all whales as soon as possible rather than harvest a few each year in perpetuity. The economists argue that as high an interest rate as would be suited to any other equally-risky investment is needed if we are to avoid a mis­allocation of resources. They also argue that people habitually dis­count events in their daily lives, preferring, say, $1,000 now rather than in a year's time. This invocation of common-sense practice reveals the immaturity of current economic science, its lack of adequate explanatory perspective in relation to its subject matter.

Price doubts whether any discounting should be done at all. For him, weighting the value of future consumption by a uniform negative exponential function of time is an extraordinary process that calls for special justification. If such justification is not forth­coming, we should simply stop doing it.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Abandoning discounting would have enormous consequences. We could begin to select projects with the greatest *total* benefits, regardless of the length of time over which they occurred, instead of those with the greatest *immediate* gains.

**Sustainability**

William Adams speaks of the "terrible versatility" of eco-de­velopment phrases, such as "sustainable development": they are superficially attractive but used with very little meaning at all: so it is that, without explicit treatment of political economy, environ­mental prescriptions for development can be disturbingly naive. The uncomfortable and unpopular question is whether the phrases are backed up by logical theoretical concepts. Adams supports the position of Robert Chambers on "sustainable livelihood secu­rity" as providing the best guidelines for a verifiable use of the language of sustainability.[[65]](#footnote-65) Chambers defines livelihood as 'ad­equate stocks and flows of food and cash to meet basic needs'; security he defines in terms of ownership of (or access to) re­sources and income-earning activities, embracing the need for reserves and assets to offset risk. In pursuit of this, he offers five well-tested learnings: the need to adopt a learning approach rather than a blue-print approach; the need to put people's priorities first; the need for a long-term view of the security of rights for the poor (without which the hope of 'wise use' of resources will re­main a mirage); the need to start with self-help and the contribu­tion of participants; the importance of the calibre, commitment and fidelity of those who wish to help.

He concludes his careful study:

Green development is not about the way the environment is managed, but about who has the power to decide how it is managed. Its focus is the capacity of the poor to exist on their own terms. At its heart, therefore, 'greening' development in­volves not just the pursuit of ecological guidelines and new planning structures, but an attempt to redirect change to main­tain or enhance the power of the poor to survive without hin­drance and to direct their own lives. 'Sustainable development' is the beginning of a process, not an end.[[66]](#footnote-66)

I see the crux of the managerial response in the denial of the extent of our nescience. This same denial on the part of ecolo­gists/environmentalists has them colluding with the evil of nation-state bureaucracies. The focus of their criticism should be the *impossibility* of macro-management of the environment. They should be witnessing to the fact that the enormous complexity of the mutually-sustaining interactions of all levels of the biosphere leads, not to arrogant claims to be able to manage better, but to the recognition of the appropriateness of just one stance: a humble, learning stance, open to immediate adjustment to new, inevitably unforeseen, developments at a multiplicity of levels. Only those at the level where the data is first experienced can respond ap­propriately. At the level of political economy, the wisdom of the ecological perspective is to restore power to those most affected.[[67]](#footnote-67)

My concern in this chapter has been simply to raise some themes relevant to our topic, those of culture and of develop­ment. These themes need to be developed through the provision of historical perspective. It takes a healthily operating cultural process to see that what for half a century has been promoted as development is itself a cultural project. Failure to see this, gives to what is factual a seeming inevitability that makes it seem normative. Then whatever suffers under such processes is seen as doomed by 'history' to disappear, automatically beyond defence. Such has been the verdict of the state in China on the phenomenon of religion. Recent recourse on the mainland to the writings of Max Weber on the theme of secularization is taken as scientific validation of the official policy. I begin the next chapter with a critical review of that issue.

**III**

**Secularisation and Marginalisation in Modernity**

*The large and powerful take what they want,*

*while the small and weak relinquish*

*what they must.*

*Thucydides, Melian Dialogues, V, 89*

**Introduction**

THE heading of this chapter hints at causal con­nections between the production of victims, both human and natural, dominant processes typical of modernity, and a possible displacement of faith from the centre of people's lived concerns. I take the word "secularization" to refer to such an alleged displacement. My approach will be to look for a connection between any such dis­placement of faith and our too-easy acceptance of unjust structures. I will further argue that such acceptance goes hand in hand with a suppression of our critical intelligence, a suppression in favour of a merely technical reason operating in a cul­ture increasingly dominated by techno-economic concerns. It is precisely this that should be of concern to faith.

I believe that attention to marginalisation on a global scale helps us to identify the true nature and challenge of the marginalisation we may be experiencing in a particular country, as a local region within it, or as a group, wherever we happen to be living on our Earth.[[68]](#footnote-68)

**Secularization and Faith**

Three decades ago, at a time when the language of develop­ment was not nearly as suspect as it is today, initial theological attempts were made to wrest a positive meaning from what was referred to as"the process of secularisation."[[69]](#footnote-69) Varied meanings were given to the word but common to all of them was the assumption that religion was not as important as it used to be. Now this is notoriously difficult to establish, but the difficulty has not stopped some people from regarding the hypothesis as an established truth, at least as far as the Western world goes. I have some sympathy for the contention of Andrew Greeley that secularisation theory in mainstream American sociology is not scholarship but the religious faith of the secularized who believe that religion ought not to be important and refuse to even look at evidence to the contrary.[[70]](#footnote-70) At any rate, one thing to be learned from the proponents of those early theological attempts was the need for critical distance from what was allegedly happening. Far from seeing secularization as manifesting an inevitable progress, any evaluation should keep threatened freedom in focus and this focus was seen to be essential to any positive faith response. Today, the costs of the experiments of modernity are becoming much clearer and show how badly needed this critical distance remains. In what follows, I take secularisation as a descriptive, not an explanatory, category.

Lonergan, whose work I tend to invoke increasingly in later chapters, sees secularisation as mainly no more than a stage in "the ongoing process in which man's symbols become ever more differentiated and specialized."[[71]](#footnote-71) He agrees that our contemporary stage is one in which much institutional religion is seen to be in decline, the world desacralized, and human living secularized. His advice is to concentrate, not on such differences, but on that which is fundamental — human authenticity. In other words, change is never the issue but rather the authenticity that is manifest in the change. If Lonergan seems more open than most to the process of change itself, it is because he anticipates the break-through to a new, third stage of meaning, which, by its mediation of integral subjectivity, places issues of sacred and profane in a new context. This break-through is due in large part to his own life-work and will be reflected on in the next chapter.

But to focus on authenticity is to question whether or not there was an active undermining of religiosity present in what was going forward. This could not be simply put down to the ongoing process of our symbols becoming ever more differenti­ated and specialized. If it be true, then our attention needs to turn again to what was going forward.

Regarding any major historical process, sweeping affirmation or condemnation is rarely appropriate. My conviction is that at­tention can focus most fruitfully on the nature and extent of injustice generated in the process. But care must be taken not to de­fine injustice in system-immanent terms, for example, as failure to share in the benefits. Such definition implicitly affirms the basic rightness of the operative system and this may be affirming too much. A more radical language of justice looks to interference with the right to life itself: it finds relevant data in what marginalisation means for the majority Third World peoples — the removal of their means of subsistence.

The side-lining of a particular local population by the promo­tion of particular techno-economic choices is something with which everybody is familiar. I suggest that the Third World perspective enables us to see the true dimensions of such marginalisation.[[72]](#footnote-72) The effort to realize global solidarity with the victims of modern economic colonies will make us aware of the true depth of the challenges in our own neighbourhood. We may come to see that underlying the obvious level of economic marginalisation of par­ticular groups is the marginalisation of people as people i.e., *the undermining of cultural integrity.* By culture here I refer to the constitutively human task of determining for ourselves the mean­ings by which we will live our lives and shape our world. The 'success' of the modern economic system is conditional on de­priving people of this basic freedom. The economic injustice to particular groups *within a* culture is obvious: the injustice to people as *people* is not so clear. But at this point I realize that I may be jumping ahead of my argument.

To return to our starting point, secularisation is taken to refer to the hypothesis that whatever has been going forward in recent centuries has been inimical to religious faith. I believe it to be worthwhile to proceed slowly here and reflect on possible sources of tension between religious faith and what has being going for­ward in recent centuries.

***Merely a Problem of Culture Lag?***

The historian Owen Chadwick warns us of the historiographi­cal sin called "Decline and Fall" history. Such an approach as­sumes that there was a golden age of faith from which there can only be subsequent decline. On such a view *any* change since the thirteenth century can be called secularisation. To claim that the nineteenth century is the age of secularisation par excellence is to imagine a previous age that never existed.[[73]](#footnote-73)

He warns us that philosophers, sociologists and, I assume, theologians, deal in tidier worlds than the historian. Secularisation, he tells us, is not to be confused with the Enlightenment which was of the few whereas secularisation is of the many. Nor is it change of Christian doctrine. To take your understanding of the universe from the Bible one year and from newspapers reporting science the next is not to become more secular: it is to have better knowledge, irrelevant to faith.

Let us not confuse secularization with the perpetual task of adjusting religious understanding of the world to new knowl­edge about the world.[[74]](#footnote-74)

Religious people have found it easy to bemoan secularisation.[[75]](#footnote-75) Was this simply an excuse for their failure to creatively re-think their tradition in the light of new knowledge? I believe both that there was such a failure and that the unease of religious people about secularisation has deeper causes.

Looking at the challenge of adjusting faith to new knowledge, we must in fairness say that what we are faced with in the mod­ern period is not just new knowledge about the world but a new understanding of what it is to know, and this makes the "perpet­ual task" one of singular difficulty in our times.[[76]](#footnote-76) The often quoted judgment of historian Herbert Butterfield identifies the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century as the greatest single cause of change in the West since the rise of Christianity. The new situ­ation demands of theology a *new kind of answer,* still in the making.[[77]](#footnote-77)

And there was a further difficulty in making the adjustment: scientists misconstrued their own work. What had decisive effect on culture, what most gave rise to tensions with Christian understand­ing, was not the actual practice of scientists but the story they told about their practice.[[78]](#footnote-78) This story was a mixture of extra-scien­tific, philosophically wrong ideas blended with strictly scientific explanations of observable data. If we pay attention to what sci­entists were actually doing, we find that the stories they told do not stand up to critical scrutiny. Thus, Galileo did not discover necessary truths; natural science as practiced is concerned with verifiable possibility; both the absolute time and space of Newton and his universe of "moving bodies" have yielded to Einstein's relative space and time and our contemporary physicists' struggle to understand entities which *cannot* bepictured. Thus it is that twentieth century developments in science demolish the mecha­nism of the last two centuries.

The indeterminate universe that actually exists is *ipso facto a* mysterious universe. Its very intelligibility is such as to allow for the fact of human freedom and for the fact of God's exist­ence as the ground of that intelligibility.[[79]](#footnote-79)

Galileo gave rise to what was to become a four hundred year old set of wrong assumptions about the scientific revolu­tion and its consequences. Through his phenomenology of sci­entific practice, Lonergan showed that scientists are moving to­wards a complete explanation of our physical universe and how it operates.

Galileo had designated knowing things in their sensible appear­ance as 'subjective knowing' and this foundational mistake, ech­oed in Descartes and Bacon, was to lead to a misunderstanding of what constituted Enlightenment.

The purpose of science is not to discredit the so-called 'subjec­tive appearances' of things. Just the opposite, scientists intend to explain them. It is a mistake to name descriptive properties 'secondary qualities,' to name scientific explanatory correlates 'primary qualities,' and then to discredit these 'secondary quali­ties' as merely subjective. This is what Galileo did.[[80]](#footnote-80)

So there were real difficulties in simply adjusting faith to the new learning. Faced with the totalizing claims of empirical sci­ence, most theological responses tended to agree in blaming the natural sciences for what they saw as the fundamental religious crisis of modern times, the loss of transcendence.

**Becoming Religious in a New Way?**

Some have questioned the secular hypothesis according to which societies became godless in this period. They suggest that societ­ies became religious in a new way. At the birth of the nation states in the 17th century, there emerged a religion of the Repub­lic in balance with the religion of the denominations. The new spirituality found its centre of gravity in the public sphere: "In Europe and the United States national religions had become the principal vehicles of sacred identity."[[81]](#footnote-81)

It is, of course, possible to agree with this and still affirm a loss of transcendence in this period. Within these new national religions, the great religious questions about the best way to live and what there is to live for were now felt capable of being an­swered *without going beyond the world of space and time,* the world that science is in the process of mastering, giving us power to achieve any ends we choose.

**Beyond the History of Ideas Approach**

There has been no shortage of attempts to explain the ori­gins of modernity and any accompanying secularisation through recourse to the history of ideas. Karl Löwith saw the idea of progress as simply replacing the traditional idea of Providence. Since he did not believe in progress, he did not judge the happening to be one of emancipation.[[82]](#footnote-82) Löwith was attacked by Hans Blumenberg who claimed that it was the 'theological absolutism' of the Middle Ages that drove persons to the act of self-affirmation.[[83]](#footnote-83)Earlier, Hegel had considered the modern world to be a worldly realiza­tion of the Christian freedom recovered by the Reformation. Gogarten also claimed to find the origins of modern secular culture in the Reformation doctrine of the two kingdoms.

While all the above with the exception of Löwith felt posi­tively about the development, Max Weber spoke of it in a value-neutral way in his investigation of the Calvinistic roots of modern capitalism.[[84]](#footnote-84) His focus was the transference to the economic sphere of the virtues of the work ethic which had developed from the Calvinistic belief in predestination in connection with an ascetic life-style. These virtues proved to be the key to economic success in a completely new way. Pannenberg sees this as yet one more instance of derivation simply in terms of the history of ideas. In fairness, he stresses that Weber did not see this connection as an overall explanation of the origins of capitalism but only as an indication of one factor that became important in it.

But the secularization of the Calvinistic ethic so that it became subordinated to a purely worldly struggle for success simply cannot be understood properly in terms of the fact that Calvinistic vir­tues like the work ethic and an ascetic lifestyle could become important factors in economic success. An explanation is needed as to why this ethic no longer primarily served the spiritual end of Christian sanctification *but increasingly served purely secular ends,* and that cannot be derived from Calvinistic piety.[[85]](#footnote-85)

Pannenberg's own explanation centres on the unintended conse­quences of the Reformation in Church history, politics and world history: these created the starting point for the origin of the mod­ern secular culture.

The schism ended in a period of confessionally motivated wars which, after a prelude in Germany, the Schmalkald Wars of 1546/7,extended via the Huguenot wars in France and the war which began in the Netherlands in 1566to the end of the Thirty Years' War in Germany. During the final phase of the Thirty Years' War the Puritan Revolution took place in England, be­ginning in 1640*,* which led to the execution of the English King Charles Iand the dictatorship of Cromwell, and his devastating expedition to subject Ireland in 1649and 1650.[[86]](#footnote-86)

What the religious wars sought to achieve was to impose unity of faith as people realized that religious passion destroys social peace. Gradually – the Act of Toleration was in 1689 –more and more people came to see that imposing unity had the opposite effect from that desired. They abandoned the idea that unity of religion was indispensable as foundation for the unity of society and came to see ideas of tolerance and freedom of religion as that which was needed. Confessional beliefs were to be bracketed off; the basic concepts of law, religion, morals and politics were formulated on the basis of what is universally hu­man, what Dilthey called 'the natural system'. In Pannenberg's judgment, that became the starting point for a secular culture in Europe. For him, the shift towards the secular society arose out of the compulsion of need, not out of the ideas of Renaissance and Reformation.[[87]](#footnote-87)

How does this explain why there should have been a weak­ening of faith? Pannenberg sees the first and most important con­sequence of this refounding of cultural life on that which is uni­versally human in the emancipation of the political order from any ties to Christianity. This has 'at least at times' been associ­ated with the tendency of the state in its own interest to claim supreme and unlimited authority over the lives of its citizens.

Getting closer to what I have argued elsewhere,[[88]](#footnote-88) he homes in on a further consequence of the emancipation of public life from religious ties: 'the autonomous dynamic which has been set in motion by economic developments and its dominant influence on the cultural consciousness.' The lifting of the canonical prohib­ition on usury – already ignored by the Calvinists – and the lapse of the demand that economic activity should be subordinated to other goals in the service of society and should not follow the mere pursuit of gain led to increasing autonomy for the economy. Although initially restrained in the mercantile period by state regu­lations, it cut lose under the rising wave of liberalism. Linked into industrial manufacture and technological development and research, the autonomous dynamic intensified and increasingly influenced the social system as a whole. Despite being modified by political conditions since the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant position of economics in modern society has led to a wide-ranging commercialization of cultural activity and not least to a consumer approach to culture, an approach manipu­lated through advertising. While this development is lauded as increasing the scope of individual preferences, the cost must be seen in the sense of a loss of the binding nature of the content of the cultural tradition. All consumer goods are interchangeable at will. But a consumer attitude to cultural tradition is particu­larly incompatible with a life of faith which imposes its obliga­tions and claims.[[89]](#footnote-89)

**Erosion of Community**

Since by now the erosion of communal bonds in the West has created serious conflicts even within national religions, if we wish to discover the alleged link between secularisation and the weakening of faith, perhaps we should be looking to what caused such communal erosion. Finding an answer at this level might validate the worries of religious people about secularisation. After all, what has been going forward has been something less than the march of pure, innocent, enlightened reason.

Chadwick, with whom I began this section, knows that an intellectual history must crash if not complemented by a social history. Debates on the relation of faith and reason need to be linked to a historical and social theory of modernity if they are to be fruitful. I find a move in the needed direction in Pannenberg's argument above. I would now like to pursue yet further the ques­tion of what was happening to human populations through the lived implementation of the scientific revolution. To borrow a phrase of Alisdair Maclntyre, the issue is always to determine whose jus­tice, *which* rationality was operative, what human interests were being served by it?

As Nicholas Lash recently put it, “[i]t is easy to get stuck in the world of religion and, having done so, to fail to find one's way back to the hearing of God's ad­dress and the celebration of his presence in all the ordinary places and problems of our world.”[[90]](#footnote-90)

He goes on to suggest that our deafness to God is best under­stood in terms of what the tradition called idolatry: the worship of the works of our hands. Most instances of idolatry in our world have nothing to do with religion and perusal of the Bible shows that this has always been the case.[[91]](#footnote-91) If there is an eclipse of the word and presence of God in our times, it has to do with *the* *eclipse of human community,* of personal identity and freedom *as constituted through the risk of social relationship.*

When our addictions are such as to preclude effective con­cern for our brothers and sisters,[[92]](#footnote-92) to be worried about the dwindling numbers of church-goers is—as far as faith is concerned—to be worried about the wrong things.[[93]](#footnote-93)

Weber's understanding of what effects the secularisation of the cultural forms of life lies in what he saw as the inevitable opposition of purposive-rational behaviour to traditional and value-rational behaviour: the increase of the first meant the repression of the second. The cultural rise to dominance of purposive ratio­nality in the modern world has been most closely tied to the de­velopment of capitalist economics and technology. Weber also expected the growth of industrial society to force religion more and more to the periphery of social life. This he saw as a matter of inevitable historical destiny. Weber's view has had dominant influence on the discussion of secularisation.

One one-time disciple who has come to question the master is Peter Berger. In *The Homeless* *Mind,* he argues that 'modernisation', characterized by industrialisation and bureaucratization, inevitably produces effects which hinder its further progress; it runs up against inner limits.[[94]](#footnote-94) These have to do with people's need for a meaningful world if their own lives are to be meaningful. The dynamics lead increasingly to experiences of frustration, crises of identity, feelings of homelessness in the social world.[[95]](#footnote-95) Contrary to Weber's assump­tions, we cannot count on an unlimited increase in secularisation.

What needs to be analyzed more closely is precisely what Weber terms 'purposive rationality'.

**Instrumentalized Reason**

On the 150th anniversary of the Great Hunger in my country, the 1840s are as good a point as any to examine the story of what was going forward socially. Barbara Ward suggested that a fair parallel could be drawn between the world conditions today and the situation back in the industrialized Britain of 1840, after some four decades of intensive development. The basic affinity is to be found in the manner in which increases in wealth are en­riching a small proportion of the population while the majority is actually worse off. She traces the cause of this situation to the great debates over the nature of property and the rights attaching to it in the time of Cromwell. One strand of the argument was directed against royal despotism: only private property rights could safeguard citizens against royal monopoly. The other strand was to the effect that a man had a right to property because his work alone had transformed it from its valueless state. The more radical Levellers asked, what about the workers, the harvesters who actu­ally do the work?

The sad conclusion to the debate was that servants are not more separate from a master than his arms and legs and so enjoy no separate rights. It was this definition which dominated the eigh­teenth century start to the industrial revolution. Manchester mill workers were simply "hands", a telling extension of the mistaken biological analogy. Even when people like Robert Owen provedthat bringing workers into partnership increased productivity and so profits, the leaders of the new system held to the old defini­tions. Property alone, now extended from land to capital, deter­mined who got the rewards of industrialism. The evidence is that, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the working class as a whole gained no increase in standards from the new system and the poorest were actually worse off. This is the back­ground to the Year of Revolutions, 1848.

After centuries of colonialism which developed little save the raw materials needed in the Atlantic world, we now witness on a planetary scale the imbalances of 1848. And the reasons for this remain exactly the same: a market system, *wholly uncorrected by institutions of justice, sharing and solidarity,* makes the strong stronger and the weak weaker.[[96]](#footnote-96)

But such an uncontrolled system makes for the commodification of everything. What we have seen during the last couple of hun­dred years is the rise of the idolatry of the market, which is slowly transforming the whole of creation into products to be bought and sold, commodities. We have seen the diffusion of what Karl Polanyi called "the commodity fiction", the illusion that the whole of cre­ation, land and water, and even human beings, are all commod­ities to be placed on the market to disclose their true worth.[[97]](#footnote-97) If in such a context many seem to be bothered by the absence of God, it could be because we have turned God's creation, pure gift, into commodity, and turned ourselves, made in God's image and likeness, into mere customers, consumers.

***How Plenty Vanished and Scarcity Came to Rule***

Until quite recently, it could be taken for granted that the great cycle of evaporation, condensation and precipitation fully replenished our sources of water, but overpumping for irrigation, which makes the water level drop, and pollution from industry which renders it unsafe for use, have today turned fresh water into a scarce good. For millions of years, bacteria, insects and worms have re­newed the topsoil, but pesticides \*and overuse of marginal land now accelerate the rate of erosion. So it goes for global rainfall, sun radiation, or temperature. *Plenty turned into scarcity as industrial and agricultural production were* *intensified and generalized around the globe.* The threat to survival is the result of identifying 'the good life' with availability of material products. Scarcity is the flip-side of open-ended production.

Many of those who today rally around the survival banner in the name of eco-development, accept as axiomatic the economistic culture within which all human need is translated into a claim on material production. Their concern is resource management. They continue to see all things — water, soil, animals, people, — as re­sources, that is, as having no value until they have been made into something else, as there to be exploited. They accept as true for all cultures the basic axiom that material progress must be pushed to the limits of nature, always. They thereby seal the world into everlasting scarcity and guarantee that they will never secure sur­vival.

The global injustice which is the fruit of the engineered scarcity of the recent past is thus to be perpetuated forever. We can look forward to a future centred on survival concerns which will grow progressively more repressive for the majority of peoples.

What seems beyond the imagination of development elites is a response which would take care of survival by taking the pres­sure off demand, the option of intelligent self-limitation. Since they seem completely unable to imagine different cultures that inten­tionally live on intermediate levels of material demand, they can­not but make the economic outlook appear as the natural mode of human living. They accept unquestioningly the predominant position of the economy in their present society and assume that the world's cultures converge in the steady desire for ever more material production.

The opposite is the case: all earlier societies had in common that *they aspired to something other than producing.*[[98]](#footnote-98)All people, being intelligent, work at being effective. They are willing to be effective but not efficient. Efficiency may be away off because their activity is embedded in a web of other concerns. People may spend most of their money on elaborate festivities because their work is placed within a wider cultural order of priorities. "Blowing" everything on the fiesta can mean that the value of community is affirmed above all other values. People habitually set cultural limits to production. They insist on valuing certain things for what they are in themselves, thereby refusing to sub­sume them under the category of resource to be exploited. Effi­ciency behaviour can spread only at the expense of culture-guided behaviour, at the expense of non-economic definitions of the good life.[[99]](#footnote-99)

**The Myth of Bureaucratic/Managerial Efficiency**

Alisdair Macintyre goes further in this direction by question­ing whether claimed managerial or bureaucratic efficiency is any­thing other than a moral fiction. Suppose, he suggests, that what is claimed is part of a "masquerade of social control rather than a reality," then "what we are being oppressed by is not power, but impotence.” He goes on to prove that the knowledge claims needed to validate managerial efficiency cannot be made good. [[100]](#footnote-100)

I have been describing the rise of instrumentalized reason. By this is meant a *use of* reason *which makes its compromises with the way things are in the historical world and is concerned only with doing those things more efficiently.* It parades as reason the biased irrationality whereby it calculates how to keep its edge in maintain­ing nuclear terror or comparative advantage in world economic dominance.[[101]](#footnote-101)As Habermas stressed, there is always some human interest behind the scientific stance: historically, it has been the concern for control through disengagement, denying our connect­edness with what we study. Of course, the disengagement is never total, but it does seek ultimately to disincarnate us, involving a psy­chic "numbing", a departure from a specifically human viewpoint.[[102]](#footnote-102)

The promotion of a specifically human viewpoint is the task of a healthy cultural process. Such a process can be understood as a successfully held tension between two opposed but related poles: that of spontaneous intersubjectivity, the way our lived meaning and truth evokes a living response in others, and that of commonsense practicality. The dominance of the pole of practicality leads to the undermining of the communal being of the human.

**The Eclipse of Community[[103]](#footnote-103)**

Our present predicament is that the most basic reality, that of human community, has in recent centuries been concealed by processes that have elevated the achievements of the individual to first place at the expense of the communal networks that sus­tain people. These processes played down *the interdependence of work and culture,* relegating the weak and the old to the margins of our deteriorating cities.

By contrast, the most hopeful movements of our times are the reactions against the eclipse of community. At its best the com­munalist movement highlights the sacred reality of the communal being of the human as opposed to the Western fetish of the sa­cred reality of the individual. Essentially, there are three kinds of communalism: fundamen­talist, private, and public. Of these three, the fundamentalist and private varieties remain radically individualistic.

The fundamentalist embraces the *products* of modernity while rejecting all the authentic values of the modern experiment.[[104]](#footnote-104) Thismeans that the fundamentalist will never get to critique the real problems. The ease with which fundamentalists entertain the prospect of nuclear Armageddon shows their separatist tendency. Of course, a theology whereby a human process of destruction is rationalized as a divine work makes it easier for people to live in a place like Amarillo, Texas, home of Pantex Corporation which has a lot to do with nuclear war-heads. But fundamentalism is not confined to institutional religions: the ideology of National Security is a case of fundamentalism in national religions.

Today's individualism is a *privatized* individualism, parallel to the private salvation of souls. Paradoxically, most of us rugged individuals in the Westernized world subordinate our lives to the corporate system. Our freedom is therefore fulfilled through pri­vate life-styles. But the paradox is lessened when we advert to a basic harmony between the private and corporate: both are com­mitted to accumulating money and capital. Both are devoted to possessions, making ours essentially an acquisitive society.

Since the human is essentially a communal being, even those who pursue this private style of life search for lost values of com­munity. However, these values are now sought in *support groups,* communal activism that is centred in personal interests: this fails to deal with the basic structures that are eroding communal solidarity.

The third kind, public communalism, is a broad challenge to the whole course of Western life which it sees as sustained by an unswerving commitment to control and domination. It is well ex­emplified in the black struggle which draws its vitality from the deeply rooted religious life of black people. Their churches al­ways maintained a close tie with the economic and political struggle of black people in racist America.[[105]](#footnote-105)

Another example is the Basic Christian Communities of Latin America which have spear-headed the struggle for justice in many countries. It is significant that they are essentially a lay move­ment, supported by religious leadership, something radically new, a people's church, as John Paul II called it.

**Power and Community**

Where power is conceived as control and domination, the world is a zero sum game, a place where you either win or lose but where we could never enrich each other. This view of power has been basic to the West since Bacon, Hobbes, and Machiavelli. But the inward bondedness of persons who can live only through *mutuality* shows that we have missed the truth of power in so conceiving it.[[106]](#footnote-106)

The true view of power sees it as the exercise of life (loving, working, deciding) in mutuality. Wise parents listen. Power is mutual, moving in two directions. Influence derives from mutual exchange, respect, and trust. We do not create power nor do we possess it: "we dwell in and through the communal energies that flow in life, binding us to nature, to one another and to our world.”[[107]](#footnote-107) In our work we share in the flow of power that is sustaining all life in the cosmos. Work is the unfolding of our mutual bondedness with earth and with one another. Love unfolds power in the true sense because it is the capacity to give as well as receive; it can bear opposition without breaking relationships.

Justice as right relations is basic to the biblical tradition. This is justice as the mutuality of shared being, as having to do with the very nature of things. The community's responsibility to share its food takes priority over individual claims to possession. We are angry at all injustice because "it violates the mutuality that constitutes our very being as human."[[108]](#footnote-108) In this perspective, "sin is the expropriation of the shared powers of human mutuality by persons, institutions, and nations."[[109]](#footnote-109)

The search for security *within limits* is also part of life. But instead of thriving on the mutuality of life in sharing and loving, —the only true security to be had in this world — we have attempted to master uncertainty, establishing institutions that dominate and control people and the natural world. Since control is never total, we develop paranoid illusions about the dangers those whom we have oppressed pose to us!

**Universal Solidarity, Community and Identity**

As long as we feel that the primary demand on us is to give up what is desirable in order to survive, we will never come through with the needed creativity. We need to understand that it is our own humanity that is at stake. What is happening to the others is happening because of what we are doing to ourselves. The chal­lenge to universal solidarity is the path to renewed community and a truly human identity for us.

As a missionary, I am intensely aware of the ambiguities of the modern missionary effort. A common interpretation is that Western *cultural monomania* has produced a network of depen­dent Western spiritual colonies throughout the world. This may be partly due to what Lonergan called the classicist mentality, what anthropologists call ethnocentrism, and what translates histori­cally into Western cultural arrogance. But all that I have said above suggests that what informed this practice in the modern period was a reflex of the imperatives to domination and control of an economistic culture, one which had given itself to the value of accumulation at the expense of all other human values.[[110]](#footnote-110) It was this barbarism that fuelled the savagery of the Conquest and deter­mined that it had to be Conquest and not an authentic exchange between cultures.

Correcting this involves conversion to irreducible cultural plu­ralism: not just as one value among many others but as the very basis of human survival. I understand our situation as one marked by injustice of truly global proportions. Intrinsic to this injustice is the destruction of peoples' cultural integrity, the undermining of their communal life. This is the context within which the gospel is to be proclaimed. An effective presence of the church to this situation can be nothing less than global. I am envisaging commun­ities of creative resistance, present in the many cultures of the human world, and linked in supportive solidarity. The Church is missionary of its very nature: I find this originating missionary meaning of the Church today in the promotion of such communities for the life of the world.

Our deepest need is to face otherness and difference. This must include the subjugated others within our Western European cultures and the others outside those cultures, especially the op­pressed now speaking with force and clarity. It must also include the inner reflex of all these — the tortured otherness lurking in our own psyches and cultures. To be authentic, this openness to pluralism must abandon the cherished illusion of our being the centre. There can no longer be a centre. Pluralism means a plurality of centres.

The other, named from our centre, is all too often a projected other. Typically today the projection is powered by our fear of the loss of privilege and power, or by the neo-conservative hope of another chance, or by the escapism of the post-modern non-self.[[111]](#footnote-111) The naming of the other that is controlled by such motiv­ation is invariably self-serving.

The liberal humanist notion of Culture as a matter of aesthet­ics was invented to marginalise people like the Irish. It offered an aesthetic mythic resolution to real historical contradictions. Fortu­nately for us, the Irish literary tradition largely resisted using the aesthetic as totalizing solution to the conflict of universal and particular. At its best, our tradition expresses and heightens one side of the contradiction, the irreducible uniqueness of a people in the teeth of that abstract universalism that is taken to be the very hallmark of modernity.[[112]](#footnote-112)

How can we creatively promote our authentic identity in the face of such abstract universalism? Politically, we begin with cer­tain needs and desires. These open us to engage with some broader social dimension:

...and what is posed within this dimension is the question of *what general conditions would be* *necessary for our particular needs**and desires* to *be fulfilled.* Mediated through the general in this way, particular demands cease to be self-identical and return to themselves transformed by a discourse of the other. The feminist, nationalist, or trade unionist might now come to recognize that in the long run none of their desires is realizable without the fulfilment of the others![[113]](#footnote-113)

I am suggesting that, for us, "mediating through the general" means allowing our concerns to be thought through by listening to the voice of the Third World. I believe that concern for the present and future of other peoples leads us to redefine the shape of a solution to our own acute problems.

There is a universality involved in such communicative praxis but it is very different from that of a closed system. The universal­ity which was the hallmark of modernity made its own cultural product normative for everybody else. But true universality does not place normativity in any *product* ofour intelligence and rea­son. It finds it in the praxis of raising ever further relevant ques­tions. It is a universality constituted by a permanent willingness to be put in question and it is *mediated* through the plurality of per­sons and communities communicating and questioning. Such uni­versality is coherent but always incomplete.[[114]](#footnote-114)

If a community creates its identity and produces its national myth by relying exclusively on its own experience, it will never be able to make room for the other as other.[[115]](#footnote-115)

The other will always be seen as enemy, rival, opponent. The only way to avoid this is to *define ourselves dialogically from the start.* Of course, the self-understanding of the other may be in need of critique. Then we have to reject their present self-under­standing but we must relate to those moments within them which promote a self-understanding worthy of our respect and dialogue. The easiest way for us to develop authentic identity is through solidarity with those in other collectivities who are striving to ar­ticulate *their* identity in dialogical fashion, in openness to the demands of justice towards all groups.

**Responsibility of the Churches**

Unfortunately, the churches are weak here. Over centuries they have erred in defining themselves non-dialogically, in exclu­sive reliance on their own heritage. In the long term, this led them always to see the other as enemy.[[116]](#footnote-116) Chadwick remarks that the first usage of the word "secularisation" in its modern sense coincides with the word "anti-clericalism". This clue is worth ex­ploring. It suggests a possible responsibility for the shape of some of the evils of modernity in the ecclesiastical patterns of the pre­modern world.[[117]](#footnote-117)

While there is no denying the scandalous involvement of the Church in the culture of the Renaissance where it set the example in enthroning the disvalue of accumulation, most historians today reject the thesis of Weber, taken up by Tawney, naming Protestantism as the religion of capitalism.[[118]](#footnote-118) A more sweeping charge was made some years ago when Jay Forrester labelled Christianity the reli­gion of exponential growth, holding it responsible for the ecologi­cal crisis of our times.[[119]](#footnote-119) His argument as it stands has been decis­ively rebutted by Matthew Lamb.[[120]](#footnote-120)

**Sacralism and Instrumental Rationality**

But Lamb draws attention to a different level of Church re­sponsibility for the predominance of instrumentalized reason than that envisaged by Forrester. He points out that there is a kind of sacralism that began quite early in Church history. It involved a suppression of freedom and creativity, an increasing demand for uniformity, the development of a clerically dominated institution. It showed itself in a concern for the poor which despite goodwill failed to come to terms with social issues. The resultant mystifica­tion of sacrament and authority changes these from being supreme moments of creative freedom into means of instrumental action, i.e., ways of getting things done, rather than of serving creative forces among the participants.

To critique our present situation as Church demands that the identification of God's truth and presence with a hierarchical sys­tem of priesthood and teaching be acknowledged and criticised. In Christ God is identified with the *powerless and the poor.* But Christians did not live in such negativity. In practice they began to identify the Kingdom of God with the Christian Churches, the interest of God with those of the rich and powerful. Such a deadly identification led to the crusades and wars of religion and those who raised prophetic voices were liable to be burned for their pains.

Unfortunately, the secular reaction to all this failed to find the source of the distortions in the human hankering after domi­native power.[[121]](#footnote-121) Reacting to the wars of religion, it saw religion *rather than war* as the problem. It thereby inherited the disease. The illusion of a God identical with ecclesiastical system has been replaced by the illusion of a *humanity identical with political-economic institutions.* The empirical sciences initially did a good critical job in bringing to light the repressed truth of the material and social world, a truth which could not emerge within the categor­izing consciousness that passed for rationality at the time. But they have fallen prey to bureaucracy and social manipulation and now feed in to the second illusion at great cost to human beings.[[122]](#footnote-122) Their value-free methodology led to social functionalism and thera­pies of "adjustment" to "reality". Politics degenerates towards amoral forms of social engineering governed by dictates of instrumental­ized reason.[[123]](#footnote-123)

***The Restoration of Cultural Integrity***

Recent analysis on the resurgence of capitalism highlights its ability to fold back into itself all desire through a rearrangement of needs. It asserts that the coercive power proper to capitalism is that of the management of human desire: "a levelling of subjec­tivity through the levelling of the modes in which the subject can represent herself and her world."[[124]](#footnote-124) The major event of social his­tory in the second half of this century is surely the manner in which electronic communications have generated mass audience culture, colonizing the social space available to the ordinary per­son for reading, discussion, and critical thought. Contrary to the proclaimed goal of making culture democratic, the effect has been the restriction of the capacity of persons to produce their own culture in the widest sense of the term.

If this is so, how can we break out of it? Is it possible for us to restore our undermined cultural integrity? How is it possible to live out the finality of Christ in a world where the meaning of all that happens is none other than the equivalence of exchange itself?

The limits of practical common sense — now so closely iden­tified with instrumentalized reason — lead to the necessity of attending to what transcends practicality: delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow. Culture is this human freedom to raise the questions and reflect, feel, and act in ways which satisfy both human intelligence and the human heart. We need to free our imaginations and hearts from market dependency. We need to affirm and develop the blessings that cannot be market dominated. We need to become inflexible in relation to what we are willing to do without in the interest of what we value more.

Such retrieval of cultural integrity will manifest itself in changed, more localized, political and economic structures. Braudel tells us that capitalism "was born of the authoritarian organization of a region that was simply too vast. It would not have grown to be as sturdy in a restricted area, and it might not have grown at all if cheap labor had not been available.”[[125]](#footnote-125) We have to make our own the Christian inheritance of the European socialists and Christian democrats with their commitment to subsidiarity, federalism, and limited intervention as the only tried and practical ways to mod­erate the destructive social effects of the free flow of international capital.[[126]](#footnote-126) But we must do much more.

If we are to help redeem human life so endangered by the modern fetishism of commodity-experience which engenders the myriad victims who cannot ever buy, we must work with all those groups in the Third World seeking to break the hold of late capi­talism on the social options of their countries.

Moralistic appeals to the common good, subsidiarity, and a just wage are hardly sufficient. Nothing less will suffice than the attempt to develop a new macro-economic knowledge of the produc­tion process, to be placed at the service of the values incarnate in agapic praxis and prophetic narratives.[[127]](#footnote-127)

Industrialization and technology can be responsibly used for the humanization of society and the world only in so far as the relations of production, i.e., the relations of human beings with nature and with each other, are constituted by intelligent open­ness and critical responsibility.[[128]](#footnote-128)

Restoring moral concern to political life will involve elaborat­ing the dialectic of redemption and political emancipation. Such dialectical discernment begins by calling attention to how very differently the processes of secularisation are received by the vic­tims of modern history whose right to live is continually being threatened. The aim of such discernment is to strengthen the tra­dition of human and civil rights against the defense mechanisms of the present political order. Faced with human suffering, the political order tends to advocate technocracy and its dictates as sole source of hope, or to blame the victims for being victims, or even, at the extreme, to deny human freedom and dignity.

Life as death/resurrection calls us to a co-suffering with the victims in their struggles to transcend victimhood. Such transfor­mative human living goes under the name of *solidarity of and with the victims.* It reveals a transformation of values which brings grace out of sin, life out of death, wisdom out of folly. It reveals our presumed rationality as irrationality, our knowledge as born of fear, not love, and geared to manipulation and exploitation, not to nurturance and freedom. Such solidarity can save us in the sense of keeping us human. It alone can lead us to the freedom to imagine alternatives to our present addictions and to re-define more faithfully the humanly desirable.

Against instrumentalized reason, we need a kind of knowing born of an empowering, life-giving love which heals the biases needlessly victimizing millions of our brothers and sisters. Against such instrumentalized reason, we need a rationality which allows itself to have a history, which shows itself to be ever open to further questioning, listens to the cry of the earth and its victim­ized peoples, is prepared to define as irrational its hitherto cher­ished projects when confronted with the dehumanizing consequences of those projects. The cries of the victims are the voice of God. If our political, social, economic, cultural and ecclesiastical preoc­cupations deafen us to this voice, we are already embarked on a descent into hell and need look for no peace in the way ahead for us and our children.

Perhaps what Primo Levi said of us is true:

"...we too are so dazzled by power and money as to forget our essential fragility, forget that all of us are in the ghetto, that the ghetto is fenced in, that beyond the fence stand the lords of death, and not far away the train is waiting."[[129]](#footnote-129)

In my desire in this chapter to name the basic issue and hint at what is demanded for its solution, I fear that I may just now have created the impression that my book has come to an end before it rightly began. But if the argument is to have any hope of convincing people it needs to go beyond the assertions of the closing section above to the critical grounding of such assertions. The really outstanding challenge is to develop explanatory per­spective on the human good. The next chapter is an effort to move toward such perspective.

IV

Towards an Explanatory Understanding of Development

*The truth yields to nothing except growth; it has no method which does not correspond to the method of the rose — which is but to grow.*

*—* Laurens van der Post

**Development: Time for an Obituary?**

My strictures in the last chapter on what devel­opment has meant for the last forty-nine years, raise questions about the appearance of the word in the heading of the present chapter. The term and its related semantic field have been sub­jected to devastating critique in a recent work where the editor andhis contributors argue that continued use of the language has now become self-defeating.[[130]](#footnote-130) But the authors stress that their conscious focus is development as a particular cast of mind. They know of the extent to which it is linked to the myth of progress. They must then know that the mere suppression of the *word* will never of itself cure people of this mind-set.

They point to the extent to which every critique of develop­ment over the last forty years was co-opted in service of prolong­ing its hegemony. Every attack on developmental politics was twisted into a justification of increased managerial responsibility for the lords of growth. Their critique merits detailed attention.

***The United Nations Commissions***

Over a six-year period the United Nations set up three inde­pendent commissions to report on what was coming to be seen as a common crisis: the Brandt Commission, set up in 1977 which produced two reports, *North-South, a* *Programme for Survival* (1980) and *Common Crisis* (1983); the Palme Commission, established in 1980 which reported within two years on *Common* *Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (1982) and the Brundtland Commis­sion on Environment and Development, set up in 1984 which produced *Our Common Future* (1987). While many disturbing truths were articulated in the analytic parts of these documents, even more disturbing was their failure to follow through with the rec­ommendations logically implied by such truths.

Despite their technical insight and expertise, the Brandt Re­ports fail to question the appropriateness of the model of develop­ment.

The interdependence created by the market is looked to as the basis for asserting mutual interests among nations.

Whoever wants a bigger slice of an international economic cake cannot seriously want it to become smaller. Developing countries cannot ignore the economic health of industrialized countries.[[131]](#footnote-131)

But the fallacy underlying the mutual interests of all parties North and South alleged by Brandt could not remain ideologically cloaked for long. The economists' doctrine of comparative advan­tage was to the effect that the general well-being would increase if each nation specialized in doing things at which nature and history had made it most proficient. But the very notion of com­parative advantage has been rendered inoperative by the relatively new situation of high capital mobility, which makes *absolute* ad­vantage the determining factor as to where production is to be located.[[132]](#footnote-132) Such a doctrine ignores the unequal terms on which various players are forced to participate.

The Palme Commission report begins with the promising in­sight that 'military strength alone cannot provide real security.'[[133]](#footnote-133) But instead of going on to develop a whole new theory of secu­rity its subsequent analysis is mostly concerned with military strength. The needed new theory would clarify the connections between military, civil, economic and ecological security.[[134]](#footnote-134) Some elements have already been explored. Thus, the pursuit of economic secu­rity lay behind the strategy of *another development* initiated by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in 1975.[[135]](#footnote-135) It is about people defining and controlling their development process in a manner that is consonant with their own culture and traditions, and that is environmentally sustainable. It has gone through many refinements over the years, culminating in the 1989 work under Manfred MaxNeef[[136]](#footnote-136) and is, I think, unjustly criticized by Wolfgang Sachs[[137]](#footnote-137) as simply helping to pluralize the roads to growth.

But, perhaps, the alleged pattern is present in its most discon­certing form in regard to *Our Common* *Future* precisely because this report set out to relate the theme of development to that of environmental deterioration. It concluded that rich industrialized countries were destroying the environment through the economic activity needed to sustain the high consumption lifestyles of their peoples, while the poor people of non-industrialized countries were destroying their environment in their struggle to stay alive.

It went on to examine the implications of these findings in very great detail, putting forward many recommendations which would certainly help to lessen the problem if implemented. It val­ues voluntary organisations, making effective citizen participation in political decision-making one of its criteria for what it terms sustainable development.[[138]](#footnote-138) It wants to decentralise the management of resources upon which local communities depend and advo­cates help for smaller rural producers:

Smallholders, including – indeed especially – women, must be given preference when allocating scarce resources, staff and credit. Small farmers must also be more involved in formulating agri­cultural policies.[[139]](#footnote-139)

Sustainable development is its proffered solution and it de­fines it as that which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[[140]](#footnote-140) Then it makes one major error. Almost incomprehensi­bly, having already revealed in its analysis two quite different causes of environmental destruction – over-consumption in rich coun­tries, poverty in poor countries – it recommends a *single* solution to the problem. This solution is further economic growth.

What is needed now is a new era of economic growth... It is essential that global economic growth be revitalised. In practi­cal terms, this means more rapid economic growth in both in­dustrial and developing countries, freer market access for the products of developing countries, lower interest rates, greater technology transfer and significantly larger capital flows, both concessional and commercial.[[141]](#footnote-141)

Paul Ekins is surely justified in calling this pure conventional developmentalism of the Brandt variety.[[142]](#footnote-142)Nowhere in the report is there a clear statement as to how sustainable economic growth is to be recognized and distinguished from the dominant variety. Since we have no single instance of an environmentally sustain­able industrial economy anywhere in the world, it is not clear that the new slogan is anything more than an oxymoron.

But Ekins does not stop at a destructive critique. He under­takes to give needed content to the phrase by setting out the con­ditions of sustainability. In doing this he effectively undermines the case for continued growth in the rich countries.

Enough by way of clarifying what I do not intend to evoke. In what follows, *nothing* of the meaning given in the conventional language of development is assumed as a starting-point. So, far from accepting the legitimacy of the official discourse, the posi­tion I hope to present offers the opportunity to think our way out of diseased mind-sets by clarifying the oversights by which we got ourselves into such beliefs in the first place. It is not enough to draw attention to the bad effects of beliefs so dearly held: that has been done often enough and only resulted in the endless side­stepping so devastatingly critiqued by Wolfgang Sachs and his companions. I believe it to be both possible and necessary to outline a heuristic of authentic human development.

**The Human Good: Formulating the Question**

Perhaps I can begin to edge towards the alternative horizon with the help of John le Carré, a writer whose sensitivity to the moral ambiguities of our times has often been remarked on. Un­derstandably reluctant to let go of his most famous creation, he recently resurrected George Smiley yet again to give us his ver­dict on the end of the Cold War.[[143]](#footnote-143) The context is a farewell ad­dress to young people being initiated into the spy game. Smiley begins by warning them of the death of their own natures that could result from the manipulation of others, and the truncation of their natural feeling: "Please don't ever imagine you'll be un­scathed by the methods you use... there is a price to pay, and the price does tend to be oneself." So, far from accepting the rhetoric of victory, he claims that, "perhaps, without the bonds of ideo­logical conflict to restrain us anymore, our troubles are just begin­ning." And then comes the final word:

*‘Man,* not the mass, is what our calling is about. It was *man* who ended the Cold War, in case you didn't notice. It wasn't weapons, or technology, or armies or campaigns. Not even West­ern man either, as it happened, but our sworn enemy in the East, who went into the streets, faced the bullets and the batons and said: we've had enough. It was *their* Emperor, not ours, who had the nerve to mount the rostrum and declare he had no clothes. And the ideologies trailed after these impossible events like condemned prisoners, as ideologies do when they've had their day. Because they have no heart of their own. They're the whores and angels of our striving selves. One day, history may tell us who really won. If a democratic Russia emerges, why then, Russia will have been the winner. And if the West chokes onits own materialism, then the West may still turn out to have been the loser… Sometimes there are no winners at all. And sometimes nobody needs to lose… It's not only our minds we're going to have to reconstruct either. It's the over-mighty modern State we have built for our­selves as a bastion against something that is not there any more. We've given up far too many freedoms in order to be free. Now we've got to take them back.’[[144]](#footnote-144)

I recall another extraordinary Polish novel of the sixties which was prophetic in its analysis of our blind spots: Stanislaw Lem's *Solaris*.[[145]](#footnote-145) This extraordinary classic of science fiction centres on the danger of our (culpable?) unawareness of the complexity of our own subjectivity, the falsity of the cover-story we tell our­selves about our real motivation and the consequent distortion of the meaning of our historical projects.

We think of ourselves as Knights of the Holy Contact. This is another lie. We are only seeking Man. We have no need of other worlds. We need mirrors. We don't know what to do with other worlds. A single world, our own, suffices us; but we can't accept it for what it is. We are searching for an ideal image of our own world: we go in quest of a planet, of a civilization superior to our own but developed on the basis of a prototype of our primeval past. At the same time there is something inside us which we don't like to face up to, from which we try to protect ourselves, but which nevertheless re­mains, since we don't leave Earth in a state of primal inno­cence..."(72)

Alongside these, consider Bernard Lonergan's reflections on what he calls the general bias of our common sense and its cor­responding longer cycle of decline. Leaving clarification of what these terms mean for Lonergan until a later section, I quote his insistence that,

for people trapped into this bias, reality is the economic development, the military equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive State. Its ends justify all means. Its means include not merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down the moral conscience and exploiting the secret affects of civilized man, but also the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and tor­ture, of concentration camps, of transported and extirpated mi­norities, and of total war.[[146]](#footnote-146)

The neglect of subjectivity referred to by Lem and the moral breakdown of the political which is the backdrop to most of leCarré's novels are key issues addressed in the lifework of Bernard Lonergan. My own interest in this work came from discovering how intensely practical Lonergan's concern was.[[147]](#footnote-147)

**The Nature of Lonergan's Achievement**

For him, coming to grips with our times called for an ad­equate understanding of what is going forward in the historical process. What he undertook to provide was a critically grounded hermeneutic of the historical process, where the critical ground­ing is to be found in our appropriation of the normative dynamics of our own consciousness.

The very advance of our knowledge has provided a power over nature and people "too vast and terrifying to be entrusted to the good intentions of unconsciously biased minds."[[148]](#footnote-148) Carved into the stone of the Stoa in Athens was the motto *gnothi s'auton —* know thyself. People have always known that self-knowledge was the key to emancipation and enlightenment. All that is new today is the level of self-knowledge that is required if we are to survive. David Tracy, while stressing the transpositions involved, has re­cently characterised Lonergan's achievement as the return of an­cient practice.[[149]](#footnote-149) Again, the key to enlightenment has always been self-transcendence. What is peculiar to our situation is the com­prehensiveness of the self-transcendence that is required.[[150]](#footnote-150)

From a more restricted time perspective, the significance of Bernard Lonergan's achievement lies in its showing how the cen­turies-long philosophic search called "the turn to the subject" can be brought to fruitful resolution. This search can be read as a tortuous attempt, involving many dead-ends, to thematise human authenticity. Resolving the debate about development in our times is contingent on just such an achievement.

Lonergan's initial and overriding concern was to provide a philosophy of history capable of correcting the operative versions deriving from Hegel that have affected the lives of so many Rus­sians, Chinese and others. Hegel had ambitioned nothing less than a misconceived mediation of totality. Lonergan invites us to work instead towards appropriating a totality of mediation, a task which can, of course, only be asymptotically realized.[[151]](#footnote-151) He wrote recur­rently on this theme for forty years, resolutely refusing to ambition more than an heuristic determination of the human good.[[152]](#footnote-152)

He saw the distorting roots of modernity's ills as deriving from the nominalist and conceptualist decline of the achievement of an earlier age and set about doing justice to the level of thought and understanding of that earlier achievement. This occasioned the long years spent "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas" and his own profound transformation as a result of that reaching. The heart of this transformation was a conscious knowing of the performance of an Aquinas, impossible without heightened awareness of the performance of his own mind. And it is precisely this achieve­ment of Lonergan which uncovered the normative dynamics of our conscious reach, the knowledge of the subject as subject, the needed self-transformation of philosophy in our times.

To facilitate the same breakthrough for others, he wrote *In­sight.* And the overriding practical concern shapes that work also. The book moves through modern scientific understanding to a generalized heuristic of the myriad instances of common sense. He has remarked that the chapters on common sense (six and seven), along with the chapters on judgment, are, for him, espe­cially significant. These are the chapters that forge critical correctives to much of modern social theory and practice.[[153]](#footnote-153) They are also the chapters most relevant to adequate understanding of on-going his­torical process.

What Lonergan clarified in these chapters was the nature of historical causality.

In his striving to meet the needs of true practicality, Lonergan came to recognize that he had initiated generalized empirical method:

Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.[[154]](#footnote-154)

Elsewhere he provided a less cryptic summary, explaining how his awareness of contemporary mathematics and science

brought to light... a generalized empirical method that covers the learning process of common sense, the procedures of em­pirical science, the ways of historical scholarship, and the philo­sophical grounding of the objectivity of human knowledge. This grounding is placed in authentic subjectivity. It challenges the once seductive implementation of reason through experimental science. It invites thoughtful men and women to the self-under­standing and self-appropriation that can follow from a height­ened awareness of their own powers of attention, their own intelligence, their own reasonableness, their own conscientiousness. It founds a methodology that not only accounts for the diversity of specializations but also stresses the historicity of their past development and promotes their future interaction and collabo­ration.[[155]](#footnote-155)

Put more simply, for Lonergan empirical now means an ori­entation to data which attends to both the data of sense and the data of consciousness. We are invited by his achievement to a significant advance in appropriating the truth of our own self- and world-constitution.

***Genetic Method and Specifically Human Development***

Lonergan treats the issue of human development under the head­ing of Genetic Method.[[156]](#footnote-156) We have been forced to develop genetic method by the fact of the existence in our world of processes which are in accord with neither classical law nor statistical law. The heu­ristic assumption of genetic method lies in the notion of develop­ment. Implicit in this notion is the movement from generic indeter­minacy towards specific perfection. As well as this general move­ment or direction, there is also a general mode of operation: the intelligibility of an emerging sequence lies in the way each successive higher integration modifies the lower manifold it systematizes so as to call forth the next higher integration in the sequence.

Within what kind of 'field' can development occur? What kind of universe can make such a process possible? Lonergan suggests that it can be understood within a framework of generalized emergent probability. This clarification of the kind of intelligibility to be found in our universe seems to me to be one of the most impor­tant contributions to have been made by Lonergan. Emergent prob­ability is "the successive realization of the possibilities of con­crete situations in accord with their probabilities."[[157]](#footnote-157)

Whereas in the plant there is the single development of the organism, in the animal there is the two-fold development of the organism and the psyche, and, in the human, the three-fold de­velopment of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence.

The distinction between the meaning of development at the pre-human level and its meaning at the human level is what most needs to be illuminated. Not that understanding of development at pre-human levels is irrelevant for our understanding of human develop­ment. Essentially the same heuristic structure that applies to organic development is applicable to the study of the psyche and of intelli­gence.[[158]](#footnote-158) Further, organic, psychic, and intellectual development are not three independent processes: they are interlocked, with the in­tellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic, while the psychic provides a higher integration of the organic. Still, the differ­ence in the integration effected at the intellectual level is vast:

The higher system of intelligence develops not in a material manifold but in the psychic representation of material mani­folds. Hence the higher system of intellectual development is primarily the higher integration, not of the man in whom the development occurs, but of the universe that he inspects.[[159]](#footnote-159)

Non-human development is not immanently guided by intelli­gence. It simply follows the patterns determined by the linked sequence of operators in their flexible unfolding under a range of 'external' conditions. But in human development, the *operators themselves are intelligent.* Human development is effected through a sequence of *questions and answers* and understanding the im­manent intelligibility of the sequence is what is required of us if we are to appropriate our own act of knowing. Since the funda­mental operator is the *unrestricted* desire to know, answers are met with further questions until there are ‘no further relevant questions’ on any particular topic.[[160]](#footnote-160) What is revealed to us is a universe of being in which our desires and fears are but infinitesi­mal components in the history of humankind; a universe to which we can belong and in which we can function only by "de-centring" ourselves and sharing a destiny with all else.

*Creative Tension of Limitation and Transcendence*

The fullness of Lonergan's treatment defies useful summary here but I want to focus on one of the laws of development which he unpacks called the law of limit and transcendence. It is, he tells us, a law of tension. It comes to light in his understanding of finality as a reality as real as anything else in our world: it is grasped in the affirmation of dynamism, of a general directedness to fuller intelligi­bility and systematization, and of the attainment of ever greater but never complete fullness through an effective probability.[[161]](#footnote-161)

The tension between limit and transcendence is inherent in the finality of all that exists in our world. Every instance of devel­opment is development inasmuch as it involves a going beyond the initial subject. Such going beyond cannot be in accord with law, with settled spontaneity, with existing schemes of recurrence, because it involves the introduction of a new law, a new sponta­neity, a new scheme. What something needs to become must be in tension with what it is, that which tends to inertial repetition and recurrence. In the case of the human this becomes a con­scious tension.

Human psychic sensitivity is itself a living and developing. It is one and the same "I" that unfolds at this level as at any other. But at this level its characteristics are those of self-attachment and self-interest. The same self "as inquiring and reflecting, as con­ceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness."[[162]](#footnote-162) Now the radical opposition between these sets of attributes cannot be abolished. We can no more divest ourselves of our sexuality than we can of our intelligence. The point of departure for the higher integration which marks entry into the world of being is *perma­nent* in the self-centred sensitive psyche, and failure to remain in touch with this point of departure condemns the effort of intelli­gent inquiry and creative living to futility. The creative tension between limitation and transcendence must be embraced.

In Robert Doran's formulation the movement of our consciousness uncovered by Lonergan in *Insight* can be identified as the search for direction in the movement of life. The tidal wave of the passionateness of being is the very movement of life itself. The entire ongoing process of self-transcendence, the movement of life in us, embraces the levels of intentional opera­tion *in a more inclusive whole.* The normative source of meaning lies in more than intelligence and intentional operations: it lies in the creative tension between these and an "autonomous but re­lated movement of life that begins before intentional operations, in neural processes and psychic imagery and affect, and that reaches beyond intentional operations in a total being-in-love in families, in communities, and with God.”[[163]](#footnote-163)

*Limitation, Transcendence and Dialectics*

The proximate possibility of thought on the concrete univer­sal that is humankind in its historical unfolding lies, for Lonergan, in a "theory of development that can envisage not only natural and intelligible progress but also sinful decline,"[[164]](#footnote-164) not only progress and decline but also the recovery made possible by religiously-mediated, self-sacrificing love. The age of innocence ended for us with the realization that human authenticity could not be taken for granted.[[165]](#footnote-165) The challenge then became “discovering what hu­man authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it.”[[166]](#footnote-166) No ac­count of human history which fails to give centrality to the pres­ence or absence of human authenticity can hope to be adequate. The problem of liberation "lies in an incapacity for sustained de­velopment."[[167]](#footnote-167) Sustaining development is, once again, a process of transcendence. But transcendence is now understood to occur with the recurrence of the dynamic structure of our questioning, the normativity of which can be expressed in the transcendental im­peratives: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. The problem of liberation occurs, then, when the structure fails to recur. While this preliminary attempt to give some sense of the nature of Lonergan's achievement is unavoidably selective and fragmentary, perhaps enough has been said to make what follows intelli­gible.

**The Human Good: A Heuristic Account**

Mention was made in the previous chapter of the horrific wars of religion which constituted historical context for the birth of the modern period. It is understandable, if regrettable, that this con­text contributed to the rise of two unquestioned presuppositions on which practically all modern Western philosophers agreed. Together they constitute massive blocks to intelligent pursuit of the human good. The first presupposition sees all natural and his­torical realities as ultimately conflictive; the second conceives of knowledge as power to control. Thus, Max Weber saw social or­ganization as always involving domination *(Herrschaft),* while Habermas assumes that empirical-analytic sciences are invariably and properly informed with instrumentalist interests in technically dominating nature since "the human species secures its existence in systems of social labor and self-assertion through violence.”[[168]](#footnote-168) Earlier, Hegel's dialectic of master-slave posited violence as an intrinsic component of human relationships: sublation *(Aufhebung)* is a movement toward preservation and elevation only through negation.[[169]](#footnote-169) It is as if the human being, faced with enormous evil, succumbs to the negative by giving it a necessary role. Each of the three masters of suspicion, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, seems to have done this. Of course, none of the three was eager to apply his totalizing explanation to his own work.[[170]](#footnote-170) John Keane notes how this "thoroughly modern belief that violence is inevi­table" accounts for the disturbing silence of contemporary politi­cal theorists on the topic of violence. What exceptions there are tend, significantly, to be women.[[171]](#footnote-171)

One of the casualties of these two assumptions is the truth that group endeavour and culture as collectively generated mean­ings and values are conditions of knowledge. If we take the monadic individual as our starting-point, it will blind us to the fact that human growth is a group enterprise, as well as to the fact that the condition of possibility of our working together is that we can believe one another.

It is arguable that another major casualty is present inability to ground our discourse of human rights. Alisdair Maclntyre has stated flatly that there is no such thing as human rights.[[172]](#footnote-172) He means that every attempt in modern times to ground them, i.e., give good reasons for them, has failed. For him, they are moral fictions that purport (but fail) to give us objective and impersonal criteria. Much of modern ethical debate is characterized by emotivism and Maclntyre shows that the move to emotivism in ethics is tied to the emergence of the "disconnected" individual, conceived as in­telligible prior to and therefore independently of his social and historical imbeddedness. This, he argues, is the foundation for the far-reaching split between fact and value in modern thought. And, indeed, as far back as we can go, some context has always been supposed by the theme of virtue: it has been the structure of the human good in the concreteness of a social order and ultimately of a comprehensive world order. Maclntyre's insights are in need of more systematic development.

*Moral Knowledge as Irreducibly Social*

The writings of Kenneth Melchin have been concerned to ar­ticulate moral reflection within an adequate perspective on the human good.[[173]](#footnote-173) This demands that we rethink moral knowledge as irreducibly social. Melchin reveals the misconception involved in traditional approaches which envisioned the goal of ethics as ar­riving at appropriating the conditions of individual moral acts which could be described in terms of their perceptible outward form. Prescriptive notions like good, evil, right, wrong, progress, decline, are essentially dynamic notions pertaining to patterns of changes in human living. As dynamic they do not pertain to individual acts taken in their individuality: they intend the total set of rela­tionships expressed by the movement from social recurrence schemes which define historical contexts, through types of action, towards intended goals and foreseeable consequences.

There is a related misunderstanding of autonomy and liberty in the present moral climate: a failure to see them as *socially conditioned* goods. The consequence is that we have come to conceive morality, justice and rights in terms of a priori optic categories pertaining to individuals, which ground our claims on society. We think it is the function of such rights to secure a personal sphere within which we can pursue our individual de­sires. Having abandoned the hope of reconciling these desires with others, we live out a lifelong adversarial relationship to others. As long as these misconceptions of morality prevail, we will remain blind to the social recurrence schemes which ground our claims for justice and rights and which make demands upon the content of these claims.[[174]](#footnote-174) The theoretical roots of the escalating dynamics of fear and distrust in our societies are not seen. Cooperative living comes to be seen as a silly ideal and all hope is then placed on laws, third-party institutions, equitable distribution of power, or brute force to reverse the cycle of decline.

*Beyond the Individualist Reduction*

Neither Judaism nor Christianity can accept these two funda­mental presuppositions. The guiding symbol of good creation in these traditions precludes the possibility of contradictions being inherent to the process. Rights are based, for Lonergan, not upon a monadic individualism in which all are fighting each, as with Hobbes, but rather upon the intelligible unity of humankind. This intelligible unity unfolds, through material multiplicity, to the in­telligible multiplicity of personalities. Historical causality, for Lonergan, is a matter of how each and every human person is within the totality of interpersonal relationships constituting hu­man history.[[175]](#footnote-175) Our experiences are embedded within the flow of human action in history, intrinsically related to complex schemes of recurrence. If anything is *not* our own, it is our experience. With every neuron in ourselves we are immersed within the sta­tistically predetermined flow. And so also our ideas are not our own, or, if they are, then they are either incidental, or they are aspects of a new movement within human history. Attention to insight-mediating experiences and ideas would lead us to be more awareof how deeply our personal insights are communal.[[176]](#footnote-176) Thepast lives on in ways we have hardly begun to understand. The concrete universal that is humankind embraces all historical time, and this is the human and historical becoming in which we live and know and act.[[177]](#footnote-177)

The universality that is concretely existent in historically ex­isting people is not opposed to the myriad flowering of countless profoundly different cultures: it provides their matrix. Yet this es­capes being historicist, for the concrete universality of cultural creativity is constituted by human operations which are norma­tive.

**Heuristic of Authentic Human Social Development**

Nobody gets to choose the point of their entry into ongoing world history. Our embeddedness in nature and history is *intrin­sic* to the making of ourselves. Between the biologically inherited neural processes and the historically inherited patterns of experi­ence[[178]](#footnote-178) there functions the endopsychic censor. This term is Freud's but Lonergan effects a needed transposition of Freud's work. He illuminates the oversight whereby the psychic censorship is as­sumed to be always repressive, in permanent conflict with the self-correcting process of learning. The source of actual conflict, the perversion of the censor from a constructive to a repressive function, is recognised as due to aberrations of human *understanding.* For the resulting distortions Lonergan uses the rather innocuously-sounding word "bias". For the aberration of the psychic censor­ship prior to conscious attention whereby it becomes repressive rather than constructive he uses the term *dramatic* bias: for the alienated conscious performance conditioned by the repression of the censor's constructive functioning, the term *individual* bias. Contra Freud, there is no primordial conflict between desire and the un­conscious. The conflict results from the repression induced by dramatic bias.

Neither is social living marked by primordial conflict. Stress­ing the originally constructive shape of social living, Lonergan effects asimilar transposition of Marx's work. Conflict is not endemic. Desires for basic goods are recurrent and so also is the co-opera­tive labour which seeks to meet them. For Marx, social coopera­tion and the division of labour result from domination and con­flict. Behind this is the assumption named above according to which human beings have basically conflictive relations with *na­ture* and among themselves. Marx could only speak of genuine freedom, even under communism, *after* labour had procured par­ticular goods or basic necessities.

Lonergan has no difficulty in accepting the schemes of per­sonal and social recurrence uncovered by Freud and Marx as con­ditioning the drama of life in the patterns of alienation they ana­lyzed. The privileged group "is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end."[[179]](#footnote-179) This blocking of new insights and of needed eco­nomic and political development is termed by Lonergan *group* bias. Group bias gives rise to shorter cycles of decline but these tend towards their own reversal: the tension of community can be relied on to achieve this. What calls for correction in Marx and Freud is their totalizing of the negative reality they have uncov­ered. He finds in their respective *performances a* commitment to the values of reflective understanding which is a lived rebuttal of such totalization. Their own work exemplifies how the dynamic orientation of intelligence is capable of transcending false con­sciousness: it is simply not possible for the whole of conscious­ness to be false.

***Community within Socially Structured Society***

The desire that gives birth to intersubjective communities lives on, in that community *generates* society. Recurrent desires gener­ate labour and recurrent labour, when informed with human co‑operation, recurrently generates practical intelligence. This gives rise to the development of technologies which in turn evoke econo­mies with complex patterns of production, capital formation, and consumption. Increasing complexity means that human coopera­tion cannot be taken for granted and gives rise to a recurrent need to generate effective agreement. This, for Lonergan, is the function of the institution of politics. Politics is meant to promote consensus in the service of practical and intelligent cooperation.

On this analysis, technological schemes of recurrence condi­tion economic schemes of recurrence, which in turn condition polities and politics. The materialist reduction fails to see how a non-dominative practical intelligence informs patterns of coopera­tion which give rise to the interlocking schemes of recurrence making up technologies, economies and polities that constitute what Lonergan calls "a good of order". But, contrary to a wide­spread mis-understanding, by this is not meant the good of an automatically functioning system. The good of order is concretely a good only to the extent that the cooperation ensures "the recur­rence of all effectively desired instances of the particular good," and that the interdependence of effective desires and cooperation is "understood and accepted."[[180]](#footnote-180) We can never bypass human in­telligence and commitment.

*Institutions' Orientation to Freedom*

For Lonergan, the social good of order is utterly concrete. Understanding it in this way enables us to avoid reifying institu­tions. We tend to think that institutions have a life of their own, wrongly assimilating them to the material products of human agency. For Lonergan all great institutions are manners in which people develop skills, roles, and tasks in cooperation with one another. Institutions are made up of living human beings and they change precisely as the quality of human cooperation constituting them changes. All institutions are for the sake of people and intrinsi­cally oriented toward freedom. Deriving from human cooperation, every institution is oriented toward value because human coop­eration lives through the feelings that are intentional responses to values.[[181]](#footnote-181) Precisely this orientation of the good of order toward freedom and interpersonal relations was omitted by Michael Novak in a false presentation of Lonergan's understanding of the human good.[[182]](#footnote-182)

***Common Sense and the Limits of Theory***

Ever since the Renaissance, common sense has been seen as opposed to empirical science in a way that belittled common sense. Lonergan shows how common sense is intellectual, a matter of insight and the self-correcting process of learning, admittedly in a different configur­ation from that of empirical science but not to be opposed to it as has been done. Clarifying the intellectual nature of common sense illuminates its intrinsically *practical* nature, its orientation towards a particular good. If we are to understand the shaping of the his­torical world, it is precisely of the workings of common sense that we need to be critically aware. Life is *lived,* not in the intellectual pattern of experience, nor in the aesthetic, but in the dramatic pattern.[[183]](#footnote-183) The dramatic pattern may need to be enriched by these other patterns of experience: it cannot be supplanted by them.

The importance of stressing the concreteness of the good of order lies in the way it highlights the *creative* contribution of people as being constitutive of historical situations. Common sense op­erations are not susceptible of being totally subsumed under ex­planatory theory. The manner in which intelligence is constitutive of common sense operations is by a process of completing in­complete sets of insights and judgments by more insights and judg­ments *in every* *concrete situation.* Suppression of this truth is what makes theories of history oppressive and dominative. For over­reaching theory, common sense is unintelligible chaos to be con­trolled and manipulated by those who possess the correct theory.

Lonergan understands our freedom in relation to the dynamic exigence of our consciousness. What he terms the transcendental imperatives, moving us towards the real and its transformation, do not force us to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and respon­sible. Rather, they operate as the gentle — and easily ignored —invitation of conscience. Lonergan understands community as *the social correlative to* *the structures of consciousness.* It is formally constituted by common meaning and is to be dynamically under­stood as a cooperative quest arising from common experiences, seeking common meanings, truths, and values.[[184]](#footnote-184) Conceived in this concrete fashion, community is clearly no guarantee of intelligence, goodness, or holiness. There is no room for any romantic idealiz­ation of community here. The failures of authenticity are every­where evident in the multiple forms of oppression, giving rise to a dialectic of community.

*Tension* *and Dialectic of Community*

Attention was drawn above to a necessary tension between limitation (underlying manifolds) and transcendence (higher in­tegrations realizing the potentialities of those manifolds) which marks every process within emergent probability. Authenticity in human development requires that this tension be acknowledged. For Lonergan the tension between spontaneous intersubjectivity (pole of limitation) and intelligently devised social order (pole of transcendence) is a very positive natural dynamism. For most modern theory — including in varying degree the work of We­ber, Durkheim, Parsons, Habermas and Giddens — it is consid­ered an antagonistic opposition. Of course, to the extent that the tension is not marked by attentiveness, intelligence, reason­ableness and responsibility we get the horrors depicted in the social analyses of classism, racism, and sexism. Then we are faced with the dialectic of community. The face of power is then marked by domination and authoritarianism. Social theo­ries have tended to simply reflect this alienation, thereby taking the diseased social order as normative, instead of undertaking to correct its aberration.[[185]](#footnote-185) Breaking with such naive realism, Lonergan refuses to locate social power in physical force; genuinely human so­cial power derives from intersubjective cooperation and its car­rier is, not punitive power, but community.[[186]](#footnote-186) This is the insight underlying my insistence on the power of community in the third chapter above.

***The Long Cycle of Decline***

Having clarified how intelligence is constitutive of common sense, Lonergan went on to clarify a final category of bias, the blindness that is peculiar to common sense. The importance of this clarification for understanding our present historical moment would be hard to exaggerate. General bias is most strikingly op­erative when people demand that the facts of the situation deter­mine how every problem is to be solved. This is to subscribe to the myth of "the way things are". It fails to advert to the truth that not all "facts" are objectively intelligible. Since some situations flow from stupidity or irresponsibility, they concretize the refusal of self-transcendence and so require a dialectical analysis to re­veal their irrationality. Those who make *facticity* (the way things are) normative for action allow the stupidities of the past to deter­mine the further course of history. Common sense, in adopting such a crude realism, generates the longer cycle of decline.

At a deeper level, our blindness lies in common sense's deep-seated tendency to resist the questions and ideas which would radically *put in question all present* *achievements.* Kenneth Melchin sees decline as based in the bias in which human subjects live out of a contradiction between the concrete goods which they pursue and the implicitly operative norms which sustain the re­currence schemes which they draw upon for their living.[[187]](#footnote-187) Lonergan sees this bias of common sense as almost invariable "for it is in­capable of analyzing itself, incapable of making the discovery that it too is a specialized development of human knowledge, inca­pable of coming to grasp that its peculiar danger is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and the immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to long-term re­sults."[[188]](#footnote-188) Such resistance of present achievements to the further developments of intelligence that would radically transform them affects all cultures. Typically, the demands of needed development are dismissed as being simply the interests of yet another group.[[189]](#footnote-189) We are in dire need of a corrective to "a utilitarianism that denied limits to utility, and so set our activities, our policies, our institutions on the fatal course of exponential growth."[[190]](#footnote-190)

Such general bias traps societies into the longer cycle of decline. The difficulty with the longer cycle lies in its invisibil­ity to the eyes of our common sense. Convinced of our com­mon sense's ability to deal with the practical, we slip into the illusion of its omnicompetence; we fail to see the necessity of complementing our common sense from other perspectives in order to be able to envisage a long-term view. We fall short of real practicality.

*Reversing the Longer Cycle of Decline*

The social surd cannot be made intelligible. Whereas the ten­sion of community can be counted on to reverse the shorter cycles of decline occasioned by group bias, it can reverse general bias only by "confronting human intelligence with the alternative of adopt­ing a higher viewpoint or perishing."[[191]](#footnote-191) At that point we are forced to recognize the limits of practical common sense and attend to those dimensions of human living which transcend practicality —"delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow". Culture can reverse the longer cycle by expanding the range of effective freedom, enabling human beings to be the attentive, intelligent, rea­sonable, and responsibly loving subjects of their own personal and communal destiny.[[192]](#footnote-192)

Since so much turns on it, what exactly does Lonergan mean by culture? The one and only schema to appear in *Method in Theology* helps to clarify his meaning.

***Individual Social Ends***

*Potentiality Actuation*

capacity, operation cooperation part. good

need

plasticity, development, skill institution, good of order

perfectibility role, task

liberty orientation,personal relations terminal value

conversion

As against the guiding assumptions of modernity, the re­ciprocal dependence between person and society, ethics and politics, is illuminated here. The schema specifies the main factors in the operation of society as a quest for the human good, providing us with four columns and three levels. Lonergan identified what is distinctive to the cultural level of the human good as what is commensurate with *the third level* of his grid.

Prior to all skills in living is the manifold of desire. The com­plexity of our life of desire is what makes moral living so chal­lenging. As D. H. Lawrence stressed in *Apropos of* *Lady Chatterly's* *Lover,* we have little desires and deep desires and the voice of our deep desires is easily drowned out by the shrill obviousness of our superficial desires. This complexity of the life of desire has a certain parallel in animal life and has been documented in fas­cinating fashion by Konrad Lorenz.[[193]](#footnote-193) But in animals such desires are instinctual responses to the need for intussusception and repro­duction; in humans they are experienced as desires eliciting in­tentional responses. Being intentional, there is an endless variety of skills invented to fulfil them. Among our deeper desires are the desire to know truthfully, the desire for authenticity, the desire for God. It is just that it takes time to discern and cultivate these.

The discovery of the normative source of meaning began with insight into insight. But insight into deliberation caused Lonergan to recognize intentional feelings as central. As the motor power of all our living, such feelings need to live in and through intelli­gence. Deliberation effects an integration of our knowing and feeling in determining what is truly worthwhile. This clarification of value is central to an understanding of the human good. We need a prioritization of values which, critically grounded, will yield an integral scale of values; Lonergan saw that the key to such prioritization lay in ascertaining the degree of self-transcendence involved in any particular level of value.

He determined five levels of value as belonging to the inte­gral human good. He presents them in a notoriously condensed paragraph.

Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, so­cial, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to avoiding the work, privations, pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social val­ues, such as the good of order which conditions the vital val­ues of the whole community, have to be preferred to the vital values of individual members of the community. Cultural val­ues do not exist without the underpinning of vital and social values, but none the less they rank higher. Not on bread alone doth man live. Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criti­cize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value. Per­sonal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and in his milieu, as an inspiration and invitation to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world.... [[194]](#footnote-194)

These five levels of the scale of values constitute the subject matter of terminal value in our grid above. Incidentally, not named here are the pre-human levels sustaining the five named levels. In my own work, I have tried to consistently name nine levels of the integral human good, adding the physical, chemical, botanical and zoological levels. I believe this practice is demanded of thinking in the Ecozoic age. It might help us toward needed wisdom in, for example, de-chemicalizing agriculture. It might cause people to advert to the significance of the fact that the chemical processes that are mediated by the biochemical system represent an exceedingly small fraction of the reactions that are possible among the chemical con­stituents of living cells.[[195]](#footnote-195) Nor is such significance hard to discover empirically. For example, the system of enzymatic catalysis evolved by biochemical systems depends in part on sulphur-containing groups; such groups react with mercury when it is introduced into a living system, and enzymes are inactivated, often with fatal results.

At any rate, as Fred Lawrence has neatly summarized it,

"Within the structure of the human good, Lonergan has brought out the differentiation of culture as the domain in which soci­ety reflects upon and appraises its way of life in distinguishing between the second and third levels. The second level regards the social dimension of the human good, the concretely verifi­able way of life as embodied in laws, technology, economy, polity, family life; the third level comprises the cultural domain in the light of which the social is (to be) judged and evaluated. By this distinction, both the "social" and the "cultural" have an utterly empirical meaning, but "culture" retains the connotation of a normative function without being classicist in Lonergan's pejorative sense."[[196]](#footnote-196)

What Lonergan meant by the classicist notion of culture will be developed in the next section.

**Premodern and Modern Answers on the Human Good**

Lawrence goes on to provide a helpful correlation of histori­cally shifting determinations of the human good with the three levels of the grid.

The premodern breakthrough lay in formulating the issue in terms of the good of order: what is the best regime? Although all the elements of the third level of Lonergan's structure of the hu­man good are acknowledged in their formulation, there is a de­cided tendency to subordinate them to the second level.

The key to the answer of the ancients is the consistent dis­tinction between mere life as physical, vital, and sensitive sponta­neity and the good life which is coordinate with the object of the reasonable good.[[197]](#footnote-197) The question of the right way to live is con­ceived ethically and morally, not just empirically. Thus, Aristotle's *Ethics* isintegral to his *Politics,* being dedicated respectively to habits/skills and institutional set-up/roles and tasks.[[198]](#footnote-198)

As a tradition, this achievement did not escape deep ambigu­ity. The reason was its formulation within a normative notion of culture. The originating creative thinkers saw culture and the po­litical order as identical only in the ideal and highly improbable case where the philosopher became ruler. This sets cultural pro­cess in a permanently critical relationship to actual political real­ity. But this sense of balance fell foul to the later classicism called by Lonergan a "somewhat arbitrary standardization of man".[[199]](#footnote-199) Clas­sicist culture transformed the Greek breakthrough into a timeless criterion in which the *content* of the classically-oriented science of man "easily obscures man's nature, constricts his spontaneity, saps his vitality, limits his freedom"[[200]](#footnote-200) by concentrating on the es­sential and ignoring the incidental, on the universal at the ex­pense of the particular, on the necessary while ignoring the con­tingent. Missing out on so much of the data, its explanations could not help but be provisional. But provisionality is what classicist culture cannot accommodate.

Turning to the modern period covering the last four centuries, Lawrence finds reliably useful the periodization of three waves first put forward by Leo Strauss.[[201]](#footnote-201) At the risk of doing violence to his nuanced presentation, I will again attempt a summary.

*The first wave of modernity*

Writing within a slave-owning society, Aristotle had stipulated that a certain modicum of wealth — "equipment" — as well as virtue was needed for happiness. In the period under discussion, the con­viction grew that the pursuit of "equipment" was impeded by the pursuit of virtue. Thinkers like Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke effectively displaced the desire to know from the norma­tive status accorded it by the ancients with the desire for self-pres­ervation. Now it is the fear of the *summum malum,* death, which replaces the *summum bonum.* The psychology of orientation gets replaced by a psychology of passional motivation.[[202]](#footnote-202) Motivated by the anxiety about death, only the accumulation of power and prop­erty seems a choice-worthy good: and so comfortable self-preserva­tion becomes the primary end of human beings.

Riding on science's myth of productivity, this first wave of the political philosophy of modernity claimed to promote universal human happiness by parleying private vice into public welfare: society and government come to rely, no longer on religion or morality, but on the spirit of acquisitiveness at the root of prop­erty to ensure success. This meant subordinating the second and third levels of the structure of the human good to the first level, that of needs, desires, and particular goods.

The common good now no longer refers to the good of order as normative but to particular goods as satisfying needs and desires as correlative with life in contradistinction to the good life. It is now a mere collectivity of private goods, "common" only in the sense of an accidental genus or species, no longer as the objective of ratio­nal choice correlative with the human capacity for intellectual de­velopment. Furthermore, in relation to the normative order of vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values mentioned above, the preference for mere life over the good life means the supremacy of vital values. Thus was born a semantic reversal for the phrase "the good life" which persists down to present times.

The purpose of civil society and government in this account is to protect pre-existent rights to life and the pursuit of property. What for the ancients was the motive of political society – facili­tating the achievement of particular goods for all the members of a society – becomes transformed into its *criterion;* even as action for the private good (enlightened self-interest) is elevated into the standard for assessing rightness or wrongness overall.

There is, of course, a concern for the third level and it comes to expression under the rubric of natural right. Friendships are relevant as long as they are based on utility or pleasure. Liberty means either the freedom to design institutions that will provide mutual security and rules that guarantee the public good by en­abling each individual to pursue private goods without obstruc­tion from others, or at least the freedom to consent to such a design. Lawrence comments that it is clear that "the notion of natural right, inalienable, underivable from any authority, is an eminently selfish idea".[[203]](#footnote-203) Such an attempt to define human equal­ity without recourse to religion or metaphysics intended to leave open the answer to the question of the right way to live, but the resulting void was easily filled by commerce.

*The second wave of modem political theory*

Rousseau is the first representative of the second wave. In his early writings, he set out the opposition between nature (meaning now the satisfaction of needs on the level of organismic sponta­neity) and culture, thereby setting up the modern use of the term culture and obscuring for those who came after him the fact that nature is a cultural construct. In his later works, he proposed a possible unity that harmonized the low natural demands with the high responsibilities of morality and art. It is this unity that Kant referred to as "culture".

Rousseau unleashed the first cultural critique of the merce­nary morality of liberalism. But, from the point of view of the structure of the human good, Lawrence sees his scathing attack as an *ambiguous* breakthrough to the second (social) and third (cul­tural) levels in reaction to the early modern reduction of all ele­ments to the first level. The evidence for saying this lies in the notorious modern dichotomies between nature and freedom, na­ture and history, and nature and art, which were exploited till our own day by the movements of idealism, historicism, and Romanti­cism. Although he did not confine freedom to the limits of scien­tific calculation and technical control and debunked early liberalism's utilitarianism and instrumentalism, freedom for Rousseau was co­ordinate with the perfectibility of the amiable but brutish human being he uncovered in the state of pure nature, and its matrix was that animal's "simple feeling of existence".

Kant is the second major figure of the second wave. Early liberalism's natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi­ness were founded not so much on the state of nature theory as on factual evidence of the dominance within us of the inclina­tions toward security and comfort. Kant's move was to use the human ability to universalize our desire in order to subordinate early liberalism's self-interest in safety and prosperity to rights conceived of as universal principles that serve to define human being as free and independent. One can, says Lawrence, appreci­ate the high moral tone of this attempt to transform so-called natural rights into human rights. It seems to give primacy to the moral demands of the second and third levels. But the apriorism, the abstractness and formalism of Kant's thought not only divorce his grounding from any concrete practical relevance, his intelligible ego with its goodwill is so isolated from the empirically *verifiable* process of *communication* within which subjects grow to maturity as to be quite unreal. Lacking an anchor in verifiable fact, Kant buttressed his normative realm of freedom with postulates about God, freedom, and immortality. His supporting speculative phi­losophy of history finally settled for a distinction between moral­ity and mere legality which represented a compromise with *Realpolitik.* As a result of the two waves, Lawrence identifies two chief forms of Western liberalism, neither of which subscribe to the modern assumption that the chief concern or issue of modern politics is power. The two liberal traditions are commercial democracy and the socialist politics of compassion.

Commercial democracy is based on consent to governmental power as guarantor of public safety and on the doctrine of classi­cal political economy that if there are no restrictions to free eco­nomic activity other than enlightened self-interest, social harmony and well-being will necessarily prevail. *Socialist politics* of *compassion* grounds the legitimacy of govern­mental power on the extent to which it bolsters equality not merely of opportunity but of the satisfaction of aggregate societal needs by attempting to reconcile older liberalism's means with socialist or collectivist ends in what has since been called welfare eco­nomics. The most notable proponent of this tradition is Marx who came to see that the liberal capitalist belief in a pre-established harmony between private interest and public welfare was ideo­logical. In The *Jewish Question* he argued that the rights of man enshrined in the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Declaration of 1789 were really only bourgeois rights, (the rights of the propertied citizen), not holding good for the proletariat. Marx tried to analyze the struggle he observed between capitalists and workers by re-introducing social (second level) and, at least in his youthful writing, ethical (third level) concerns into political economy in opposition to possessive individualism. However this important attempt got derailed by his "uneasy blend of idealism

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and materialism." The idealism trivialized the underlying problem of evil just as Rousseau and Kant - had done. The materialism kept him from breaking cleanly with the utilitarianism and instrumen­talism of his early liberal predecessors.

He failed altogether to appreciate Rousseau's insight that to achieve freedom in equality requires small communities with religious foundations. And no matter how much the Romantic model of artistic creation was his privileged model for the making of his­tory by human subjects, his revolutionary idea was ultimately just a project of technical mastery which not even a classless and stateless society would be capable of redeeming.[[204]](#footnote-204)

*The third wave of modem political theory*

The two key figures of the third wave are Nietzsche and his most influential disciple, Weber. Nietzsche saw clearly the limita­tions of *both* liberal democracy's dedication to preservation and comfort and social democracy's well-fed, well-clothed, well-shel­tered human beings with their up-to-date education, entertainment, and psychiatry. The realization of their visions would be the abo­lition of all ideals and aspirations. Choosing mere life over the good life means producing "the last man" — healthy, but without heart or convictions.

The true significance of Nietzsche is to be found in his effort to re-establish the importance of the third level of liberty and ter­minal value. Lawrence sees him as on the verge of the religiously mediated insight aptly expressed by Sö1le's title, *Death by Bread Alone* and, as such, as a precursor of Benjamin and Metz whose short definition of religion is *interruption —* interruption of the modern project of subjugating human and subhuman nature. But Nietzsche is beyond a religious stance; for him all supports for ultimate value in nature, God, or reason are gone. All that he can assert are human beings as originating value in the absolute sense of being able to posit values arbitrarily. In him, the most radical break‑ through to the third level of terminal values coincides with the most thoroughgoing human disorientation and chaos.

Weber is to be understood as in tension between Kant and Nietzsche. He domesticated his master Nietzsche's concept of value by marrying it to the synthesis of culture performed by Kant in his three Critiques. In doing this he gave rise to the fact/value distinc­tion as it is commonly and erroneously understood. The realm of nature investigated by science and exploited by technology be­comes the value-free domain of fact; while both the realm of freedom and responsibility and that of art and religion become the domain of value. As a result of this fateful distinction, the normative moment of culture intended by Lonergan's notion of terminal value is obliterated in the arbitrariness of values con­ceived as the creation of the Nietzschean will-to-power.

The unfortunate consequences of Weber's position are clearest in the manner in which contemporary social science understands the Weberian distinction to control the relationship between so­cial science and social policy.

Social science is confined to facts: It describes, and its descrip­tions are expected to yield information on the basis of which social policy can predict and control. Any normative judgment — either as classical intelligibility or as true judgments of fact and value — gets systematically excluded. The individual, group, or general bias of those in power leads them to repudiate true terminal values (beyond the desires and needs of organismic spontaneity) and to reject any intelligibility yielded by science that does not afford means of prediction and control. The point is to increase managerial efficiency even at the cost of human liberty or social, cultural, personal, or religious values.[[205]](#footnote-205)

Those who subscribe to this perspective can hardly avoid being more or less viciously nihilistic in their treatment of others, the range being from manipulation to terror. Historically, the best of those who responded to Nietzsche's challenge to become true selves were motivated not by nihilism but by the Kantian principle that people ought never to be used as a means to any purpose not chosen by themselves. This remains, of course, a postulate within Kant's thought: it is not seen to follow from the concrete good­ness meant by terminal values, goods of order, and particular goods in Lonergan's critical realist sense.

Once again, the value of Kant's inchoate acknowledgment of the human person is rendered pragmatically irrelevant by Weber's separation of "the ethics of conviction" from "the ethics of re­sponsibility." Since the ethics of conviction is concerned with ul­timate ends and the ethics of responsibility exclusively concerned with the pragmatic consequences of means in relation to ends established irrationally, the resulting separation effectively seals off the third level of the human good from the second. And, to reinforce this impenetrability of the two levels, there is Weber's historical reconstruction of why people obey authority.

Weber's hypothesis about modernity as a process of *rational­ization,* combined with his analysis of bureaucratic control, un­wittingly confirms the meaning of Nietzsche's critique of liberal democracy and socialism on the level of the good of order. This is not to say that Weber approved of the processes he analyzed: he was clearly on the side of freedom. But he saw the process as inevitable. Bureaucratic modernity is characterized by him through the dominance of instrumental reason which treats all the ele­ments of nature and society as objects of management and ad­ministration. No matter how clear the dangers of this were to Weber, he could not critique it creatively, given his assumptions about the relationship of fact and value.

Lawrence ends his historical overview by observing that, de­spite the rhetoric of emancipation and the claim that the concern with prediction and control was 'for the relief of man's estate', "it all seems to have paved the way for bureaucracy and centraliza­tion: Weber's 'Iron cage'."[[206]](#footnote-206) Lawrence's correlation of the shifting meanings of modernity with Lonergan's grid is a powerful help to‑ wards the needed conscious break with the conditioned 'obvious­ness" of meanings that derive from these multiple waves of moder­nity. In subscribing to these meanings, our capacity to ask signifi­cant questions about our concrete situation is drastically reduced.

*Back from Weber's 'Iron Cage"?*

Social theories which accept the dialectic of community as axiomatic do not help. The Weberian legacy has for too long blocked needed insight. What has happened is that the development of ra­tional bureaucracy has introduced a new variation of the old an­tagonism between theory and common sense, the opposition be­tween technocrats advocating social engineering and romanticists striving to escape the iron cage. The iron cage is in fact a frontal assault on common sense itself since modern bureaucracy forsakes equity, stifles the creativity of the person on the spot, and provides too much space for the poisonous will to power.[[207]](#footnote-207) The relevant insight here has to do with the healthy relation between common sense and theory. For over-weening theory, common sense is an imperfect tool to be subsumed eventually into the no longer incom­plete theory. The creative tension was resolved in our times by the totalitarian practicality of both the right and of the left, who thereby achieved, according to their own nightmare visions, a "unity of theory and practice". But a failure to sustain the creative tension by giving excessive emphasis to the pole of practical intelligence must give rise to the breakdown of community.[[208]](#footnote-208)As Toulmin concludes, we are in dire need of an "ecology of institutions."[[209]](#footnote-209)

*Excursus on a Counter-position:* *Novak's 'Democratic Capitalism'*

I believe that entrapment in the meanings of modernity is what explains Michael Novak's failure to do justice to Lonergan's insis­tence on the orientation of the good of order toward freedom and interpersonal relations. Any attempt to treat of the common good without explicit acknowledgment of the need for conversion from the meanings generated by modernity and attention to how this conversion may be facilitated builds on shaky ground.

There is no apparent correction in Novak's more recent work, entitled, in deliberate contrast to Weber, *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.[[210]](#footnote-210)* In this work he argues that the official Catholic religious and moral demand of the "option for the poor" can best be met by the kind of democratic capitalism that he is defending. Given the record – especially in the Third World – of presently existing capitalism in meeting the basic needs of the poor and involving them actively in the economy, his argument calls for some fancy footwork.

Novak's adroit ploy is to endlessly shift the ground of argu­ment. What he is defending is "capitalism rightly understood," and for this he wishes to provide a moral, spiritual and religious foundation. He argues that John Paul II's *Centesimus Annus* is in fundamental support of his argument. Given that the Pope repeats three times that "it is unacceptable to say that the defeat of so-called 'real socialism' leaves capitalism as the only model of eco­nomic organization", it might seem difficult to enlist him as en­dorsing 'really existing capitalism'. Novak's ploy is to insist that what the Pope is putting forward as corrective coincides with what he himself means by ‘democratic capitalism’.

What then is the status of Novak's democratic capitalism? Is it an ideal, a guiding vision? It seems that the qualifier 'demo­cratic' does not refer to any particular quality of the capitalist economy. Whereas the Pope understood 'democratic' as referring to the entry of democracy into the organization of the economy –participation being the key idea –, Novak does not share this un­derstanding. Democratic capitalism in his usage refers to any form of capitalism that is located in a democratic society. The term therefore allows apologists like Novak to praise contemporary capitalism in the western democracies without having to ask any questions about its impact on society, such as income distribu­tion, rate of unemployment, spread of chronic poverty and dete­rioration of the environment.[[211]](#footnote-211)

Already in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,* John Paul II had stressed the implications of the globalization of the economy. He was under no doubt that this was due to Western free market dominance. He annoyed many by insisting on the commonalities present in both Eastern and Western systems. He argued that both theories entertain an 'economistic' concept of the human being,[[212]](#footnote-212) both look upon economic behaviour as following certain laws and hence as determined, both regard economics as an exact science, and both reject the entry of traditional values such as justice and solidarity, into the logic of the economy.

This reality of globalization under Western capital dominance forbids the move by which Novak denies any responsibility of the system he is defending for the woes of less developed countries. He is intent on defending the North American form of capitalism, although anxious that his definition be broad enough to include northern European variations, such as that of Sweden. He there­fore sees the Pope's strictures as applying to a non-existent capi­talism or to a form unconnected with the Western reality.[[213]](#footnote-213) The latter option leaves him open to the charge of unconscionable naivete.

Novak's vision of a sound modern society involves three dis­tinct spheres: a democratic polity, a capitalist economy, and a moral-cultural system which he takes to include "churches, schools, families, universities, and media of communication."[[214]](#footnote-214) This might soundlike an echo of Lonergan's clarification of the scale of val­ueswith which we have been concerned in this chapter. On closer scrutiny it becomes clear that the meanings given to these key societal moments derive more from modernity than from Lonergan.

On the American scene Novak is primarily concerned with the moral-cultural. He targets in successive fashion as source of the cultural problem i) the 'adversary culture', ii) liberalism of a kind associated with radical individualism, and iii) the erosion of intellectual and moral habits of the citizenry through prolonged state dependency. Amazingly, he never raises the possibility that the very things that disturb him might be the *result* of the eco­nomic system. As I stressed at the end of the last chapter, the institutions of the moral-cultural system are themselves, in many cases, large and profitable economic entities. He attacks the intel­lectuals whom he sees as alienated from family and religious val­ues rather than the corporations for whom they work, corpora­tions that have consistently evaluated their intellectual products in terms of profitability, regardless of intrinsic value or conformity to moral norms. Novak wants an autonomous cultural and political process and sees that these are essential to the working of his democratic capitalism. One does not have to be an out-and-out Marxist to doubt that such autonomy is to be found anywhere in our market-dominated world. To argue as if it were, is to fail to address the very real problems of actually existing capitalism.

The Pope is more realistic, insisting that an acceptable capi­talism would be an economic system defined by personal enter­prise, the free market, business and private property, all situated within a juridical framework that assures that they serve the com­mon good as well as freedom in its totality.[[215]](#footnote-215)

Novak sees his leftist opponents as suffering from statist bias. "The left sees the poor and the vulnerable as passive, awaiting the ministrations of the state. The right and the center see the poor as capable, creative, active."[[216]](#footnote-216) His argument on future policy stresses how small businesses based on knowledge of local needs can benefit large numbers of poor people both in the United States and in the countries of the Third World shifts the whole debate from the level of ideals to the level of the means of reaching the morally compelling end of aiding the poor. He thus claims a common end with the liberationists he attacks so unrelentingly. For his reading, *creativity* becomes "the heart of the matter'.[[217]](#footnote-217) He argues further that capital should be thought of primarily in terms of human cre­ativity, invention, and the possession of know-how, technology and skill.

This appears admirable but much is ignored here. Lonergan had said many decades ago (1959) that our problem today is that "You have to be in big business to be in business at all, and in big business you have nothing to say."[[218]](#footnote-218) Attention is thus deftlydistracted from the developments which make financial capital and equipment so very difficult for Third World countries to obtain. If creativity is the heart of the matter, the perennial losers have only themselves to blame. The upshot of the whole elaborate argument is the age-old ploy of blaming the victim for being victim.

Novak is not and cannot be blind to the "many faults, liabili­ties, and worrisome tendencies" of democratic capitalism[[219]](#footnote-219) andcalls for much hard thinking about how to enable the poor to participate actively in our economies. He just seems to fall signifi­cantly short of realizing that in many countries, providing the minimum necessary for such enablement will require either basic changes in the way societies are organized or massive reallocation of resources. This blind spot is surely connected with his extreme antistatism, a stance which enables him to avoid address­ing the issue of needed renewal of the public sector and its insti­tutions. The scale of our problems are such that, no matter how deeply committed to democratic capitalism we may be, the sug­gestion that there is no need for governmental action borders on the anarchic. Granted the need to keep critical control over gov­ernment action to ensure that it does not become unduly restrictive, expensive, centralized, and insensitive to local need, we must not fall into the trap of considering government inherently despotic or corrupt. To do this would be to undermine the very function that the political should be exercising within the scale of values of the integral human good.

Recently, John Langan has pointed out that, even if at the moment there is no comprehensive alternative to capitalism, its practical dominance does not excuse us from understanding its internal problems, still less from facing up to the awful costs it is exacting on so many people. "More radical challenges to capital­ism will probably have to wait the emergence of a new constella­tion of social and intellectual factors; but to suppose that this will not or cannot happen is to be guilty of inexcusable historical naivete."[[220]](#footnote-220)

One final point: to endorse the preferential option for the poor is to recognize the subjective dimension in the search for truth, the way love enters into the process of knowing.[[221]](#footnote-221) On the grounds that he wishes to write for non-Catholics, Novak seems to me to bracket out what is distinctive in the Catholic search for the truth of the social.[[222]](#footnote-222)In spite of this extrinsicism, Novak wishes to pose as an adequate interpreter of the position of John Paul II.

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Christian Presence to *Tien-hsia[[223]](#footnote-223)*

THE somewhat allusive title of this book was meant to draw attention to the centrality of cul­tural process in the furtherance of the human good. The exploration of the last two chapters was driven by the need to determine what makes for authenticity in such cultural process. But, as the subtitle indicated, the specific goal of this clarification was to throw light on the issue of authentic Christian presence to China. What forms does authentic help towards self-help take in relation to Chinese cultural process? I am con­vinced that the clarifications provided in the third and fourth chapters can contribute much to our understanding in this area.

Since the position outlined in the last chap­ter makes formidable demands on theological thinking, I must first indicate how Christian mis­sion is to be articulated in the light of this criti­cal position.

**Christian Mission**

The unavoidable challenge shaping the last chapter was that of critiquing the dominant language of development. We are faced at this point with the challenge to carry out a similar critique on the contemporarily dominant discourse of mission. Again, the task is one of dislodging a recent understanding which has come to be taken as normative in favour of an older, more adequate, understanding. True, the time-frame of what ‘recent’ means changes here from four and a half decades to four and a half centuries. But against the two thousand years of Christian tradition, modern meanings are rightly to be seen as recent. The understanding which shapes the modern period and which has been all too easily universalized is not to be found prior to the sixteenth century.[[224]](#footnote-224)

Deriving from the various parts of the world which suffered the impact, there have been many attempts to evaluate the nature of the conflict of cultures which occurred in the modern Christian missionary encounters which began in the sixteenth century. But, at the very least, critical distance from the taken-for-granted meaning of mission in this period is in order.

The task of Christian mission is to open access to the gospel, removing the blocks that stop the flow of meaning and extinguish the light of truth. The justification of such a task lies in the truth-claims of the gospel, that which constitutes it as good news. Such a formulation is unacceptable to the variety of postmodern pluralism which rejects any claim of a particular narrative to raise itself above the plurality to normative status, any claim to validity of a meta-narrative. But such prejudice on the part of postmodern thought is not the foundation of a new pluralism; it simply reflects the abandonment of the quest for truth. As such, it brings nothing new into the world. Insights, including postmodern insights, are a dime a dozen: the issue is always whether one can justify their implicit claim to truth or not. Any refusal of this challenge is ide­ology in the pejorative sense.

For Christian faith, the Gospel is the hermeneutic of the en­tire historical process; the law of the Cross is the immanently tran­scendent intelligibility of God's one world in the making. As such it is relevant to everything. This deep-down truth of things is to be lived out by all those who have come to believe. Their witnessing in this way to the glory of the Mystery in history is the missionary meaning of their lives. These assertions may gain some clarifica­tion and expansion as I outline a needed transposition of the dis­cipline of missiology.

***Transposing Missiology***

The effect of the needed transposition is quite drastic. In what turned out to be his final work, David Bosch remarked that we are in need of a missiological agenda for theology, not just a theological agenda for mission. The Church exists by mission. The extent of the transposition being effected here measures up, I be­lieve, to the challenge issued by Bosch.[[225]](#footnote-225)

For a start, understanding the theological task in a manner appropriate to the third stage of meaning involves a break with traditional field and subject specializations. Field specialization derives from data division while subject specialization derives from a division of results. Missiology I take to have been an instance of subject specialization.

In Lonergan's clarification of theological method concentra­tion is on the moves we make, the distinctive steps that lead from data to results. He discovered that, in each of the two phases of doing theology — appropriating the past, shaping the future — there were steps corresponding to each of the four levels of intentional consciousness. This means that, although activity on all four lev­els of consciousness are necessarily involved in doing any spe­cific step, it is the pursuit of a distinctive kind of intelligibility that distinguishes each step of the collaborative theological task. This provided him with the notion of functional specialty. Any indi­vidual could, in principle, work in many specialties; in practice, the enormity of the tasks now means that theology must be done in collaborative fashion.[[226]](#footnote-226)

The concerns of missiology seem to me to be predominantly second phase concerns, dedicated to shaping the future. Of the four functional specialties which make up this phase – founda­tions, doctrines, systematics and communications – I believe that the content of missiology is covered *principally* by the relation­ships between the functional specialties of foundations, systemat­ics and communications. The qualification is necessary because of the radical interdependence of all eight functional specialties: system­atics, for example, works on doctrines which, in turn, must be relatable to scripture. Allowing for the qualification, this final chapter involves work which belongs to these three theological specialties. What follows immediately is a brief introduction to each of them.

*Foundations*

As a functional specialty Foundations has to do with the thematisation of conversions. In relation to the present work, we have been "doing foundations" in that we have been struggling over the last few chapters for larger heuristic context, based on a fuller foundational perspective. That, for example, was the point in the last chapter of the clarification of the scale of values and the reading of modernity as a long, complex struggle towards appropriating authenticity.

As a foundational effort, then, this chapter builds on the pre­ceding one and, more remotely, on *Method in Theology,* 286­–288, where the task is the generation of critically based, general theological categories. Such categories are common to theology and other human sciences. The base, as was indicated in the last chapter, is self-appropriation within the context of society and history. In addition to the integral scale of values, the various kinds of bias clarified in the last chapter are important general categories.

The use of the general categories is meant to provide a foun­dational grasp of ongoing historical process, just as *Method in Theology* was intended to facilitate the community's ongoing ob­jectification of authenticity.[[227]](#footnote-227) The theological specialty of founda­tions is necessarily presupposed by that of doctrines and system­atics. Likewise, communications cannot find its way without be­ing able to operate within general theological categories. As Lonergan states, the use of the general categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties.[[228]](#footnote-228)

The intelligibility sought for in foundations is that which be­longs to the fourth level of our intentional consciousness, the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, where consciousness becomes conscience.

Why are the general categories, common to theology and all human sciences, to be called theological? The answer is crucial. Foundational heuristics are concrete: they provide the interpre­tative anticipations of a worldview by which we think of the re­alities of mind *and grace* within the fullness of the emergent prob­ability of meaning. To think in this manner is to operate within generalized emergent probability. It follows on the realization that *everything* in God's universe is governed by emergent probability, not simply pre-human emergence but also the phenomenon of meaning, *both* divine and human. Thus, a fully foundational heu­ristics would involve a non-reductionist sublation of Christology within a perspective on the Universe Story.[[229]](#footnote-229) We only understand the doctrines of our faith when we succeed in integrating the re­alities proper to theological study with the realities studied as well by other disciplines.

*Systematics*

When systematics is conceived on such a foundational base and is geared towards communications, its concern is with the way doctrines clarify the intelligibility of the one world we live in. This means that what are called special theological categories, the categories peculiar to a particular faith tradition, must be un­derstood *in* and *through* general theological categories. Contem­porarily adequate theological reflection is to be recognised by its capacity to envisage possible and probable seriations in our col­laboration with divine providence, our lived witness to the real­ization of God's coming kingdom. This leads Robert Doran to characterize his work as follows:

Asa systematic theologian I am concerned... with the construc­tive labor of creating for our situation... a coherent and grounded systematic statement of the meanings and values affirmed by Chris­tian faith. But I understand this task as one that, by evoking a change in the meaning constitutive of the situation, will mediate a transition from this situation to an alternative situation more closely approximating the reign of God in human affairs.[[230]](#footnote-230)

In this perspective, natural sciences and human sciences are part of the history that is revelation and, as Christians, we must listen to them.[[231]](#footnote-231) It goes without saying that we must listen critically, since it is clear that the shaping of our present century by truncated science has effected a significant shift in the schedules of global non-survival.

*Communications*

Theology as a whole "mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion in that matrix".[[232]](#footnote-232) The crowning moment of the theological task, communications, is, firstly, con­cerned with living out interdisciplinary relations with the media­tion of the human that are the arts, philosophy, the human and natural sciences of the day. Since theology is not the full science of human being, it simply must enter into collaboration with scholarly and social sciences. Integrated with them, it can help apply dia­lectic in the historical and social sciences and in the analysis of social process.[[233]](#footnote-233)

Communications is concerned, secondly, with the transpositions that theological thought has to develop if it is to retain its identity and reach into the minds and hearts of people of all cultures and classes. Thirdly, it must be concerned with the creative use of whatever media of communication are available at any given time and place.[[234]](#footnote-234)

In regard to the second task, communications reaches for the integrated proximate grounds of the mediation of "the cumulative, historical process of development in a multiplicity and succession of individuals."[[235]](#footnote-235) This task may be viewed in terms of a full no­tion of actual contexts. Scholarly sensitivity to local cultures pro­vides systematics with fuller actual context.[[236]](#footnote-236)Systematics in turn has to operate out of complex genetic perspective in appropriat­ing what the scholars mediate: "as research tabulates the data from the past, so communications produces data in the present and for the future."[[237]](#footnote-237) Centrally at issue in such perspective is the explana­tory understanding of development which was our topic in the previous chapter.

The use of the metaphor of the crowning moment above indi­cates that communications constitutes a final step in theological method: theology is practical in that its goal is a transformed situ­ation. But this obscures the manner in which communications can give rise to a new beginning: questions for systematics, observed Lonergan, can arise from communications.[[238]](#footnote-238)Nor is this the limit of the questions that derive from communications: it can, for instance, generate a use of the functional specialty of dialectic which bears on an evalua­tion of our present situation and this in turn will call the special­ties of research, interpretation, and history back into play.[[239]](#footnote-239)Rob­ert Doran has argued that Lonergan's opening statement that the­ology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of a religion within that matrix indicates how the situation of the cultural matrix constitutes a source for theology's reflexive mediation.[[240]](#footnote-240)

In introducing these specialties, I can only hint at the manner in which foundations spirals its way through the other specialties, generating the endless cycles of an open process. Communica­tions, foundationally conceived, is marked by the openness of ongoing conversion to the ways of the Spirit in the unfolding of the human venture. It is the very antithesis of the one-sided com­munication of a message that leaves us with nothing to learn from those to whom we are present.

Given this understanding of communications, an adequate theology is one which undergoes the expansion of horizon needed to understand the distinctive mode of the search for meaning that shapes a particular culture. An adequate theology is also able to discriminate dialectical aberration in that search, and, finally, knows how to be creatively present to a people's search.

Brief though it be, this attempt to indicate how we might transpose missiology into the mode of adequate contemporary method does provide us with clear initial direction. We need to clarify the Chinese search for meaning with the help of general categories which place it within generalized emergent probability. But the fruitfulness of such at­tempts at clarification will depend on the self-corrective learning stance—conversion in action—which we exercise in relation to those whom we strive to understand.

**Differentiations in the Chinese Search for Meaning**

What brings enormous complexity into the task of generating general categories adequate to the ongoing historical process is the manner in which the expression of the authentic quest for meaning of any person is conditioned by history, by their being situated within a particular culture and time. The search for intel­ligibility amidst such pluralism is greatly furthered by the discov­ery of the presence or absence of particular differentiations of consciousness as that which most significantly distinguishes one form of the search for meaning from another. Mention was made in the previous chapter of the varied patterns of experience within which the intentional operations occur.[[241]](#footnote-241) A slightly expanded list would include the biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, prac­tical, and worshipful patterns. Depending on the pattern, our in­tentional operations move towards their goals in different man­ners giving rise to different realms of meaning and different worlds meant. So we get the world of immediacy, the world of common sense, the world of the sciences, the world of interiority and philosophy, the world of religion and theology. A differentiated con­sciousness moves with ease from one manner of operation in one world to another manner of operation in a different world. By contrast, in the hypothetical case of a totally non-differentiated consciousness—a "compact" consciousness, locked into its one pattern of common sense —such consciousness could not com­prehend anything deriving from the worlds of theory, interiority, or transcendence. I qualify the case as hypothetical because there is not, in fact, any evidence of a historical culture which was not differentiated in some ways. A central figure in aiding this discovery has been the enor­mously erudite philosopher of consciousness, Eric Voegelin.[[242]](#footnote-242)

***Voegelin on China: An Incomplete Breakthrough?***

Voegelin set himself the ambitious task of understanding the varied under­standings of order that appear throughout human history. He speaks of the "In-Between" character of human existence emerging into consciousness with the poetic differentiation of consciousness of the Greeks and the pneumatic differentiation of consciousness of the Hebrew tradition. He eventually concluded that the process of history and the order to be found in it is a mystery in process of revolution, turning on human participation in a flow of Divine Presence. In this context, Voegelin uses the word "compact" to characterize cultures untouched by this awareness of human "in­-betweenness".

Already introduced in his first volume, extended treatment of the Chinese mode of the search for meaning appears in Voegelin's fourth volume of *Order and History,* titled *The Ecumenic Age.*[[243]](#footnote-243) Voegelin confines himself in this volume to the period stretching from the rise of the Persian to the fall of the Roman empires. He features the achievements and fragmentations of the West in that period and reflects on what he refers to as the "undeveloped" Chinese Ecumene.

Such a judgment sounds very provocative, and not just to Chinese ears. To be more precise, what Voegelin claims to find is evidence of an "incomplete breakthrough", resulting in a dialectic of culture because of an inadequate sense of both sin and the historical in Confucian tradition. This sounds remarkably close to some recent Chinese cultural self-analysis referred to in the sec­ond chapter above.

To approach this issue with openness, it may help to place Voegelin in relation to some standard prejudices of the modern period. He is no wide-eyed child of the Enlightenment subscrib­ing to a progressivist interpretation of history. Nor is he a pro­tagonist of "the West", who believes that its cultural achievement is normative for the human. More than any other, he is consis­tently critical of the failure of the western tradition to have sus­tained the search in the mode made possible by its originating breakthrough. His endless questioning of modernity is in terms of its pneumopathology. For example, adverting to the parallel falsi­fications of history in the Sumerian King List and Hegel's *Philoso­phy of History,* he asks what is modern about the modern mind if Hegel, Comte, or Marx, in order to create an image of history that will support their ideological imperialism, still use the same tech­niques for distorting the reality of history as their Sumerian prede­cessors.[[244]](#footnote-244) We need, he says, to find our way back to the dialogue of humankind with its humility. Nor does Voegelin ever confuse the occurrence of any differentiation of consciousness with the achievement of a more authentic humanity. He works on three guiding principles:

1) The nature of man is constant.

2) The range of human experience is always present in the fullness of its dimensions.

3) The structure of the range varies from compactness to dif­ferentiation.[[245]](#footnote-245)

So, what we are dealing with here is decidedly not an in­stance of chauvinistic presumptive judgment. This does not mean that Voegelin's judgment in the Chinese case is necessarily cor­rect: simply that it merits more than a reactive response.

*Cosmological and Anthropological Modes of Search*

Just what is the nature of the breakthrough judged by Voegelin to have happened in an incomplete manner in the Chinese case? Essentially it is a shift in the mode of the search for meaning, the search for the direction that is there to be found in the movement of life. And this shift is brought about by particular differentiations of consciousness in China, Greece, India, Israel and Persia during what Jaspers named the Axial Period of human history. This pe­riod was identified by Jaspers as falling between 800 and 200 b.c.e. though Toynbee wished to extend it into the seventh cen­tury c.e. The shift is from a cosmological to an anthropological mode of the search.

For by far the longest stretch of the human story, the mode of the search can be classified as being *cosmological.* Distinctive to this mode is the experience of the order of society as a part of cosmic order. Cultures that exist under the aegis of the cosmo­logical find the prime analogate for the cultural order in the rhythms and processes of nonhuman nature. They have not differentiated the theoretic and world-transcendent realms of meaning from the compactness of the aesthetic and ecological sensitivities that in­form their common sense. In the Chinese case, over a period of some three thousand years the cosmological symbolism seems to remain unbroken, with the Son of Heaven as mediator between cosmic-divine order and society.

The breakthrough which initiates the *anthropological* mode of the search occurs with the discovery of that which transcends cosmic order: in the case of Israel, humankind moves to existence in the present under God, in the Greek case to existence in love of the unseen measure of all being. In this mode of the search it is the divine or world-transcendent measure of integrity that is the stan­dard for individual rectitude, and personal integrity measures so­cial order.

Now Voegelin maintains that in Confucianism Chinese civili­zation also underwent an experiential break with the cosmologi­cal order. Disillusionment with the cosmic order of society and with its preservation through the Son of Heaven led to the discov­ery of the autonomous personality as a source of order, even if the break did not go as deep as the contemporary one in Greek philosophy.

The order of society, which hitherto had depended on the Son of Heaven alone, now depended, in rivalry with him, on the sage who participated in the order of the cosmos.[[246]](#footnote-246)

The sage was no longer simply a member of a society which as a whole received its order through the mediation of the ruler. He himself had access to the *tao,* had become a potential rival to the Son of Heaven in mediating the *tao.* But this is where Voegelin locates limitation in the breakthrough: the value of the autonomy of the personality, independent of the authority of the society, was gained through an immediate relationship to cosmic *tao*. This suggests that the authority of the sage was of the same cosmologi­cal type as that of the authority of the Son of Heaven.

Confucianism did not lead to a break in the cosmological form of the empire because itwas not a philosophy in the sense established by Plato. And since there was no radical incompat­ibility in the experiences of order, the empire could even uti­lize Confucian scholarship as a bureaucratic support for its cos­mological form.[[247]](#footnote-247)

Voegelin admits that Chinese society moved towards an an­thropological conception of order through a leap in being but ar­gues that it was not radical enough to break with the cosmologi­cal order completely.[[248]](#footnote-248)There can be no doubt that China, like Greece, developed the symbolism of an historical course in retro­spect. But he finds the method in the Chinese instance both "charm­ing and exasperating".[[249]](#footnote-249)

I would like to stress that there is something amoebic about the manner in which a Chinese universe of meanings changes shape, contracts, and expands: From empirical observations we move to essences, from institutions to principles, from principles to man­ners of operation, from the *tao* of a dynasty to the *tao* of culture and the *jen* of ecumenic rule, from the *jen* back to methods of federal execution, and finally we arrive at a philosophy of history which pictures the course of a civilization as the exhaustion of its sub­stance, not so very different on principle from Giambattista Vico's *torso.* The differentiated meanings, though present, never become articulate with any precision; and the symbols created for their expression never achieve the status of analytical concepts. As a consequence, at every turn the symbolization may slide back from a theoretical level apparently reached to expressions of extreme compactness and, then, advance to theoretical insights.[[250]](#footnote-250)

The lack of precise articulation in the Chinese case has, for Voegelin, serious consequences. Although the emergence of the sage in China is comparable to that of the philosopher in Greece, the difference is significant. Voegelin's careful paragraphs purporting to illuminate this difference show remarkable parallels.[[251]](#footnote-251) There is the same recognition of an ordering force in the human soul re­gardless of one's institutional rank in the cosmologically ordered society. And consequent on this differentiation we get a structural one between the organizers of effective power and the representa­tives of spiritual order. A return to the compact royal institution could never again be expected. Despite this, Voegelin insists that the breakthrough was incomplete.

As evidence he quotes Mencius (VII, B, 13) who could assert: "There have been men without goodness who have attained a *kuo;* but no man without goodness has ever attained the *tien-hsia*.*"*[[252]](#footnote-252)What is intended here is the statement of a principle: it is futile for people without the necessary moral qualifications to seek to rule. Voegelin stresses that this can only be so if it is against the nature of things in the cosmological sense. The rule of the man without goodness will not come to pass. But, since this assertion takes the form of an empirical observation, it invites the reversal, What if it happens? What then? With the victory of Qin Shi Huangdi in 221 b.c.e., the man without goodness became the ruler of China. This man was one of Mao's few heroes and models.

"Chinese ecumenism grows from the matrix of Chinese cos­mological order itself without ever completely separating from it."[[253]](#footnote-253) For Voegelin the cost of the incomplete breakthrough is clear in the inability to carry out a radical critique of established naked power. This is what leads him to contrast the completeness of the Hebrew-Christian pneumatic breakthrough and the poetic break­through of the Greek tradition with the incompleteness of the Chinese breakthrough into the fundamental tension-in-existence.

*The Shift as Instance of Authentic Development*

To speak of a complete separation from cosmological order is misleading. Complete separation is not what is desirable. There can be no question of leaving behind the valid insights of the cosmological mode of the human search. If the Chinese were mistaken, it was not in refusing to separate completely from their cosmological past.

But to try to keep both forms of the quest, the anthropological and the cosmological, operative at the same time would be an inad­equate response to the breakthrough and would hinder the flower­ing of the philosophical differentiation. The breakthrough calls for a *new* appropriation of the insights gained through the cosmological mode of the quest.[[254]](#footnote-254) The breakthrough is weakened by the simple juxtaposition of insights articulated through different modes.

What, then, constitutes a true development from the cosmo­logical to the anthropological mode of the search? It cannot mean a negation of the cosmological insight in the manner of Hegelian sublation. Since every instance of genuine development in an emergent universe is the fruit of a creative tension between a pole of limitation and a pole of transcendence, this same pattern must also be present in this case. A collapse of the tension towards the pole of limitation — the enabling ground of the emergence — must, consequent on the breakthrough, lead to fatalism and repression. There is never a way backward. Recent attempts to resuscitate animism as a religious option for us have no future. Such attempts are involved in unacceptable regression. What is called for is a new integration of cosmological truth.

Historically much more in evidence has been collapse towards the pole of transcendence within the anthropological mode of the search. The Western mis-definition of development can be read as an instance of this form of collapse into a dialectic of culture. What is the generic form of such collapse? The anthropological breakthrough occurs in the differentiation of intelligence and rea­son from the underlying sensitive flow. But the differentiation can easily lead to neglect of the sensitive symbolizing psyche. Such neglect, aided by the differentiation in modern science of expla­nation from description, can result in a neglect of the constitutive contribution of the sensitive flow itself. Since this contribution is constitutive insofar as the sensitive psyche provides the very move­ment of life in which intentional consciousness is to find direc­tion, such derailment of the anthropological can result in the trun­cation of intentional consciousness into the instrumentalized ra­tionality we found to be so typical of modernity.[[255]](#footnote-255)

**Recapitulation and Clarification by Contrast**

My goal in the preceding section has been initial clarifica­tion of the Chinese mode of the search for meaning. The very possibility of attempting the task is based on the position sketched in the previous chapter. There it was argued that the challenge put to us by the achievements and dead-ends of modernity is to discover the normative dynamics of our own consciousness by a difficult and demanding process of self-appropriation. Such self-appropriation constitutes a new flowering of subjectivity which can ground a new stage of human meaning, authority and con­trol. The notion of ‘a stage of human meaning’ turns on the recognition of changes in the control of meaning. Thus, control in an earliest stage, a stage which encompasses by far the longest part of the human story to date, is in relation to the image; in a subse­quent stage of meaning—that of theoretic control—following on the differ­entiation of intellect from the sensitive flow, control is in relation to the concept; and in the third stage of meaning being born it is in relation to insight.

The possibility of authentic dialogue, of a respect devoid of condescension, demands the move to this third stage of meaning because the ability to identify how our consciousness is working in different modes of the search is needed to illuminate how each mode can be a path to truth. Lonergan found pointers in moder­nity to the grounds in self of an eight-fold "interpretative recon­struction of the constructions of the human spirit"[[256]](#footnote-256), and with them the possibility of mediating the passing of modernity through self-appropriation. An open foundational tabulation of differentiations of consciousness provides us with the heuristic system we need.[[257]](#footnote-257)

This whole section on the differentiations of the Chinese search for meaning does not easily lend itself to illustration. Perhaps I can exemplify the heuristic framework involved by applying it to the reading of some significant recent works. The three works chosen are not put forward as representative of any consensus but in their different ways all are involved in evaluation of Chinese cultural traditions.

*Gernet:* *The* *Incompatibility of Cultures?*

*China and the* *Christian Impact: A Conflict of* *Cultures* docu­ments in scholarly and fascinating detail Chinese reactions to the actions of the Christian missionaries of the seventeenth century. His study is of huge interest because it was around 1600 that for the first time real contacts were made between two great civiliza­tions that had developed entirely independently of each other.[[258]](#footnote-258) The missionaries in question are the Jesuits who arrived from 1583 onwards. They wished to engage with Chinese traditions of learning and to undertake a dialogue with the educated classes. It was this that gave rise to the wealth of positive and negative reactions to their teachings.

The key name usually associated with this venture is that of Matteo Ricci (Li Madou). But the vision of Ricci was due in large part to Alessandro Valignano. Born in Chieti and reared under Spanish domination in southern Italy, he could not have been unaffected by the fact that the Italians were spoken of by the Spanish officers as the 'indios' of Europe. This was the man who guided the Society of Jesus to a new style of mission that attempted to break with European political imperialism. Ross claims that Valignano even broke with Europeanism, though it may be anachronistic to posit this. It is arguable that it was his racism which led him to identify the Japanese and the Chinese as "white" and to advocate a new openness of approach in their regard. He did not, for example, approve of extending this policy to India. He had already died be­fore Da Nobili began his efforts in India.[[259]](#footnote-259)

The Jesuits were keen to exploit any apparent analogies be­tween Chinese and Christian religious and moral traditions. Those on the Chinese side who sympathised with them were delighted to hear such confirmation of what they had always held to be true. When the analogies turned out to be more apparent than real—something that was seen from the start by the Chinese who opposed them—the initial sympathy turned to hostility.

Two quite distinct charges were then made against them: they practised deception and their doctrines were subversive if not absurd. While invoking Confucian classics, Ricci was seen to be giving them an interpretation alien to literate traditions. Ricci was aware of what he was doing but was convinced that his interpretations must have been what the tradition originally stood for. Just as he believed that the neo-Confucianism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was not the true Confucianism of Antiquity — and in this belief he had many Chinese supporters —, so he tended to read parts of the tradition with which he did not agree as later distort­ing additions. In 1609, one year before his death, Ricci wrote in a letter:

To begin at the beginning, in ancient times they followed a natural law as faithfully as in our own countries. For 1,500 years, this people practised the cult of idols hardly at all, and those that they did worship were not so despicable as those of our Egyptians, Greeks and Romans; certain deities were even extremely virtuous and famed for their good actions. In fact, in the most ancient books of the men of letters – those that have some authority – they worship only heaven and earth and the master of both. When we examine these books closely, we dis­cover in them very few things which are contrary to the light of reason and many which are in conformity with it, and their natural philosophers are second to none.[[260]](#footnote-260)

Now the phrase "and the master of both" is a pure and simple addition of Ricci, as much a projection as is his account of a beginning. He could not comprehend how the Chinese or anyone else could accept an anonymous power of order and anima­tion in the universe and not recognise a personal, unique, all-powerful creator God. He had similar difficulty in live discussions on moral topics. Unlike texts, the thinking of live dialogue partners does not ac­commodate wishful projection. Ricci, who praised the logical prowess of the Chinese philosophers of antiquity, writes that his Chinese contemporaries “have no logic and are incapable of distinguish­ing between moral goodness and natural goodness”.[[261]](#footnote-261) His insis­tence that moral value flows from rational action seemed to them to make a meaningless split between nature and culture.

With the help of a foundational tabulation of differentiations of consciousness the reason for the charge of duplicity and de­ception becomes understandable: those whose thinking is shaped by the anthropological mode of the search for meaning will tend to regard those influenced by the cosmological mode as atheistic, or superstitious; they will tend to misconstrue the religious mean­ings of such people to fit in with their own categories. When this misconstrual is discovered, they will be accused of duplicity and their openness to what others really believe will be put in ques­tion.

Similarly, the charge of subversion becomes intelligible when one adverts to the manner in which religion, morality and politics mutually echo one another within a culture shaped by the cosmo­logical mode of the search. Any critique by the Jesuits of the moral tradition was seen as subversive of the social order.

What comes to light in Gernet's detailed study is the limita­tion of a Christianity imprisoned within a conceptualised theology with no means of escape, no means of going beyond the doc­trines to the grounding insights. The result was an inability to articu­late Christian truths in strictly historical categories for a culture whose strength lay primarily in its sensitivity to historical *change.* If Christianity were confined to such a theology, then Gernet's conviction that the missionaries were trying to reconcile the irrec­oncilable and that we are dealing here with incompatible cultures would be correct.

To say this is in no way to endorse the reason tentatively put forward by Gernet in the closing section of his book to explain the irreconcilable differences. Falling back on questionable lin­guistic arguments, he there suggests that the very Chinese lan­guage itself precludes the kind of distinctions that the Western Jesuits were accustomed to make.[[262]](#footnote-262) This will not do. It confuses linguistic conditioning, which is undeniable, with linguistic deter­minism, which is simply false.[[263]](#footnote-263) Any human language has the po­tential to express anything which may be of interest to those us­ing that language. The key factor is what they happen to be inter­ested in expressing.

What could be cogently argued on the evidence provided by Gernet is the *de facto* incompatibility of world-views at the time of the clash. He is right to stress that the Chinese Rites controversy centred on a detail when the question really at issue was whether it was possible "to reconcile Christianity with a mental and socio­political system which was fundamentally different from the one within which Christianity had developed and from which it was, like it or not, inseparable." Gernet's formulation may seem to make the question merely rhetorical but his closing sentence, whether this is intended or not, points the way towards an alternative answer: “Instead of rejecting from the start the arguments of the Chinese, it might have been worth taking the trouble to learn from them.”[[264]](#footnote-264)

*Jenner: The Tyranny of Chinese Culture*[[265]](#footnote-265)

Gernet's study had its focus in the early seventeenth century. China along with the rest of the world has changed much since then. The concern of our next author, W.J.F. Jenner, is with what he sees as China's contemporary crisis. Writing in sorrow and con­cern in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, he is convinced that this crisis is not to be attributed simply to the present regime.

It is the crisis of an inherited cultural and political order and of the script in which they are encoded, of the present conse­quences of past glories, of an empire in the guise of a modern­izing unitary state whose long-term continuation seems to be just as seriously threatened by the switch to capitalism of a kind as it would have been by prolonging attempts to keep Maoist socialism alive.[[266]](#footnote-266)

In chapter after chapter he insists on the negative influence of China's cultural past on the present. He seems to agree with those who regard most of China's traditions as so deadly that the only thing to do is to get rid of them as fast as possible. What is one to make of such a sweeping attack on culture? I have spent much of the last few chapters insisting on the centrality of culture in the pursuit of the human good.

Jenner is understandably critical of those who would invoke the glorious past as a means of shoring up their increasingly inde­fensible political power. But he does not entertain the possibility that there might be a valid and necessary engagement with the past for those who would wish to face *critically and creatively* the challenge of the forces shaping their historical present. While such an engagement has to be critical, it cannot take place at all with­out affirming the irreplaceable value of the cultural past. What is involved in such an affirmation and how can it be compatible with a critical stance?

The differentiation of the cultural level of value above in our fourth chapter is needed to illuminate the dynamics. By means of this differentiation we are able to place cultural value accu­rately: it pertains to the *process,* not to the *product.* The anthro­pological definitions of culture, which are legion, all fail to make such a distinction. They predispose us toward placing the normativity of culture in its products.

What Jenner's true target should be is the lapse into *classicism* of Chinese culture, i.e., the promotion of cultural products to nor­mative status for all future progress. Such a move undercuts the possibility of genuine progress. The lapse into classicism can hap­pen to any culture. Our unavoidable struggle with the language of development in the previous chapter is indicative of the extent to which it has happened in contemporary Western cultures. Classi­cism always involves the fallacy of misplaced normativity, the fail­ure to see that if anything is deserving of emulation it is the quality of intentional performance and not the resulting cultural product, be it virtuous living, social institution, or artistic achievement.[[267]](#footnote-267)

No cultural achievement can be fruitfully furthered without critical attention to the limitations of its genetic context. No mat­ter how highly we value a particular achievement it cannot es­cape this critical scrutiny. This is true, for example, of democracy and Jenner himself draws attention to the limitations of the origi­nal Athenian breakthrough in regard to this.[[268]](#footnote-268) But he fails to see that what he himself spontaneously does at this point is program­matic for all cultural action for freedom. It is by creatively work­ing within a particular cultural tradition that advance is effected, not by an illusory cutting ourselves off from inherited meanings. Not that belonging to a cultural tradition means an inability to be affected by, enriched by, other people's cultures. Xenophobia is a cultural pathology. But those who would attempt to jettison their own past are doomed to imitation and a loss of creativity.

Most of Jenner's negative criticisms would be echoed by other mainstream historians of China and by some Chinese scholars.[[269]](#footnote-269) That to which he is drawing attention is, in large part, the reification of meanings. The deeper issues are those of how authentic identity is to be achieved within an ever-changing historical world. How, in particular, is continuity compatible with the revolutionary breaks involved in differentiations of consciousness? The classicist and conceptualist find normativity in cultural *product* and for them this issue is insoluble. But they are mistaken. Just as the only cross-cultural constant lies in the dynamic structure of the human mind that generates all cultures, so also normativity in cultural process lies in the authenticity of performance in such generation. Nevertheless, the fruit­ful functioning of the process is within, and in relation to, an actu­ally existing tradition of tested historical meanings. The creativity of a people is conditional on access to their own tradition. Con­tinuity derives from the authentic performance of cultural agents.

I suspect that the one and only prejudice of the Enlighten­ment emerges again here. This was the prejudice against all "pre­judgment", all tradition, the illusion that it is possible to wipe the cultural slate clean. It is true that being born into the givenness of a particular cultural tradition is a ‘limiting’ thing. But, as our in­sertion into language, it is an *enabling* limit and the condition of possibility for all further human growth.

I recall the message of an acclaimed zoologist who saw the relevance to cultural process of the biological lesson that what distinguishes healthy mutation, fertile variation, from monsters and abortions depends upon millennially inbuilt genetic coding which both limits and enriches new adaptations or species.[[270]](#footnote-270) Although the essential factors in human mutation are no longer genetic but social-historical and noetic, this insight can be carried over to the context of human cultural change. In this context continuity re­mains a condition of significant novelty, but the continuity is now with ancient survival factors in the species such as powers of adaptation and assimilation. Inherited givens and codes may be creatively transformed but not abolished.

Human culture has its ancient determinations: freedom and creativity depend on respecting, not abandoning, these long-estab­lished constants which insure our world-relatedness. To indulge in unqualified revulsion against the past, to glorify novelty, disconti­nuity and gratuity, is to forfeit the ground of meaning and any purchase on reality. The Cultural Revolution was grossly mis-named.

At various points in his book, Jenner shows agreement with what I have just said by his placing his hopes for the future on localism, on the vitality of minority cultures and on the culture of merchant values to escape the clutches of bureaucratic autocracy.[[271]](#footnote-271)

*Ci:* *Dialectics of the Chinese* *Revolution*

Jiwei Ci's work, like that of Jenner, is born out of the sadness, anger and sense of futility caused by the events of June 1989. He uses his considerable philosophical ability to read with hindsight the actual story of the last forty years of Chinese history. His ar­gument is that the utopianism of the Revolution was from the start simply hedonism postponed and sublimated. There was an ascetic code but the imperative of asceticism, dictated by poverty, was to be made permanently unnecessary through the products of labour. He holds that the failure of the utopian project led via nihilism to unalloyed hedonism. "The grounding of morality on political be­lief contributed in no small way to the undoing of both."[[272]](#footnote-272) This he sees as a still ongoing crisis of the spirit in China. He judges it the most important element to be understood in the whole period.

The Opium War marked the birth of "modern" China. But what is significant here is that, for the first time, China could only retain a sense of superiority by doing something that the integrity of the traditional Chinese order had never allowed room for — splitting civilization into values/technology. Such a disjunction led to the maxim "Chinese learning as substance, Western learning as application": the Chinese way in what was supposedly important (*ti*), adopting the Western way in what was necessary for self-preservation yet supposedly of merely practical significance *(yong).*[[273]](#footnote-273)

What the formula reveals is that China had the integrity of its order undermined and with it the possibility of continuing to evolve on its own terms and at its own pace. Resort to such a formula indicates that it was imposition from outside rather than voluntary development that shaped the process. Ci does not preclude the possibility that China might have found its way to capitalism in any number of ways on its own terms. Nor does he see any value in the preservation of "the China it had always been". What he is stressing is that from the Opium War to communist China, China did not simply do what its own culture valued most. The logic was one of reaction. The need to catch up with Western produc­tivity was desperate, giving rise to the need to stress how different you were from the West the more you became like it.[[274]](#footnote-274)

The precision of his analysis at this point compares favourably with an alternative reading of history which is fairly widespread among many Chinese. It is clearly articulated by Ray Huang who, making a virtue out of necessity, effectively says that what hap­pened should have happened! Affirming the desirability of a one-world history initiated by capitalism, he asserts that "Chinese his­tory since the Opium War is a series of continual efforts at read­justment to meet this challenge. The settlement we have in mind is essentially a merger of China's cultural tradition, developed on a huge continent, with this oceanic influence."[[275]](#footnote-275)

Talk of "readjustment" and "merger" only serve, like the for­mula, to conceal the extent of cultural change. It is impossible to have the guns and gunboats without the form of social relations that goes with unique relations of production: this involves cul­tural change. The extent of this cultural change was such that, admittedly for a complex variety of reasons, the whole Confucian social order itself crumbled in the early years of the twentieth century. Once this holding framework was destroyed, the three­fold structure of traditional morality went also: the code of belief was found to be absurd, the code of virtue hypocritical, and the code of conduct repressive.[[276]](#footnote-276)

In the terms of our explanatory framework, Ci sees clearly that the *reduction of the human good to the level* *of vital and social value* was central to the Marxist-Maoist utopian project. And this made hedonism, not moral value, central. What he re­gards as the present post-Tiananmen trend of unfettered hedonism was, he argues, implicit from the very start. Further, the politicization of morality introduced by Mao meant the reduction of virtue to belief: virtue and vice were defined as whatever promoted or hin­dered the political program. The conviction that the end justified the means was so unquestioned that it did not need to be ever explicitly stated: the equiperation of moral wrongness with pursu­ing incorrect ends meant that the issue of inappropriate means was never raised until Maoism in its entirety came to be ques­tioned.[[277]](#footnote-277)

Ci's conclusion is rather dismal. The rule of hedonism is here to stay in the absence of the spiritual resources to break out of it. Confucianism, despite its social costs, had elevated moral and intellectual values over material interests. Intellectual values un­derwent a twofold devaluation in the recent history. Under Mao they were subordinated to political dictates and criticised as rem­nants of Confucian elitism. Then in the gradual movement toward a market economy they were further devalued through the instrumentalization, as opposed to the politicization, of education.

With the almost complete removal, at long last, of Confucian intellectualism through its twofold devaluation, there no longer exist any significant indigenous cultural resources for the nega­tion of hedonism.[[278]](#footnote-278)

There is reason to believe that the removal may not be as complete as Ci thinks. He tends to equate the fortunes of "the Chinese people" with those of a minority of intellectuals. It is even doubtful if his thesis holds true for the minority.[[279]](#footnote-279) But a fairly major change in educational priorities is needed if future genera­tions are to have critical access to their own tradition.

**Third Stage Authority and Control v. Paradigm of Truncation[[280]](#footnote-280)**

Goethe is at one with Chinese traditions in insisting that those who cannot account for three thousand years live only from hand to mouth. Living as we tend to do in the fingernail of the present, we lack needed historical perspective and are blind to the bizarre na­ture of what we have come to accept as ordinary. Jung spoke of the next six centuries as a period for the sprouting of neglected subjec­tivity. His time-frame is indicative of the depth of our present im­mersion in a cultural swamp of self-neglect. But *seeing all this* de­pends on our trying to come to grips personally with the solution.[[281]](#footnote-281)

Massive contemporary truncation is the source of present so­cial and ecological crises. It has deep historical roots which are neither easily known nor rapidly cured. The explorations in chap­ter four indicate that we are dealing with an aggregate of ideolo­gies. By reading history through the mediation of heuristic interi­ority, we came to see the key issue as that of subjectivity both in its deep aspirations and its modern truncation, meshed into the large weave of historical process.

Such a reading also highlights some salient truths about the present of our scientific search. Ever since the suggestion to Prince Kung in Beijing in 1864 to set up a special branch of the mandarinate to open traditional Chinese education to Western technical, mili­tary, legal and political structures, what has occurred is a dialectic and superficial absorption of European varieties of truncated development. Therefore, naming the truncation present in West­ern science is a further significant step in our task of clarifying an appropriate Christian presence to China.

**The seventeenth century Revolution in Science**

Firstly, this was in physics. It took a hundred years for the "revolution" to occur in chemistry, while the shift to explanatory perspective in biological science is a nineteenth century phenom­enon. Now, there is a reason for the "postponement" of the revo­lution in chemistry and the other successive "postponements" and it is a reason that is easy to grasp within adequate heuristic per­spective: chemical reality is more difficult to understand than physics. The scientific revolution did not happen: it is still happening. And its beginnings are locked within fragmentations of consciousness that leave physics and chemistry loaded with paradoxes regarding subjectivity, objectivity, imaginability, the middle sciences of botany and zoology committed to a naive reductionism that, instead of explaining, explains away, and the higher sciences locked in a positivist eclecticism.[[282]](#footnote-282) Worse, the technological output from the hierarchy of sciences adds further distortions. Thus, the lucrative successfulness of the easier sciences, physics and chemistry, leads to the identification of technology solely with their advance, and to a narrow perspective on the significance of objectifications of future insights in the vital sciences. These life sciences are so heavily disoriented in their present objectification by profiteering agribusiness as to be enmeshed in the famine business.[[283]](#footnote-283)

Meshing with the massive folly and malice of the drive of modern­ity towards empire and state, which blossoms in the neurotic control structures ofmodern government and business, is a pseudo-theoretic of microcontrol which seeds patterns of experimenta­tion and implementation, of mindset and lifestyle, of research and relaxation, of farming and foodprocessing, that cuts man out of the genetic throbbing of history.[[284]](#footnote-284)

Seeking out the source of these fragmentations and disorien­tation of the scientific and technological revolutions led us to enlarge our context. Lonergan's research led him to conclude that Kant's unsuccessful struggle was with mind as conceived by Scotus, while Fred Lawrence says that modern political thought is “rooted in the Machiavellian option to develop 'realist' views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done”.[[285]](#footnote-285)

Scotus began a tradition wherein understanding's generative role in concepts was systematically excluded. Machiavelli initi­ated a like systematic exclusion of transcendent values from his­torical practice. Modern education in the West—as in China—merges both oversights.

Weber presented an analysis of authority in terms of legiti­macy theory. He distinguished charismatic, traditional, and bu­reaucratic forms of authority. By contrast, Lonergan argues that it is the authenticity of common meanings and values that both ren­ders power legitimate and whose absence makes authority merely authoritarian. The orientation of all modern political theory to 'ef­fectual truth' indicates its acknowledgment of the primacy of sheer power. Instead of sheer power, a foundation which makes all government necessarily oppressive, the real basis of authority is to be found in the pressure of evidence and love. There is acute need for an education focused on the *dynamics of quest* in every­body, not simply, as now, on *content* in the educated.

John Milbank has drawn attention to a curious inversion of Plato's logic which affects our modern political thinking.[[286]](#footnote-286) Plato thought the *demos* should not rule because it is governed by the lowest common denominator of unruly passions: we have come to assume that, if it should rule, it *must* be governed by the same selfish passions. In the Christian reading this is not so. Since wis­dom is love, all can learn love and all can achieve wisdom. What remains true is that the path to this is Plato's "aristocratic" route of authentic personal growth. In no other way will democracy cease to degenerate into propaganda and manipulation. This is the path of microautonomy and its furtherance is the measure of the education that is called for.

*The Instance of Economics[[287]](#footnote-287)*

McShane suggests that if we are trying to find our way back to humankind's dialogue with its humility, we may find a hopeful sign in the growing humility of *natural* science. Its nineteenth century optimism is gone. Learning from its conscious nescience, we could come to envisage a larger context of 2,000 million more years of our biosphere. The sorry state of modern economics could then be seen in the light of the pedagogy of the economic rhythms of the next million years.

Currently accepted economic dynamics is "a complex math­ematics of fairyland assumptions that calls for not well-behaved people but well-behaved functions." The main body of present economic theory is trapped into a conceptualized systematics not uninfluenced by Scotus and locked within a larger Machiavellian axiomatics of successful procedure and within a still larger neglect of the pedagogy of history and of the possibilities of an in­novative human future.

It has refused to engage with the voices of an alternative tra­dition involving Clement Juglar, Karl Marx, Wesley Mitchell, Jo­seph Schumpeter, Michael Kalecki, Adolf Lowe.[[288]](#footnote-288) Not that adequacyis to be claimed for this alternative tradition: Adolf Lowe's *The Path to Economic Growth,* for example, while containing some elements of a concrete economic dynamics, is focused on the need for *control* to implement it, a control continuous with the power structure of the Ecumenic Age. There can be no alternate struc­tures of control without *the personal transition to* *luminous microautonomy* and it is to this that the historical process invites us. At present the power structures of truncated modernity ground the impossibility of the communal analysis and implementation of an economics that would be a *Humanomics* with its mesh of rhythms of creativity, innovations, take-offs, and dynamic equilibria within the conditioned schemes of recurrence of an emergent probability of *standards of human meaning.* Only within the perspective of a subtle appreciation of the self in history can there emerge a clear-eyed critique and dismantling of power, centralization, welfarism, monopolies, paternalism, planning, empire.

Without minimizing the difficult challenge involved in achieving explanatory perspective in the field of economics, McShane main­tains that, even now, anyone can grasp broad neglected features of economic dynamics. He invites us to envisage an isolated is­land community, with a non-horsepower technology. On this is­land, some sub-group grasps the innovative idea of the plough, with horse, oxen, or karabao. As the community moves towards the realization of the idea, there will be fluctuations in the exchange economy of the island. For a period, energy and money will be devoted to the carpentry, tannery, horse-training, etc., which makes the plough culture concretely possible. The community is build­ing towards a period of higher consumption, greater leisure. The fluctuations in the flow of finance may be less obvious. But there will be an initial period of reorientation of present resources pre­paratory to the emergence of a new aggregate of capital ventures associated with horse-ploughing; this will be followed by a period when production of horse-ploughs is under way, accelerating, gradu­ally levelling to the demands of maintenance and replacement; then comes the later period when the benefits emerge in con­sumption goods and better times.

But human adaptation to the rhythm of evolution *internal* to the production process is called for. Ideally, such adaptation is to be grounded in microautonomy, educated to an unusual perspec­tive on what constitutes success. This may be lacking.

The sub-group may be obsessed by securing the extra money mistakenly called profit. Enamoured of planned obsolescence, they may add woodworm to the plough. They may advertise the myth of the necessity of a new plough every year. They may turn to persuading neighbouring islands of fruit-gatherers that they too need ploughs. They may find ways to benefit from taxes imposed on origin or destination principles. They may eventually have the fruit-gatherers making cheaper ploughs; and so on. Ultimately, they may generate an economic theory which promotes their mistaken notions of profit and success to axiomatic status.[[289]](#footnote-289)

Thus far the parable of the island. It calls for detailed func­tional analysis of the kind offered by Lonergan in his *Essay on Circulation Analysis*.[[290]](#footnote-290)It also makes clear why he stressed the enormous *educational* challenge involved in hav­ing a sane, humane economy. To behave responsibly people need to be enlightened about a world governed by emergent probabil­ity and they need to have access to the information that will establish that economic policy is in accord with the truth of such a world.

Lonergan's perspective generates a concrete normative heuristic of possible, probable, and actual seriations of relatively station­ary and evolutionary interacting economies. Its centerpiece is the analysis of a normative possibility; the evolution of a closed economy from one dynamic stationary state to another through the intussusception of new technological and institutional hori­zons. That perspective and its fruits will eventually be more acceptable to genuine goodwill in the Third World than to growth theoreticians and global managers.[[291]](#footnote-291)

*Need for Total Concrete Dialectic*

We began this section by drawing attention to the actual present of our scientific quest, the levels of complexity of our world in relation to which we have so far succeeded in gaining some ex­planatory perspective. The limits of present science is not in itself a problem. But ignorance of these limits facilitates reductionist procedures and such ignorance is the fruit of self-neglect. We have bracketed out attention to our own performance.

In our times the adequate response to any issue depends on its merging in a total concrete dialectic. As total this dialectic is inte­grally theological and philosophical. Both theologians and philoso­phers of science seem to prefer to work in abstraction. But the key issue is the discovery of our own consciousness: *scientific interest* *in the consciously questing self.* At present, the distinction of hu­man studies from physics and chemistry is maintained only by smug­gling across the borders of apparentlyobjective method inadequate descriptions of the academics' own data of consciousness.

Given the profound disorientation of political, economic, military and academic establishments, there is no ground for any short-term optimism. In the light of all this, it is clear that the West is not in a position to teach anybody. The hope is that even as we struggle to understand our flawed selves, grasp the oversights which have led to our manifold blind alleys, identify the deep challenge of the actual breakthroughs which have been made, we may fa­cilitate the creative quest of others in a way that will enable them to avoid our historical pitfalls.

**Conclusion: Authentic Christian Presence to China**

To speak of Christian presence to China is to question how Christians might creatively mediate their religious and personal values to the conversation of Chinese civil life. The very possibil­ity of such mediation turns on furthering a political culture where meanings and values irreducible to Machiavellian 'effectual truth' are taken seriously. Such a culture has millennia-long roots in China although recognizing this today involves correcting both the May 4th view of Confucianism as a purely secular humanism and the related, Weberian misunderstanding of it as this-worldly accomodationism. The retrieval of this tradition has to be a criti­cal process since a politicized Confucianism has held far greater sway historically than a humanized politics. But a critically recov­ered Confucianism can inform our appreciation of the great tran­scendental issues of human existence.[[292]](#footnote-292)

I have argued that a key move in determining adequacy of presence lies in developing the general categories. Personal ap­propriation of the general categories provides the perspective within which we can envisage the movement of life as Total Process. In this perspective the "fullness of time" is seen to be contingent on the emergence of the higher rational culture: it is this that permits the Word to become flesh and the mystical body to begin its leav­ening of history.[[293]](#footnote-293) The present challenge to Christian theology is to envisage with heuristic adequacy the possible, probable and actual seriations of such leavening on the global scale. The task of this book is to initiate such envisagement in relation to China. It is imperative to think in terms of historical process and within this context the thematisation of conversions is essential in the task of transforming the global network of neurotic aggression and greed with new healing patterns of kindness and success and hope.[[294]](#footnote-294) This will be our closing topic.

**The Normative Reality of Humanity: The Fundamental Tension-in-Existence**

Voegelin's talk of complete and incomplete breakthrough into the fundamental tension-in-existence "can be considered a generic description calling for a genetico-dialectic systematics" of modern existential tensions.[[295]](#footnote-295) Beginning with Voegelin's account, I will consider a limited number of varieties of the tension-in-existence and, finally, some related pathologies.

Voegelin saw the Greek classic experience as moral and reli­gious; it was a matter of creative resistance to public disorder and cultural decay and took the form of a return to the light.[[296]](#footnote-296) His account of religious experience is in terms of the struggle in the soul and it draws both from Plato and the New Testament. It is a dialectical experience. If we respond to the pull, the movement luminous with truth, we experience peace: giving way to the counter-pull leads to the unease of a bad conscience. Lonergan commented on this in terms of there being "an inner light that runs before the formulation of doctrines and that survives even despite opposing doctrines. To follow that inner light is life, even though to worldly eyes it is to die. To reject that inner light is to die, even though the world envies one's attainments and achievements".[[297]](#footnote-297)

In Voegelin's terms, the historical dimension of humanity is neither world-time nor eternity but the flux of presence in the Metaxy (the In-between).[[298]](#footnote-298)

There is no In-Between other than the metaxy experienced in a man's existential tension toward the divine ground of being; there is no question of life and death other than the question aroused by pull and counter-pull; there is no Saving Tale other than the tale of the divine pull to be followed by man; and there is no cognitive articulation of existence other than the poetic consciousness in which the movement becomes lumi­nous to itself.[[299]](#footnote-299)

Of this closing phrase, Lonergan says that what is at issue is inspiration or revelation, since Voegelin goes on to say that there is "a mutual participation (*methexis, metalepsis*) of human and divine; and the language symbols expressing the movement are not invented by an observer who does not participate in the move­ment but are engendered in the event of participation itself. The ontological status of the symbols is both human and divine.[[300]](#footnote-300)

To label this the core tension-in-existence is somewhat undif­ferentiated. First of all, the core source of tension-in-existence in material finitude is the presence of the dynamism of mind. This constitutes the pole of transcendence in the unity-in-tension which is the human person. To the extent that people are not collapsing this creative tension towards either the pole of transcendence or that of limitation, then the fundamental tension-in-existence is being lived out.[[301]](#footnote-301)

Secondly, the central issue in a philosophy of history is the ongoing discovery and incarnation of mind. Adequate systematics would sublate within emergent probability both the history of psy­chology *and* the psychology of history, i.e., the growth of the subjects's own view of personal and historic growth in the mea­sure of the differentiations of the subject and history. In the per­spective of such a systematics, we would have to distinguish multiple forms of the tension-in-existence and their related pathologies.

*Forms of the Fundamental Tension-in-Existence*

By way of introductionto attempts at systematic naming, it may help to consider briefly some forms of the fundamental tension which are both transcultural and available to common sense.[[302]](#footnote-302) Among suchtensions is the tension-in-existence which may be called *mystical.* It is normally genetic of other tensions which can be aesthetic or dra­matic but with a noetic core.[[303]](#footnote-303) William Johnson has shown how this core noetic tension can lead today to issues of transcultural interior­ity*.*[[304]](#footnote-304)In an earlier period solidly within the second stage of mean­ing, it reached for a theoretic theology in Theresa of Avila's prefer­ence for a learned over a pious director. In a yet simpler culture, it was happy to express itself in memorable metaphor:

He shewed me a little thing the size of a hazel nut, in the palm of my hand,

and it was round as a ball.

It is all that is made.

It lasteth forever and ever shall,

Because God made it: God loveth it:

God keepeth it.[[305]](#footnote-305)

Then there is the aesthetic tension-in-existence of modern sculpting. If Langer is correct in saying that sculpture effects the objectification of self and environment for the sense of sight, then we must expect an axial shift in objectification and in its recep­tion consequent on transformed subjects.[[306]](#footnote-306) Philip McShane sees Henry Moore as anticipating the challenge of sculpting in the third stage of meaning. Moore speaks of the sculptor getting the solid shape, as it were, inside his head, identifying himself with its cen­tre of gravity, its mass, its weight. As a result, he thought that the sculptor should make the viewer feel that what she was seeing "contains within itself its own organic energy thrusting outwards... It should always give the impression, whether carved or modelled, of having grown organically, created by pressures from within."[[307]](#footnote-307) For the sculptor in the third stage of meaning the real statue is not already-out-there. The symbolic presence within subjectivity is appropriated within interiority and it is mediated by that appropri­ation.[[308]](#footnote-308)

I am only belatedly discovering the relevance of areas of con­temporary music, art, and literature to the birth of the third stage of meaning. I had long been impressed by the way developments of literature and drama preceded and at their own level anticipated the break-through into the theoretic differentiation of consciousness and a new control of meaning in fourth-century Athens. The literary and dramatic development appears to have been a neces­sary precondition for the breakthrough.[[309]](#footnote-309) An analogous relation­ship between twentieth century arts and literature and the con­temporary philosophic breakthrough into interiority was to be ex­pected but I had failed to advert to this.[[310]](#footnote-310)

Writing in the context of dance, Susanne Langer comments on "the great trauma that Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts—secularization."[[311]](#footnote-311) The decline of much institutional religion, the desacralization of the universe, and the secularization of human living in our times is hardly to be de­nied. But how this is to be evaluated is not obvious. Reasons for a judgment more nuanced than that of Langer were given above in the third chapter. Lonergan was quoted as seeing secularisation as mainly no more than a stage in "the ongoing process in which man's symbols become ever more differentiated and specialized."[[312]](#footnote-312) He could calmly come to this conclusion because he saw the emergence of a third stage of meaning with its mediation of inte­gral subjectivity as placing issues of Sacred and Profane in a new context.

By contrast, Mircea Eliade is not so positive. He noted that "in the presence of any tree, symbol of the world tree and image of cosmic life, a man of the premodern societies can attain to the highest spirituality, for, by understanding the symbol, *he succeeds in living the universal".*[[313]](#footnote-313)While refined modern sensibility can still echo such premodern response to tree, dance, sculpting, this rarely happens. Eliade sees us as doubly fallen: after the first fall religious sense remained with fragmented consciousness and secu­larization; in the second fall, within truncated consciousness and secularism, religious sense is forgotten, hidden, clamouring in the unconscious.[[314]](#footnote-314)

And yet, ever since the 1890's modern dance has moved to­wards non-representation, towards subjectivity, even towards the symbolization of the shift from control to microautonomy. With such anticipations, there is given the possibility of a new access to the full range of human experience, inclusive of Mystery.

This will have to serve as indication of forms of the tension which are accessible to common sense. The forms of the tension to which we now turn are related to the breakthrough to generalized empirical method. This means they are involved in the kind of self-appropriation to which Lonergan and the modern scientific search invite us.

As Lonergan transposes the God-question to the third stage of meaning, he finds three distinct forms of its emergence in relation to the second, third and fourth levels of consciousness.

We can enquire into the possibility of fruitful enquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worth while.[[315]](#footnote-315)

To highlight third-stage forms of the God-question invites re­flection on the corresponding answers. First there is a form of the tension-in-existence mediated by the epiphany through theoretic answers of the what-question: the deeper we go in exploring the intelligibility ofour emerging universe, the more powerfully this epiphany presses on us in the lived awareness of the impossibility of a universe of *limited* intelligibility. In spite of truncated recep­tions critiqued above, the centuries of science since Galileo, self-corrected into the twentieth century, powerfully mediate this epiphany to the contemporary thinker. This grounds the next form of the tension.

A second form of the tension-in-existence is that mediated by the epiphany of the is-question as we appropriate the meaning of its answers. Lonergan's most precious contribution is his exposi­tion of the moment of human judgment, of what is involved in Is-saying. In the presence of contingent being, known to be such as a virtually unconditioned, we find ourselves faced with the ten­sion of mere facticity. Reflecting on the nature of reflection, we stumble on the mystery of Is.

Then there is the tension-in-existence mediated by the even more self-involving epiphany of Yes-saying. Brendan Kennelly comes close in his poem "Yes":

...the only agelessness

Is yes.

I am always beginning to appreciate

The agony from which it is born. Clues from here and there

Suggest such agonyis hard to bear

But is the shaping God

Of the word that we

Sometimes hear, and struggle to be.

There is, further, the third-stage meaning tension that has pre­occupied Robert Doran in his work on psychic conversion.[[316]](#footnote-316)This form is mediated by the permeation of other tensions into total consciousness, into nerves, bones, molecules. In man, the symbolic animal, there is an all but endless plasticity that permits the whole of our bodily reality to be fine-tuned to the beck and call of sym­bolic constellations...self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal...first of all of our flesh and blood that through nerves and brain have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands."[[317]](#footnote-317) There is a transcendental reach to our dreams.

There is the tension-in-existence to be experienced by those who would attempt to flesh out the heuristics of Total Process discussed in the present work, the worldview which thinks of the realities of mind and grace within the fullness of the emergent probability of meaning. It is characterized by a sharpened aware­ness of nescience and mystery.

*Identification of Pathologies*

Given the extent to which the scientific revolution is still in process of happening, the working out the full range of patholo-  
gies that can afflict the fundamental tension-in-existence remains  
a future task.[[318]](#footnote-318) But some forms of pneumopathology can be clearly identified. In his work, Eric Voegelin concentrates on withdrawal from the partnership but indicates two related pathologies. The one who has failed to measure up to the noetic challenge can disguise the fact either by resorting to a nominalist rationalism, which pays lip-service to a Greek tradition while avoiding the challenge of the tension named by that tradition, or by recourse to mere force. In the West, long before Machiavelli, the attempt to order society by the truth of existence was seen by Polybius to have been abandoned; he himself was a casualty of the destruc­tion of the Achaean League by Roman imperial expansion.[[319]](#footnote-319) These pathologies treated by Voegelin can be identified within the heu­ristic specifications of generalized empirical method as privations of the dynamics of the human spirit.

*Truncation and Atheism*

Atheism, heuristically, is a complex pathology involving un­stable or closed integrations of the various levels of human inten­tionality.[[320]](#footnote-320) Since it is seen as a perfectly normal option in our times, the issue here is the specification of a predominant lunacy of our present world.

The extent of religious persecution in China over the last forty years, inspired by the explicitly atheistic policy of its rulers, might seem to force the conclusion that the existence of such policies was the primary issue and their reversal our primary concern. But the experienced difficulty of living out authentic faith in modern con­texts unmarked by any such explicit official atheism should make us pause. Atheism takes many forms: some of them are even compat­ible with what many people mistakenly consider religious living. Such is the religious righteousness of the hypocrite. Some are subtle.[[321]](#footnote-321)

This is not to question the centrality and importance of reli­gious conversion for human living: both faith conviction and critical reflection on the integral scale of values indicate the priority of such conversion. But the Gospel warns us not to identify the presence of such conversion with simple ‘Lord’-saying, or the ab­sence of such conversion with simple ‘No’-saying.

Apropos of the manner in which the anthropological mode of the quest for meaning has undergone derailment in the West, Robert Doran writes:

The radical derailment is the instrumentalization both of the intel­ligence and reason that are *capax Dei* and of the psychic sensitiv­ity that is at home with cosmic rhythms and participates in them, but that shatters against the ugliness of a human world constituted by intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic pathology.[[322]](#footnote-322)

In my analysis above in the third chapter, the challenge to faith in the modern period was traced to the commercialisation of cultural activity owing to the dominant position of economics in modern society. The heart of the challenge was not theoretical atheism but *practical* atheism. And the heart of such practical atheism is the truncation of our intentional reach, the instrumentalisation of intelligence and reason. Such truncation gives rise to an economistic culture, i.e., a culture where everything finds its sig­nificance in being subjected to economic evaluation.

If there is truth in this analysis, then the greater danger to future Chinese creativity derives, not from the official atheistic line of its present government, but from the inevitability of practical atheism involved in a radically instrumentalized reason.

Pathological truncation of our intentional reach does engen­der political consequences but only rarely today are they a matter of explicitly atheistic policies. The normal consequence is that we become more liable to worship the (institutional) works of our hands. Failure to think within generalized emergent probability leaves us open to the temptation to hypostatize historically pass­ing societies into ultimate subjects of history. Giving in to that temptation obscures the fact that the normative reality of human­ity is not control within transient empire but *microautonomy within historical* Mystery, the authenticity of persons.

Lonergan located the autonomy of the subject radically be­yond the power of the political party, the planner, *and* the profit­seeker.[[323]](#footnote-323) For him, freedom of choice is grounded in our ability to criticise *any* finite course of action and this means that implicit in human choice of values is the absolute good that is God.

As appreciation is a spring of action, so criticism is a source of restraint, and, as only the infinite good is beyond all criticism, radically man is free.[[324]](#footnote-324)

Lonergan's notion of freedom is one of effective empower­ment. He transposes the classical notion of virtue into the context of intentionality analysis. When one is inattentive, stupid, irratio­nal, or irresponsible, one is not *expanding* one's freedom: it is being constricted and jeopardized. Conversely, fidelity to the de­mands of our intentional reach is the flowering of freedom.

The transposition of Voegelin's category of rationalist nomi­nalism is to that of commonsense eclecticism. This is also a com­plex pneumopathology, but at its core is the avoidance and ob­scuring of the conversion to serious understanding. It is general bias in action, willing to consider anything except the true dimen­sions of the historical challenge.

Finally, the predominant lunacy of our times is that of mere power: at its heart it is a sickness in the dynamic of responsibility. A therapeutic heuristics, working through formal and informal education, would hope to bring about such a change in common meaning that everyone (not just eccentrics like Mo Ti) would marvel at the fact that a man who steals a pig is universally condemned and generally punished while a man who invades and appropriates a kingdom is a hero to his people and a model to poster­ity.[[325]](#footnote-325)Such a shift in common meaning would be a shift in power because "the carrier of power is the community". Insofar as the shift is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility, there is authenticity and consequent progress. "Au­thenticity makes power legitimate. It confers on power the aura and prestige of authority. Unauthenticity leaves power naked. It reveals power as mere power."[[326]](#footnote-326)

**The ultimate Enlargement: Christian Systematics**

We are only on the way toward the genetico-dialectic sys­tematics that could incorporate Lonergan's poetic reach for the Mystery of God in *De* *Verbo Incarnato* and *De Deo* *Trino.* The issue of Lonergan's challenge is the subjectivity of God and the reality of history as absolutely participative in that conscious fellow­ship.

One can ask whether God revealed his love for us by having a man die the death of scourging and crucifixion? Or was it his own Son, a divine person, who became flesh to suffer and die and thereby touch our hard hearts and lead us to eternal life?[[327]](#footnote-327)

What is the meaning of our Eternal Relations' design of per­sonal presence in history? By his coming Jesus wraps history in essential sacredness. What is clear is that this sacredness is a re­ality of *all* human time by the concomitant gift of the Spirit. Lonergan's theological work has helped us to understand how this essential sacredness is linked directly with the elements of the human good through interpersonal relationships. We are, each of us, loved specially and humanly. By his coming as human the Son loves us humanly, responding to our particularity and inviting us to respond in turn. For our knowing and loving to become a true sharing at this level, God must transform the human good of order into a finite yet supernatural good of order. This is why the Word and the Spirit were sent.[[328]](#footnote-328)

We come to see that the fundamental tension-in-existence is the Trinitarian tension of Abundant Care, lifting the darkness out of history. And 800,000,000 young Chinese become 800,000,003 persons living in darkness and a great light.

The intention of the general categories is to reach toward the future in the full vigour of the personal perspective of the general­ized emergent probability of meaning and Faith. It envisages world history in its concrete emergence in terms of possibilities and prob­abilities. Communications is very demanding, calling for sophisti­cated selection from systematics that would mediate larger life to diverse communities. The selection involves those elements, sym­bols, and stories from the systematic transposition of history that would mesh in dynamic gentleness with cultures, communities, media.

Within the perspective of the general categories, we must seek out the probability schedules of schemes of transcendental alive­ness or alienation in China.[[329]](#footnote-329) This involves attention to areas in which I, regrettably, am a complete outsider: Chinese theatre, opera, dance. There is the even longer tradition of Chinese poetry and painting. There is the recent intense pressure towards a new mandarinism of science. All of these, within a creative global context, push towards a third stage of meaning. But the block is the necro­philia of the Western academy, making only another version of truncated subjectivity available to Chinese universities.

And yet history has habits grounding hope. We have no choice about wanting to understand: we cannot put off the eros of our minds and are committed not by decision but by nature to intelli­gent behaviour. Such determinants were responsible for the emergence of social orders in the past: they can continue to account for their reformation. Moreover, through the problem of emergent sci­ence, history is pushing towards an epiphany of understanding as data: we need to grow to appreciate the kind of universe that is living through us.

Mao Zedong transcended doctrinaire Marxist-Leninism in as­serting the continued presence of *non-antagonistic* contradictions among the people that could be resolved within socialism.[[330]](#footnote-330) But his truncated subjectivity excluded him from envisioning the principal contradiction noted above, the dialectic between truncation and transcendental dynamics in the people. It was a blind spot en­couraged if not caused by the practice of Western government, economics, education. What Mao added to that practice was the blunt strength of a totalitarian integration of common-sense prac­ticality which ensured that Party thinking would never discover the major principle of decline in general bias (common-sense's illusion of its own omnicompetence) and the minor principle in group bias (the antagonism of classes).[[331]](#footnote-331)

Even such limited instances of transcendence provide grounds for hope: they could mean a miniscule shift in the probabilities of an opening for democracy and dialogue. But the orientation to centralization and planning of the West must first be intelligently restrained. We need to re-learn that "the principle of progress is liberty, for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights".[[332]](#footnote-332)

Understanding this is what grounds the imperative of restrict­ing all managerial and bureaucratic ambition.

Both East and West in these late modern times are massively and madly committed against the transcendental structure of human dreams, feelings, insights. One reviewer of Ci's work criticises him for overlooking how ‘the pursuit of pleasure elicits institutions of its own which may develop interests not easily imagined by the present government.’[[333]](#footnote-333) Perhaps. But the reviewer is wrong in thinking that such interests will guarantee the future. The pleasures of the 'mar­ket' are no defence against the darkness of the 'final solution': the darkness of a culture that thinks itself only human, conceiver of an absolute and arbitrary power. That is why my central concern has been to show that authentic human development is "an opening to Transcendence"; to show, further, that such authentic development is costingly committed to building a just history on earth precisely because it is such an opening. Every religious tradition is open to critique in terms of its "coefficient of secular commitment".[[334]](#footnote-334)

*Trinity and Mission*

Of John 20:21, Frederick Crowe says we must learn from the Father's procedure. If our apostolate is analogous to his, then it will be accomplished by word and love, the love will always be total while the word will be according to the condition of the time and place. If in primitive times the Spirit came incognito and worked in secret while awaiting the time when the fullness of the Word would be manifested, perhaps our missionary activity should consist for a long time in living charity with others while we help with agriculture, housing, education, health, etc., and bring conditions to the point where they can raise questions regarding the hope that is in us.[[335]](#footnote-335) Charity is about building community through kinds of exchange: it is not about something independent of the dynamics of exchange. Christianity gave rise to a peculiar open­-yet-bound practice of giving. In the Middle Ages, charity was a reciprocal 'state', not just an 'action': its purpose was to effect *real* reconciliation with a visible neighbour, not to ensure gener­osity to a stranger. The beggar who received your alms could re­turn your love by praying for your soul. All charity was a public exchange binding one within a more human community. The bonding was both free and associative, giving rise to the most genuine kind of community.

The Word proceeds from an understanding of history. What is eternally and solely spoken is the understanding of all the concrete patterns of diverging series of scattering conditions that leave us groping for light through emergent probability. History slowly reveals to us the schedules of God's patience. But the Son who was not sent until 748 A.U.C. is graced as head of all; history is eternally spoken as absolutely supernatural, laced with an invitation to a friendship without a Name. The invitation constitutes a state of Eternal and historical being: the Globe and China are in that state of grace. But that state is changed by the coming among us of the One whom we did not know. The Mystery was darkly revealed to a group in humour, parable, compassion and terrible suffering, and the group was invited to a new justice.

We who belong to this group can afford neither to pass over its history of impatience, law, power, and empire, nor to pretend that this is all that there is.[[336]](#footnote-336)The challenge remains of fostering the transition to generalized empirical method and the third stage of meaning in all fields and in our concrete living. It is a chal­lenge to go beyond the related madnesses of Western capitality, the truncation of academic life, the eclecticism of conventional Theology. Only in this way can we adequately invite the Chinese people into the third stage of meaning, into a larger presence of the Unnamed Trinity. We might listen anew to Christ's injunction "tell no man that I am the Christ". The reason for what might seem to be a mysterious injunction must be understood: a prema­ture telling can never communicate the life-giving truth. Effective telling is always a response to the questions raised by authentic practice. Authentic practice is lived charity. Charity is usually as­sociated with help but everybody knows there are pitfalls here. We need to complexify the issue of help to require a help to­wards self-help grounded in Chinese insights. And help is authori­tative only through the collaborative achievement of the goal of help in the helpers. There are three basic ways of bringing a sub­ject to the third stage of meaning which opens up integrality and hope: understanding, belief, love. The way of love leads to belief and understanding. It would seem to be God's way.

My line of thought in this closing section has been so influ­enced by Philip McShane that it is only fair to give him, if not the last, at least the second-last word:

Help is genuinely given in the shedding of pseudo-theism, power and eclecticism. It is given in the Mystery of God, with limited authority and reverence for liberty, withdrawn from the sinful backwardness of common-sense eclecticism.[[337]](#footnote-337)

On being confronted with Christian doctrines some of Ricci's interlocutors found them beyond belief: “they had never heard tell of a Master of Heaven who died nailed to a construction in the shape of the character ten.”[[338]](#footnote-338)

Is there another way? Those who learn from the concrete particularity and patience of our Eternal Relations' way of loving will come to abhor the indecent haste of mission practised in its classicist form.

…Is there another way

of engaging? There are those who,

thinking of him in the small hours

as eavesdropping their hearts

and challenging him to come forth,

have found as the day dawned,

his body hanging upon the crossed tree

of man, as though he were man, too.[[339]](#footnote-339)

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1. Gregory Bateson, *Angels Fear: Towards an Epis­temology* of *the Sacred,* New York: Bantam Books, 1988, p. 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The impact of Newtonian science on the wider culture is well sketched in Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dia­logue with Nature,* New York: Bantam, 1984, pp. 27-99 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. "Cross Currents" program, *Radio-Telefís Éireann 1*, March 26, 8.02 p.m., 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. John Moriarty, *Dreamtime,* Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1994, p.137. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For an account of the clash see Jacques Gernet, *China and the Chris­tian Impact,* Cambridge University Press, 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cf. my *Life* Before *Death: Inculturating Hope* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1986); On *Earth as in Heaven* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1988). I defer clarification of what I mean by 'modernity' to the third chapter below. In addition to the references given there, see Stephen Toulmin, "What Is the Problem About Modernity?" in his *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity,* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, pp. 5-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Convinced of the possibility of such a dialogue is Paul Rule, *Kung-tzu or Confucius: The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism,* Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Convinced of its impossibility is Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact.* Confucian scholars of the Ming period such as Xu Guangqi and Yang Guangxian were similarly divided on the issue. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Much of this third chapter first saw the light of day as a keynote ad­dress in an international theological conference held in Galway in 1993 with the theme 'Secularisation, Marginalisation, and the Gospel'. The interview presented above as Preface to the present work took place on the day after that address. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Andrew C. Ross, A *Vision* Betrayed: *The Jesuits in Japan and China, 1542-1742.,* New York: Orbis Books, 1994, p. xv. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This is my attempt toformulate the relation between the technical terms "description" and "explanation" in Lonergan's philosophical work where they make a centrally important distinction. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *In­sight: A Study of Human Understanding,* London: Longmans, 1957, p. 291, [Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, p. 316]. Where I have had access to published volumes of the Col­lected Works editions, I have provided the reference within square brackets. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Cf. in this regard the comments of Jose Comblin, "The Novelty of *Redemptoris Missio"* in William R. Burrows, ed. *Redemption and Dialogue,* New York: Orbis, 1994, pp. 231-238. In the final chapter of the present work I attempt to clarify the meaning of missiology within a contemporarily ad­equate systematic theology. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History" in *The National Interest,* Sep­tember, 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. I am aware that this expression, coined by the French in the 1950s to denote those caught between the two superpowers, cannot survive the demise of one of those powers and has no place in a polycentric world. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Mohammed M. EI-Doufani, "Regional Revisionist Client States under Unipolarity" in *Third World Quarterly,*Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992, pp. 255-266. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. James G. Blight and Thomas G. Weiss, "Must the Grass Still Suffer? Some Thoughts on Third World Conflicts after the Cold War" in *Third World Quarterly,*Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992, p. 246. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Cf. Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy,* London: Verso, 1991. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Cf. Francis McDonagh, "The New Europe and the Third World" in *New Blackfriars,*Jan. 1992, pp. 70-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The judgment of World Bank officer Ramgopal Agarwala is more dras­tic. He states that even with improved efficiency the present standard of living in the United States could probably be sustained for only about one billion people in our world. See his contribution in David Beckmann, Ramgopal Agarwala, Sven Burmester, and Ismail Serageldin, *Friday Morning Reflections at the World Bank: Essays on Values and Development,* Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press, 1991, pp. 60-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. John Milbank, "Enclaves, or Where is the Church?" in *New Blackfriars***,** Vol. 73, (June 1992), p.352. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. For over forty different examples see Paul Ekins, A *New World Order: Grassroots* *Movements for Global Change,* London: Routledge, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Hirano Ken'ichiro, ed., *The State and Cultural Transformation: Perspec­tives from East Asia,* Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1993, pp. 15­-118. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Hirano, ‘Introduction,’ *The State and Cultural Transformation,* p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The phrase was used by Arnold Toynbee to describe the way the Meiji Restoration exemplified the encounter of civilizations. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Strictly speaking, these do not constitute two methods unless it can be shown that the cultural effects of the indirect were actually intended. The indirect transformation of culture can result, not from desire to promote cul­tural change but from exercise of the proper task of the political role. If both direct/indirect are "methods", then manipulation is the only mode of state relation to culture. This may be factually the case but, if so, needs to be subjected to critique. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *The State and Cultural Transformation,* p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *The State and Cultural Transformation,* p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Sun Yue-Sheng, ‘China's development mode and her cultural tradition,’ in *The State and Cultural Transformation,*  30-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See "Different social and cultural types among Chinese national minori­ties: Their transition to socialism and development toward modernization," in Hirano (ed.), *The State* *and Cultural Transformation,* p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. "Chinese family values: past and present" in Hirano (ed.), The State *and Cultural Transformation,* p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See Wei Zhang-ling, "Chinese family values", p.88. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Michel Masson, "Chinese Culture and Christianity: Assessing the Agenda" in *Pacifica***,** Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 123-144. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Masson, p. 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Quoted in Masson, pp. 125-6 and dating from 1968. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Quoted in M.Masson, "Les Jesuites en Chine Aujourd'hui", ETUDES, December 1990, pp. 667-677. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Cf. Masson, "Chinese Culture...”, p. 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Masson relates that the list since 1988 includes T.S. Eliot, H. Küng, M. Scheler, K. Barth, L. Chestov, R. Niebuhr, D. Bonhoeffer, K. Rahner, J. Moltmann. Edmond Tang details Augustine's *Confessions,* Tillich's *Theology of Culture* and *The Courage To Be,* and Macquarrie's *Principles of Christian Theology,* in his "Contextualization of the Chinese Church", Tang/Wiest eds., *The Catholic* *Church in* Modem *China,* New York: Orbis, 1993, pp. 243-255. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. "Chinese Culture." pp. 130-131. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Masson, “Chinese Culture” p. 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. For illuminating documentation on this typical Chinese reaction to the Christian doctrine of the Fall see Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures,* pp. 232-238. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Masson, pp. 130-1, referring to *Tianjin Daily,* July 4, 1988. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. As quoted byMasson from *Readings,* 1989, No.5, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Masson, "Chinese Culture...", p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. For a use of Weber that denies that there is any danger of "Western­ization", see Chen Yo-guang, "Cultural Factors in Chinese Modernization" in Hirano, (ed.), The *State and Cultural Transformation,* pp. 15-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. As quoted in Masson, "Chinese Culture...", 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. In the light of his reflections under this heading, I am mystified by Masson's declaration that the basis of Church interest in Chinese culture at this time is that the biblical narrative has caught the attention of intellectuals in this moment of cultural soul-searching, resulting in Christianity gaining a new intellectual respectability. Such an approach would seem to be opportu­nistic and blind to the real missionary demands of taking culture seriously. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Jin Guantao, *Questions and Methods* (Shanghai: People's Press, 1986) pp. 43-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Cf. Masson, "Chinese Culture...", 140. For a more optimistic view of the possibilities for scholarship on the mainland compare Wm. Theodore de Bary, "The New Confucianism in Beijing" in **CROSS CURRENTS,** Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, pp. 479-492. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Chung Chai-Sik, "Humanizing Modernity: Notes on the Agenda for Confucianism and Christianity", *Ching Feng* (Hong Kong) 34/2(1991), p.120. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Science and Civilization in China,* 10 Vols., Cambridge (Eng.), 1954. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Masson, "Chinese Culture...", p. 141. In this context, he refers the reader to J. Lagerway, *Taoist Ritual in Chinese Society and History,* New York: Macmillan, 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. This phrase echoes the title of a significant study by Sun Longji (Hong Kong, 1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Masson, "Chinese Culture...," p. 143. Cf. Lü Xiuyuan, "A Step Toward Understanding Popular Violence in China's Cultural Revolution," in **PACIFIC AFFAIRS,** Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 533-563. Lü argues that a deep and lasting enlightenment backlash occurred when the people realized that their sincerity had been grossly manipulated: their faith in the polity and its ideological system was destroyed. He makes a credible case for blaming the mechanisms of control as primarily responsible for generating the awful violence. This highlights the need for the microautonomy I mention in the final chapter below. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *China's Environmental Crisis,* M.E.Sharpe, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Cf. M. Soulé,and B. Wilcox, "Conservation Biology - its Scope and its Challenge" in *Conservation Biology: an Evolutionary-Ecological* Perspec­tive, Sinauer Associates, Massachusetts, 1980. It is important to have a sense of the *rate*of extinction today: over the last 200 million years something like 90 species became extinct in each century while the ongoing evolutionary process more than replaced them with new species; now, the extinction rate is approximately 40,000 times higher than this due to the activities of hu­mans. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. For source see H. Schocking, and P. Anderson, "Voices Unheard and Unheeded" in *Biodiversity:* *Social and Ecological Perspectives*, Zed Books, 1991, pp. 13-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Cf. Jose Lutzenberger, "Who is destroying the Amazon Rainforest?" in THE ECOLOGIST, 17:4/5. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. J.Lutzenberger, "Rainforests — Their Survival and Ours" in LINK-UP, March 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The context of these reflections is the recent study by the World Bank, World Resources Institute (WRI), the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) entitled *Conserving the World's Biological Diversity,* Gland, 1991. The study is deeply flawed by the inability to critique the true causes of the present crisis. For critique of more recent UNEP-sponsored studies, see David Cooper, "Genes for Sustainable Development" in Vandana Shiva et al., *Biodiversity: Social & Ecological Perspectives,* (pp. 105-123). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Cf. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development,* *and Human Rights,* Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1990, pp. 129-141. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Aimé Césaire, *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal*, (1947), as quoted in John Berger, *The Success and Failure of Picasso,* New York: Pantheon Books, 19892. Césaire goes on to evoke the creative power of cultural roots:

    I would find once more the secret of great speech and of great burning. I would say storm. I would say river. I would say tornado. I would say leaf, I would say *tree.* I would be soaked by each rain, moistened by each dew. As frenetic blood rolls upon the slow cur­rent of the eye, so I would roll words like maddened horses like new children like clotted milk like curfew like traces of a temple like precious stones far enough away to daunt all miners. Who would not understand me would no more understand the roaring of the tiger.

    Rise, phantoms, chemical-blue from a forest of hunted beasts of twisted machines of jujube-tree of rotten flesh of a basket of oysters of eyes of a lacework of lashes cut from the lovely sisal of a human skin I would have words huge enough to contain you all and you too

    stretched earth

    drunken earth

    earth great sex raised at the sun

    earth great delirium of God

    earth risen wild from the sea's locker with a bunch of cecrops in your mouth

    earth whose surfing face I must compare to the mad and virgin forests that I would wish to wear as countenance before the undeciphering eyes of men.

    one mouthful of your milk-spurt would let me discover always at the distance of a mirage an earth – a thousand times more native, golden with a sun no prism has sampled – a fraternal earth where all is free, my earth. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Cf. Wolfgang Sachs, "The Blue Planet: An Ambiguous Modern Icon", in *The Ecologist***,** Vol. 24, No. 5, Sept./Oct. 1994, pp. 170-175. I find Gregory Bateson's reflections on the incompatibility of the camera and ritual very relevant to this issue: Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, *Angels* *Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred,* 69-81. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Time, Discounting and Value,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Cf., for further helpful reflection, John O'Neill, "Cost-Benefit Analysis, Rationality and the Plurality of Values" in *The Ecologist***,** Vol.36, No.3, May/June 1996, pp.98-103. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. W. M. Adams, *Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third World,* London, Routledge, 1990, pp.9, 198. For Chambers, see his "Sustainable rural livelihoods', pp. 1-17 in C. Conroy and M. Litvinoff (eds), *The Greening of Aid: sustainable livelihoods in practice,* London: Earthscan, 1988. Also his 'Sustainable livelihoods: the poor's reconciliation of environ­ment and development", pp. 214-230, in Paul Ekins and Manfred Max-Neef (eds), *Real-Life Economics: Understanding Wealth Creation,* London: Routledge, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *Green Development,* p. 202. In a recent article, ("Out of the Green­house", *New Blackfriars,* Jan. 1993, pp. 4-13), John Milbank critiques ecotheology for failing to acknowledge that nobody knows what is to be done and failing to realize that the condition of our restricting our economism is a restructuring of our social world, "a mode of human reciprocity collectively affirmed." Adam's study of environment and sustainability in the Third World supports Milbank's contention. The point under attack is the universalist preten­tiousness of managerial power into which some environmentalist play. The tra­dition of the Left knew that power is relevant to all social problems and sees that it must be relevant to environmental problems also. The challenge to the Left is to let go of universalist power logic in favour of advocacy of a more differentiated communal understanding of life-giving power. Milbank's critique on this issue is fully consistent with his earlier rejection of a dialectical ground­ing for justice in favour of the tradition of Christian socialism which operates through 'negative knowledge' (see the references in note 47 of the next chapter). A similarly pretentious claim to knowledge is operative in both issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Societal responses are significant: in the Philippines it has been esti­mated that over 5 million people belong to some 16,000 NGOs, of which probably 4,000 are concerned with development and environmental issues. This could constitute a significant counter to technological nihilism and bur­eaucratic unaccountability. See Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, *Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines,* Berkeley, Uni­versity of California Press, 1993, p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. The original context in which I shared some of the key ideas of this chapter was that of people living in the economically depressed, western region of Ireland. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Cf. J-B. Metz, Theology of *the World,* New York, Herder, 1971; Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Per­spective,* New York, Macmillan, 1965. For corrective re-evaluation in relation to what Cox saw as the unexpected come-back of the political influence of religion some twenty years later, see his *Religion in the Secular City*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1984. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Andrew Greeley, "The Persistence of Religion" in **CROSS CURRENTS,** Vol.45, No.1, Spring 1995, pp 24-41. The brief but helpful Pro Mundi Vita publication *Studies 11: Does development lead to secularisation*, (Leuven, 1989), provides an overview of the debate with relevant bibliographies that are not confined to English language listings. Of further help is their subsequent *Stud­ies 14: The transmission of the faith in a secularized society*, (Leuven, 1990). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. 'Religious Experience’ in *A Third* Collection, ed. by Fred E. Crowe, London: Chapman, 1985, p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Cf. for historical treatment, Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life,* 1400-1800, New York, 1973-'78; idem, *Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism,* Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1977; Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism,* London, 1983. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. *The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19th Century,* (Cam­bridge, 1975), p. 3. He draws attention to the statistics on illegitimate births in eighteenth century Toulouse: from a ratio of 1:59 in 1668 it reached a ratio of 1:4 by 1788. Assuming that practice belongs to religiosity, it is hard to see the nineteenth century as declining significantly in relation to the eighteenth. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Chadwick, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. It may help to recall that "secularisation" originally referred to the legal practice of restoring a cleric to worldly status, or to the canonically condemned act of transferring clerical goods into worldly possession. With the spread of the concept to cultural history, we get a similar ambivalence of release and loss: demand for emancipation along with lament on the increas­ing detachment of the culture from Christianity. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Collection*, ed. by F.E.Crowe, New York: Herder, 1967 [CWL 4 (1988)]; *Method in Theology*, London: Darton, Longman, Todd, 1972; A *Second Collection,* Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975, *A Third Collection*, New York: Paulist Press, 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Cf. the article by Charles Hefting on "Science and Religion" in Komonchak, J.A., Collins, M., and Lane, D.A., (eds.) *The New Dictionary* of Theology (Wilmington, 1987) pp, 938-945. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. It is important here to advert to the extent that the new conception of science worked within "old" (often misunderstood) Aristotelian premises. In his study, *The Crisis of Philosophy,* (New York, 1990), Michael H. McCarthy documents the manner in which an obsession with "necessity" blocked the modern philosophy of science from appropriating the truth of actual scientific work, and blocked it right into the twentieth century. He shows how the *totalizing orientations* within modernity flow from the failure of emerging empirical sciences to appreciate the extent to which their performance broke with the Aristotelian ideal of certain knowledge of necessary causes. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Hefling, "Science and Religion", p. 944. But the self-correction of sci­ence may meet with cultural resistance. As Hefling puts it, "the news may take a long time to affect our individualistic world which finds a mechanistic universe for which nobody need take responsibility very congenial." [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Joseph Flanagan, SJ, "Where the Late Lonergan Meets the Early Heidegger," in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop* 10**,** pp*.* 83-­118, 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Gibson Winter, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* New York: Crossroad, 1989, pp. 11-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. *Meaning in History,* Chicago, 1949. A sophisticated argument in the same direction of delegitimizing the secular is contained in the work of John Milbank, *Theology* *and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason,* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Milbank rejects "the facile theme of secularization", in ac­cordance with which notions are simply transferred from the divine to the human. He argues that only the theological model allows one to construct the myth of sovereign power, sovereign person. Thus, there are no essentially secular realities. The Hobbesian construction of man as the maker of society is itself theology — or antitheology in disguise. The secular is not that which is discovered when the sacred is removed, but that which is first constructed within the space of the sacred. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. *The Legitimacy ofthe Modern Age,* trans. by Robert M. Wallace, Cam­bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985, (*Die Legitimität der Neuzeit,* 1966). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. For some of the ways in which Weber's thesis must be refined, supple­mented and corrected in the light of later works, see Hans Küng, *Christianity: Essence, History and Future,* New York: Continuum, 1995, pp.577-79, along with the accompanying references. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Christianity in a Secularized World,* New York: Crossroad, 1989, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. *Christianity in a Secularized World,* p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Cf. *Christianity in a Secularized World,* p. 19*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. In *Life Before Death,* pp. 30-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Cf. Pannenberg, *Christianity in a Secularized World,* pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. *Easter in Ordinary,* London: SCM Press, 1988, p. 289*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. For a brief but helpful biblical overview see Pablo Richard, “Biblical Theology of Confrontation with Idols” in Richard et al., *The Idols of Death and the God of Life: A Theology,* New York: Orbis Books, 1983, pp. 3-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. As quoted in Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary,* p. 201, American philosopher, Richard Rorty says in sanguine fashion, that we should not be afraid to claim that bourgeois capitalist society is ‘the best polity achieved so far, while regretting that it is irrelevant to most of the problems of most of the population of the planet.' [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. In an article on the absence of God in modern culture refreshingly free from any taint of nostalgia, Lonergan names the challenge to us as that of heroic charity, not that of a development of our theology: "For to know what is truly good and to effect it calls for a self-transcendence that seeks to benefit not self at the cost of the group, not the group at the cost of mankind, not present mankind at the cost of mankind's future." *A Second Collection,* p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Peter L. Berger, Brigette Berger, Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness,* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Cp. Berger, The *Homeless Mind,* pp. 69, 73, 78, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. See her Foreword to Mahbub Ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices* *for the Third World,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1976, ix-xiii. The still outstanding task is the critique of the modern social construction of *homo economicus:* "All known traditional cultures can be conceived as meaningful configurations that have as their principle purpose the repression of those conditions under which scarcity could become dominant in social relations. Such cultures enforce rules of behavior that obviate the appearance of scarc­ity, and therefore undercut envy and the fear of it." (Ivan Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past,* London: Marion Boyars, 1992, p. 117). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Karl Polanyi, The *Great Transformation; the political origins* of *our time,* Boston, 1957, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Compare the comment of Ivan Illich above in n. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. It is not just that an instrumentalization that reigns supreme experi­ences no need of redemption (Robert Doran); the gospel of efficiency with its assumption of scarcity undermines religious perceptions of the world in terms of good creation and resurrection. "Tragedy as a thematic is linked to politi­cal space, to the incompatibility of private and familial goals with those of sovereign spatial order, to the monopolisation of power reinforced by a myth of scarcity: *limited* space, time, resources... Creation ex nihilo and the resur­rection of the dead are protocols *against* the myth of scarcity, of limited be­ing" (John Milbank, ‘Enclaves, or Where is the Church?’ p. 350). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. *After Virtue,* Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 19842, p. 75 ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Cf. Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason,* New York: Seabury Press, 1974, pp. 1-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. To glimpse something of the extent of our psychic numbing one could turn to Farley Mowat, Sea *of Slaughter,* New York, Bantam Books, 1986; Rob­ert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The *Genocidal Mentality,* New York, Basic Books, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. In writing this section, I am indebted to the work of Gibson Winter on democratic communalism, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* NewYork, Crossroad, 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. On the extent to which modernity conditions the perceptions of the fundamentalist, see Timothy Radcliffe, O.P., 'Time and Telling: How to Read Biblical Stories', in *New Blackfriars****,*** March 1991, pp. 131-139. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. The originality of liberation theology as social criticism is that it cre­ates symbols of community and identity at the same time as it offers critical social analysis. This the left has never been able to do, resulting, for example, in the alienation of black people who found their identity in their ethnicityabout which the left had nothing to say. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. The reality of power not grounded in community is the hidden ele­ment in moral debates today – power against women, power of women: all is reduced to a power struggle.Such debates must be related to the issues of love and justice but this can only be done through the reconstitution of com­munal values. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Winter, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Winter, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* p. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Winter, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Involvement in such domination and control leads the Church to un­derstand its mission, not just as preaching the gospel, but of controlling the mode of its reception. "We are living in a world of pluralistic faiths and postcolonial peoples who are claiming their right to be subject of their own histories. Yet Western Christianity, in most of its forms, continues to think in terms of the conversion of the world to the Christian faith. To this extent, religious institutions are lending their support to Western imperialism" (Gibson Winter, *Community and Spiritual Transformation,* p. 17) [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. There is reason to suspect the talk of pluralism among some postmodernists. "(T)he postmodernist simulacrum of pluralism supplants the search" (for true naming and identity): ...'it plays with diversity and makes a mystique of it; it is the concealed imperialism of the multinational, the infinite compatibility of all cultures with one another envisaged in terms of the ultimate capacity of all computers to read one another." So, Seamus Deane, in his introduction to Eagleton, Jameson, Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature* (Minneapolis, 1990), pp. 18-19. On the dangers of a postmodern sell-out of conscience and, there­fore, freedom, see also )-B. Metz, "Theology in the Struggle for History and Society" in *The Future of Liberation Theology,* (New York, 1989), pp. 165-171. Some postmodernists make an unwarranted leap from discovering the radical incompleteness of human rationality to concluding that reason must be totally critiqued. They continue to work on the assumption that if rationality exists it must be capable of complete and coherent theoretic purity. See the extended and balanced critique to be found in the magisterial essay of Fred Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other" in Thomas J. Farrell & Paul A. Soukup (eds.), *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age,* Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1993, pp. 173-211. This is an expanded version of his 1993 article published under the same title in *Theological**Studies,*54, pp. 55-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Cf. for example, O'Tuama/Kinsella, *An Duanaire:* 1600-1900 *Poems of the Dispossessed,* Portlaoise, Dolmen Press, 1981. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Terry Eagleton, "Nationalism: Irony and Commitment" in Eagleton, James, Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature,* p. 38. On the necessity of the ironic, see Nicholas Lash, ‘Paganism and the Politics of Evangelization’ in Ellis and Maduro (eds.), *The Future* of *Liberation Theology,* (New York: Orbis, 1989), pp. 154-164; also his *A Matter* of *Hope* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981) pp. 236-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. See the reflections of John Milbank, 'On Baseless Suspicion: Christian­ity and the Crisis of Socialism" in *New Blackfriars,*Jan. 1988, pp. 4-18; 'Religion, Culture and Anarchy: the attack on the Arnoldian Vision" in *New Blackfriars,*October 1988, pp. 436-445; Nicholas Boyle, 'Understanding Thatcherism" in *New Blackfriars****,*** July/August, 1988, pp. 307-324. More recently, Nicholas Boyle, "Hegel and 'The End of History'" in *New Blackfriars****,*** March and April 1995, pp. 109-119, 164-174. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Gregory Baum, "Community and Identity" in Ellis and Maduro, (eds), *The Future* of *Liberation Theology*, New York: Orbis, 1989, pp. 220-228. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Ivan Illich, *In the Mirror of the Past,* pp. 92-95, has proposed a six-stage metamorphosis in the definition of the other, leading into the distinctively Western preoccupation with progress as 'development'. While the intent or mission of imperial Rome was never to *bring the barbarians in,* the Western European Church of late antiquity defined the alien as someone in need, someone to be brought in. The sense of a universal mission and of the others as a burden is born here and inseparable from the subsequent history of the West. But in order to fit into this definition the *barbarian* had to mutate into the *pagan,* the unbaptized destined to become Christian. By the early Middle Ages most people in Europe were baptized. But the appearance of the Muslim, a believer resistant to conversion, called for a re-definition of the alien as some­one who needed to be subjected and then instructed. The pagan becomes the *infidel.* By the Late Middle Ages, with the Moors driven from Spain, the New World "discovered", and the Crown taking over many of the functions of the Church, a new definition is needed – the alien becomes the *wild man* who has no needs and threatens all humanistic civilization. To justify colonial pro­cedure, needs have to be imputed to the wild man but they are not those of civilized man: he becomes the *native.* But, finally, by the time of the Marshall Plan, with multinational conglomerates expanding, the natives limited needs are seen to thwart growth and progress — the native becomes the *underde­veloped* person, our present Western view of the alien. This last view is, for Illich, the most pernicious of all. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. This has long been the thesis of Ivan Illich who sees clerical mo­nopoly as providing the model for all the subsequent "disabling professions" of modernity. See *The Right to Useful Unemployment,* (London: Marion Boyars, 1978), which Illich describes as a postscript to his earlier *Tools for Convivial­*ity, (London: Penguin, 1973); *Gender,* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 151-­157; also his *In the Mirror of the Past,* (New York: Marion Boyars,1992). To balance this hermeneutic of suspicion, it is necessary to stress an older, positive meaning of profession. M. Mauss asserts that the idea of profession is bound up with the notion of the gift. It is the community value of what is produced and exchanged that is of primary concern here. In relation to this positive meaning, what must be resisted today is capitalist de-­professionalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. This thesis was never put forward by Weber himself as an overall explanation of the origins of capitalism. See note 17 above in this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. "Churches at the Transition between Growth and World Equilibrium" in Meadows, (ed.,) *Toward Global Equilibrium,* Cambridge, 1976, pp. 337-353. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. "The Production Process and Exponential Growth: A Study in Socio­-Economics and Theology" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop 1*, Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978, pp. 257-308. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Cf. W. Pannenberg, *Christianity in a Secularized World,* pp. 3-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. See Matthew L. Lamb, *Solidarity With Victims: Toward a Theology of Social* *Transformation,* New York: Crossroad, 1982, pp. 17-19; 34-36; 123-125. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. While most critics of this phenomenon move away from the empirical sciences to stress the realm of human freedom and self-determination, Lonergan undertook to uncover the dynamic performance of questioning as grounding all advances in empirically scientific knowing. In doing this he showed that there was no basis for the notions of deterministic necessity and axiomatic deductiv­ism which had led to the new identifications, with their accompanying social and cultural alienations. These alienations resulted from the attempt to impose conceptual necessities through the use of technocratic and bureaucratic tech­nique. Cf. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 10: Topics in Education,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, pp. 60-61, where Lonergan critiques bureaucracy as illustrative of sin in the social process. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. See David Moss, "Law, Change and Revolution: A Theological Note on the Finality of Capitalist Resurgence" in *New Blackfriars***,** Dec. 1992, pp. 614–22, 617. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. *Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism,* p. 93. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. The obvious need for intervention in market economies is stressed by Jan Tinbergen in his foreword to Meadows, Meadows and Randers, *Beyond the Limits,* Post Mills, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. This explains why Bernard Lonergan returned in the last decade of his life to his earlier macro-economic explorations. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Cf. Matthew Lamb, *Solidarity with Victims,* p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. *Moments of Reprieve,* London: *Sphere* Books, 1987, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictio­nary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power,* London, Zed Books, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. W. Brandt, *North-South: A Programme for Survival,* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Cf. Daly, H.E. and Cobb, J.B. *For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Towards Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future,* Boston: Beacon Press, 1989, pp. 209 ff. Also, J.B. Cobb, *Sustaining the Common Good: A Christian Perspective on the Global Economy,* Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 1994, pp. 89-131. For helpful clarification of the institutionalized forms of interdependence which would lead to genuine cooperation, see Paul Ekins, A *New World Order,* pp. 34-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. ICDSI, *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament,* London: Pan Books, 1982, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. “China has shown that arms reductions in favour of civil benefits are not only the response of governments in desperate economic straits. Between 1971 and 1985 its arms spending fell from 17.4 per cent to (a still high) 7.5 per cent of GNP in 1985, with further big troop reductions announced in 1985 bringing it down to 4 per cent by 1988” (Paul Ekins, *A New World Order,* p. 19). [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, "What Now? Another Development", special edition of *Development Dialogue,*No.1/2, Uppsala, 1975. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. "Human Scale Development: An Option for the Future" by Manfred MaxNeef, Antonio Elizalde, Martin Hopenhayn in *Development Dialogue,*Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1989:1, pp. 5-80. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. "Environment", in W. Sachs, ed., *The Development* *Dictionary,* p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. WCED, Our *Common Future,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p.65. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. *Our* *Common Future,* p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. *Our Common Future,* p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. *Our Common Future,* pp. xii, 89. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Cf. Paul Ekins, *A New World Order,* p. 311. Also his "sustainability First" in Ekins/MaxNeef, eds. *Real-Life Economics,* pp. 412-422. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. John le Carré, *The Secret* *Pilgrim,* Coronet Books, Hodder & Stoughton, 1991. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. *The Secret Pilgrim,* pp. 16, 19, 336, 339. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. NewYork: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1987*.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. *Insight,* p. 232;[*CWL* 3*,* 257]. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. In the Preface to his monumental *Insight,* Lonergan asserts that the value *of* his work lies in its providing "the very key to practicality'[CWL 3:8]. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. B. Lonergan, *Insight,* p. xiv; [*CWL* 3, 8] [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. David Tracy, "Bernard Lonergan and the Return of Ancient Practice' in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop* 10**,** Boston College, 1994, pp. 319-331 [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Cf. B. Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’, in Frederick E.Crowe, ed., *A Third Collection,* pp. 169-183, esp. p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. The inversion of phrase derives from Matthew L. Lamb's *History, Method, and Theology,* Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978, but I can no longer find the exact reference. Cp. Robert Doran's use of the phrase in his foreword to Thomas Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, eds. *Lonergan and Communication: Common Ground for Forging the New Age,* Kansas City, Sheed & Ward, 1993, ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. See the late essay (1977) referred to in note 21 above for a developed presentation of Lonergan’s thought on this topic. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Cf. Matt Lamb, "The Social and Political Dimensions of Lonergan's Theology" in Vernon Gregson, ed., *The Desires of the Human Heart,* pp. 255-284. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Bernard Lonergan, "Religious Experience" in *Trinification of the World,* eds. T. Dunne and I.-M. Laporte, Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978, pp. 84­–96. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Preface to Matthew L. Lamb, *History, Method and Theology,* Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978, p. xi. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. *Insight,* pp. 458-483; [*CWL* 3: 484-507]. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. B*.* Lonergan, *Insight,* p.171 [*CWL*: 3,195]. See *Insight, pp.* 121-128 [CWL:3, 144-151] for the initial presentation of the idea. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Cf. B*.* Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 467; [CWL:3, 492]. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. B*.* Lonergan, *Insight,* p*.* 469; [CWL:3, 494]. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. If we identify this unrestricted desire with what ismeant by the human natural potential, we get a notion of human finality that is compatible with modern science. Further, it will transcend the limitations of any particular culture's vision of the good life, being itself the source of all such ideas as well as the source of their criticism and revision. Lonergan's account of hu­man finality avoids attempting a direct account of the end to be realized and concentrates on a heuristic account of how that end is to be realized. Cf. Patrick H. Byrne, "Teleology, Modern Science and Verification" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Worshop 10***,** Boston College, 1994, pp. 1-47; also his *"Insight* and the Retrieval of Nature" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop 8,*Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1990,1 -59. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. See *Insight,* pp. 446–49; [*CWL*:3, 472–75] [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. *Insight,* p. 473; [*CWL*:3, 498]. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Robert M. Doran, "Foreword" to Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, eds., *Communication and Lonergan,* p. xv. Cf. also his *Theology and the Dia­lectics of History,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. The task of nego­tiating the operations is distinct from that of negotiating the full movement of life although both negotiations involve intentional operations. The negotiation of the operations – the primary achievement of Lonergan in *Insight –* is a pre­requisite for self-appropriation at the non-cognitive levels and it is to this last that Doran's work on psychic conversion is a significant contribution. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. B. Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 743; [*CWL*: 3, 764]. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Cf. B. Lonergan, 'The Ongoing Genesis of Methods" in A *Third* Col­*lection,* ed. by F. Crowe, New York: Paulist Press, 1985, p. 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* p. 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. *Insight,* p. 630; [*CWL*: 3, 653]. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* [ET] Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, p. 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Cf. Matthew L. Lamb, "The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan's Theology", in *Method: Journal Of Lonergan Studies,*8:1, pp. 48-73. For Lonergan, sublation is taken to mean that "what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts every­thing on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroy­ing it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context" (*Method in Theology,* p. 241). [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Cp. Ben F. Meyer, *Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship,* Collegeville, Liturgical Press, 1995, pp. 40-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Cf. John Keane, *Reflections on Violence,* London: Verso, 1996, pp. 6-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. *After Virtue,* p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Kenneth R. Melchin, *History, Ethics and Emergent Probability,* Lanham, University Press of America, 1987; "History, Ethics and Emergent Probability" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop*7,Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1988, pp. 269-294; "Ethics in *Insight",* in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop* 8*,*1990, pp. 135-148; "Revisionists, Deontologists, and the Structure of Moral Understanding" in *Theological Studies,*1990, Vol.51, pp. 389­416; "Moral Knowledge and the Structure of Cooperative Living" in *Theo­logical Studies,*1991, Vol.52, pp. 495-523. An overview of the shift ef­fected by Melchin's work is provided by Cynthia S. W. Crysdale, "Revisioning Natural Law: From the Classicist Paradigm to Emergent Probability" in *Theo­logical Studies,*1995, Vol. 56, pp. 464-484. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Cf. on this point William R. O'Neill, "No Amnesty for Sorrow: The Privilege of the Poor in Christian Social Ethics", in *Theological Studies*,Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 638-656. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Cf. *A Third Collection,* p. 176 for the connection between natural right and the communal making of history. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. This paragraph refers to the argument of an unpublished Lonergan MS of the 30's titled "An Essay in Fundamental Sociology". I am indebted to M. Lamb, “The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology” for the material. See note 40 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Cp. *Insight,* p. 363, 743; [*CWL:3*, 387, 764]. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. On the patterning of experience, see note 54 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. *Insight,* p. 223 [*CWL:3*, 248]. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. *Method in* Theology, p. 49. "The same economic set-up is compatible with prosperity and with recession. The same constitutional arrangements ad­mit wide differences in political life and the administration of justice." [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Cf. M. Lamb, "The Social and Political Dimensions...", pp. 262-269. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism,* New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1982, pp. 711-80. See the excursus at the end of the present chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. The patterning of experience is derived from specific human interests. Needs generate desires and desires generate interests. Depending upon inter­ests, our experiences are dynamically patterned. In *Insight* atleast seven pat­terns are mentioned while four are analyzed. In the later work, these patterns are mentioned within the context of differentiations of consciousness and six are listed. The four analyzed in *Insight* are:

     1. the biological, meeting the needs of intussusception, reproduction or, in danger, self-preservation; extroversion of consciousness is most obvious at this level, revealing our embeddedness in physical, or­ganic and animal environments;
     2. the aesthetic: where human experience begins to be experienced for its own sake, moving into the self-justifying joy of play, music, dance, etc.. The move into these is spontaneous: artful patterns involve a further differentiation leading to formal art;
     3. the intellectual pattern arises whenever the pure and unrestricted desire to know empowers us to wonder and question;
     4. the dramatic pattern is that of our everyday living: how we each blend the multiple patterns in the making of ourselves, our primor­dial work of art, the one and only version of ourselves.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. "Community is not just an aggregate of individuals within a frontier, for that overlooks its formal constituent, which is common meaning. Such common meaning calls for a common field of experience and, when that is lacking, people get out of touch. It calls for common or complementary ways of understanding and, when they are lacking,

     people begin to misunderstand, to distrust, to suspect, to fear, to resort to violence. It calls for common judg­ments and, when they are lacking, people reside in different worlds. It calls for common values, goals, policies and, when they are lacking, people oper­ate at cross-purposes." *Method in Theology*, pp. 356-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Through similar conformity to the deformations of the world, the Church is also tempted to compromise its mission to transform the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Cf. "Dialectics of Authority" in Bernard Lonergan, *A Third Collection,* pp. 5-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. "History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop*7, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1988, pp. 269-293, 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. *Insight,* p. 226; [*CWL:3*, 251]. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. This can be exemplified also in contemporary political options in edu­cation. There is a crisis of epistemology which is affecting the whole of hu­man theoretical learning. The 'great divide' is now no longer between the Sciences and the Humanities—Snow's 'two cultures'—but between the *practi­cal and the theoretical forms of learning.* On the one hand stand astronomy, pure mathematics, theoretical physics, philosophy, literature, history and religious studies. On the other hand engineering, biology, electronics, law, economics, busi­ness studies, and political science. The point is clear to anyone who has seen what Thatcherite policies did to the U.K. educational system. While the prac­tical applications of knowledge are booming in all fields, the disciplines that are engaged in asking the more fundamental questions about the nature of the human and of the universe are in a state of deep crisis. Their current political unpopularity just might be connected with the unpopularity societies have always heaped on those who ask awkward questions without supplying com­forting (marketable) answers. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. B. Lonergan, Preface to Matthew Lamb, *History,* *Method and Theology*, xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. *Insight,* p. 235; [*CWL:3*, 260]. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Cf. *Method in Theology*, pp*.* 52-55; 93-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. See his work *On* *Aggression,* London, 1966. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. *Method in Theology,* pp. 31-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. “a) Of the approximately one hundred chemical elements that occur in the materials of the earth's surface, less than twenty appear to participate in biochemical processes, although some of those which are excluded, such as mercury or lead, can in fact react quite readily with natural constituents.

     b) Although oxygen and nitrogen atoms are common in the organic compounds found in living systems, biochemical constituents which include chemical groupings in which nitrogen and oxygen atoms are linked to each other are very rare.

     c) Although the numerous organic compounds which occur in bio­chemical systems are readily chlorinated by appropriate artificial reactions, and the chloride ion is quite common in these systems, chlorinated deriva­tives are extremely rare in natural biochemical systems.

     It is no coincidence that these chemicals are not found in living tissues. There is good reason for it. The organization that is the biosphere, has been able to evolve at the expense of eliminating possible reactions between these substances and living things. If any living systems once included them, then they have been eliminated by natural selection.

     The consistent absence of a chemical constituent from natural biological systems is an extraordinarily meaningful fact. It can be regarded as prima facie evidence that, with a considerable probability, the substance may be incompatible with the successful operation of the elaborately evolved, ex­ceedingly complex network of reactions which constitutes the biochemical system of living things” (Barry Commoner, in his Foreword to Epstein and Grundy, eds., *Consumer Health and Product Hazards/Cosmetics and Drugs, Pesticides, Food Additives,* Vol. 2, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1974). [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Fred Lawrence, "The Human Good and Christian Conversation" in Farrell/ Soukup eds. *Lonergan and Communication,* pp. 248-268; p. 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Cp. B. Lonergan, *Collection,* p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. "By treating the question of the good of order as a question of moral­ity and ethics, the ancients kept questions for practical intelligence distinct from questions of technical expertise; by never reducing the former to the latter, they did not make sheer feasibility in a technical sense into a criterion for practical judgment, but normally judged against advances in technology when it was thought to jeopardize the common good" (Lawrence, "The Com­mon Good and Christian Conversation", p. 252). [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. *Collection,* p. 262. Cp. *Method in Theology*, p. 124: "...classicism is no more than the mistaken view of conceiving culture normatively and of concluding that there is just one human culture." [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. *Collection,* p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. *Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo* *Strauss,* Indianapolis: Bobbs­Merrill, 1975, pp. 81-98. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. Cf. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987 (1952). [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Fred Lawrence, "The Human Good"..., p. 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Lawrence, "The Human Good...", p. 257. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. Lawrence, "The Human Good...", p. 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Lawrence, "The Common Good...", p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Cf. B. Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. xiv, 231-232, 235, 237, 420, 528-9, 534, 549; *Method in Theology*, 98-99; *A Second Collection,* pp. 115, 186. For what I read as complementary reflection, see Alasdair Maclntyre, *After Virtue,* ch.8: "The Character of Generalizations in Social Science and their Lack of Predictive Power" which rejects as unfounded the claims of bureaucratic managerial expertise. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. For a careful analysis of the significantly destructive workings of one of our world's most powerful — and most highly motivated — transnational bureaucracies, the World Bank, see Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis* of *Development,* Boston, Beacon Press, 1994. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. *Cosmopolis*, p. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. New York: The Free Press, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Cf. Gregory Baum, *Essays in Critical Theology,* Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1994, p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. By 'economistic' is meant the view that sees the essential characteris­tic of human life as lying in the constant effort to improve the material con­ditions of one's life. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Cf. M. Novak, *The Catholic Ethic.* p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. *The Catholic Ethic*..., p. 195*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. *Centesimus Annus,* n. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. M. Novak, *The Catholic Ethic...,* p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. M. Novak, *The Catholic* *Ethic...,* p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. B. Lonergan, *CWL* 10, *Topics in Education,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. M. Novak, *The Catholic Ethic...,* p.. 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. John Langan, "Ethics, Business, and the Economy" in *Theological Studies,* Vol. 55, No.1, pp. 105-123, 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Cp. Matthew Lamb, *Solidarity with Victims,* pp. 82-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Cf. *The Catholic Ethic...,* pp. 221-222. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. *Tien-hsia,* meaning "all under Heaven", signified the age-old belief in the inner unity of the Chinese realm. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Cf. David J. Bosch, *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission*, p. 228; idem, *Believing in the Future: Toward a Missiology of Western Culture*, Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1995, p. 29. But see Andrew Ross, *A Vision Betrayed*, p. 202 for needed qualification to Bosch’s argument. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. David J. Bosch, *Believing in the Future: Toward a Missiology of West­ern Culture*, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. Cf. *Method in Theology,* pp. 125-145. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. In my reading, a significant attempt to develop the general categories is that of Robert Doran in his *Theology and the Dialectics of His­tory.* [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. *Method in Theology*, p. 292. It should not be necessary to state that the generalized empirical method used to generate the categories is no more tied to Lonergan than modern physics is to Galileo. Generalized empirical method is simply meeting the demand that empirical method be applied to the data of consciousness as well as to the data of sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. See Bernard Lonergan's suggestions in *Insight,* pp. 734, 742-3 [*CWL 3*: 755, 763-4]. Also, Brian Swimme and Thomas Berry, The *Universe Story: A Celebration of the Unfolding of the Cosmos,* San Francisco: Harper, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. Robert M. Doran, Theology *and the Dialectics of History,* p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. "To theologians who debate various views regarding history as revela­tion I would put such questions as 'Is the mind of Galileo part of history as revelation, or the self-energy of the electron, or animal thirst?'" Philip McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method" in Matthew Lamb, ed., *Creativity and Method,* (Marquette University Press, 1981), p. 555. "To theologians who debate various views regarding history as revela­tion I would put such questions as 'Is the mind of Galileo part of history as revelation, or the self-energy of the electron, or animal thirst?'" Philip McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method" in Matthew Lamb, ed., *Creativity and Method,* (Marquette University Press, 1981), p. 555. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. *Method in Theology,* p. xi. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. *Method in Theology,* p. 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Cf. *Method in Theology,* pp. 132-133. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. *Insight,* p. 741;[*CWL:3,* 762]*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. The scholarly differentiation of consciousness consists in the successful entry into the common sense world of a people distinct in culture from the scholar's own. A‘post-scholarly’ form of common sense is a *sine qua non* condition for anyone who would wish to be involved incross-cultural evangelization. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. B.J.F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* p. 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. *Method in Theology,* p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. See *Method in Theology,* p. 358. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. *Theology and the Dialectics of History,* pp. 12-16.Cp.Philip McShane, "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts" in Fred Lawrence, ed. *Lonergan Workshop 6*,Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986, pp. 143-174. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. See note 54 in the previous chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Cf. his five-volume work *Order and History, 1: Israel and Revelation, II:The world of the Polis, III: Plato and Aristotle, IV. The Ecumenic Age, V: In Search of Order,* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. It was in this fourth volume of *Order and History* that Voegelin broke with his original purpose of presenting in historical succession human existence in society and its corresponding symbolisms of order. The reason for the break was his deepened appreciation of “important lines of meaning in history which did not run along lines of time" (p. 2). Note that in his title and throughout the fourth volume Voegelin uses "ecumenic", in the sense of "em­pire-building", "totalizing". [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Cf. *The* *Ecumenic Age,* p. 68; also pp. 7, 65-67. Voegelin's critical presentation of 'historiogenesis' as operative in modern societies is relevant to recent debates in Japan and Korea on appropriate textbooks for the teaching of their respective histories. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. *Israel and Revelation,* p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. *Israel and Revelation,* p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. *Israel and Revelation,* p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. *The Ecumenic Age,* p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. *The Ecumenic Age,* p. 296. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. *The Ecumenic Age,* p.295. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. *The* *Ecumenic Age,* pp. 297-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. As quoted in *The Ecumenic Age,* p. 293. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. *The Ecumenic Age,* p. 284. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. “Myth is not a primitive symbolic form, peculiar to early societies and progressively to be overcome by positive science, but the language in which the experience of divine-human participation in the In-Between becomes ar­ticulate. The symbolization of participating existence, it is true, evolves his­torically from the more compact form of the cosmological myth to the more differentiated forms of Philosophy, Prophecy, and the Gospel, but the differ­entiating insight, far from abolishing the *metaxy* of existence, brings it to fully articulate knowledge" (E. Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture" in *Jesus and Man's* Hope, ed. by Donald G. Miller and Dikran Y. Hadidian, Pittsburg: Pittsburg Theological Seminary, 1971, Vol. II, p. 76). [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. Cf. Robert M. Doran, *Theology* *and the Dialectics of History,* pp. 507-513. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. The original German expression is that of August Boeckh as quoted in Peter Hünermann, *Der Durchbruch Geschichtlichen Denkens im* 19. *Jahrhundert,* Freiburg: Herder, 1967, p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. The value of *The Ecumenic Age* lies in the author’s recognition of differentiations of consciousness, but McShane observes that Voegelin himself did not live within that heuristic system noetically. The same observation may be applicable to Robert N. Bellah but does not detract from the value of his recent *magnum opus*, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Jacques Gernet considers earlier contacts to have been in the nature of ‘historical curiosities’. He believes that even Nestorianism is no exception as it remained the religion of merchants of Syrian origin. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. See A. C. Ross, *A* *Vision Betrayed,* Chapter 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Quoted in J. Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact,* p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. Quoted in Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact,* p. 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. *China and the Christian Impact,* pp.238-246. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. See B.Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 254-257. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. *China and the Christian Impact,* p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. W.J.F. Jenner, *The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis,* London: Penguin Books, 1992. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. *The* *Tyranny of History,* p. 249. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. See Matthew Lamb, “The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan's Theology”, pp. 60 ff., where he points out that critical history is enough to dispel the pretensions of the classicist notion of culture. It does so by showing that since concepts have dates, they cannot be normative for all times or places. But critical history is not enough to save this discovery from leading to a nihilistic relativism. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. *The Tyranny* of *History,* p. 182. Compare the level of Robert Doran's genetic critique of the anthropological breakthrough: *Theology and the Dia­lectics* of *History,* pp. 473-499. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. See, for example, John K. Fairbanks, *The* *Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, and the comments of Sun Yue-sheng referred to in the second chapter above. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. Cf. Adolf Portmann, "Naturwissenschaft and Humanismus" in *Die Fünfhundertjahrfeier der Universität Basel: Festhericht,* ed. Paul Roth (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1960) pp. 77-93. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. See *The Tyranny of History,* pp. 179, 232-5, 245-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Jiwei Ci, *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution: From Utopianism* to *He­donism,* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Ci is aware (p. 249) that this distinction as metaphysical dates from a third century A.D. commentary on the *Dao de jing.* His interest here is solely in the political transformation of the distinction in the period under discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. The result of a dual obsession with the West, seen both as political adversary and technological superior, was some ingenious ideological acro­batics, "chief among which was the idea of catching up with a West that was *behind* China" *(Dialectic* of *the Chinese Revolution,* p. 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. *China: A Macro History,* New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1990, p. 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. Cf. *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution,* pp. 103-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. Cf. *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution,* pp.113-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution,* p.241. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. See W.T. de Bary, 'The New Confucianism in Beijing' in *Cross Cur­rents*,Winter 1995, pp. 479-492. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. 1 am much indebted in this section to the stimulus of the Philip McShane paper, “Middle Kingdom: Middle Man,” in P. McShane, ed., *Searching for Cultural Foundations,* Lanham,MD: University Press of America, 1984, pp. 1­43. Some of his argument there was anticipated in P.McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge to* *the University and the* *Economy,* University Press of America: Washington, D.C., 1980. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Contrary to the deeply-cherished illusion of modernity, nobody can be helped to see what is at stake here by being provided with 'a clear state­ment': clarity is relative to the reversal of self-neglect. McShane ("Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", p. 7) invites us to consider what it takes to appreciate the subtlety of musical meaning of Beethoven's Last Quartets, to probe their vari­ety of mood, sweetness, power, intensity, humour, compassion, assertion of life. He goes on to state that all this is perceived by unrefined sensibility as ordinary... as is great ugliness! Appreciation involves a transformation of us. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. See Philip McShane, "Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", pp.7-8; for ex­pansion see his, *Lonergan's Challenge* to *the University and the Economy,* pp. 42-128. On the pressures of reductionism in botany and zoology, see his *Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence,* Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. For the broader ecological implications see Vandana Shiva, "Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Profits", in Vandana Shiva et al., *Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Perspectives,* pp. 43-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Philip McShane, "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop 6***,** p. 166.1 have quoted this before in my *Life Before Death:* it bears repetition. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. "Political Theology and ‘The Longer Cycle of Decline’", *Lonergan Workshop 1*,pp. 223–56, 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. John Milbank, "Socialism of the Gift: Socialism by Grace" in *New Blackfriars*, Dec. 1996, p. 544. The material is reworked as chapter 9 of John Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Cf. P. McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge to* *the University and the Economy,* Washington, 1980, pp. 112-128; also his "Features of Generalized Empirical Method and the Actual Context of Economics" in Matthew L. Lamb, ed. *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. pp.* 543-571, esp*.* 566–­570. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. For relevant bibliography see McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge...,* p. 202. More recent helpful primers include P. McShane, *Economics for Everyone: Das Jus Kapital*, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Axial Press, 1998; idem, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*, Axial Press, 2002; Bruce Anderson and Philip McShane, *Beyond Establishment Economics:No Thank You Mankiw*, Axial Press, 2002; Philip McShane, ed., *Do You Want a Sane Global Economy?* in *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (2010), 155-256. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. See P. McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", pp. 566-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Lonergan’s economic writings have received publication in two volumes of the Collected Works series: *CWL 21: For a New Political Economy*, edited by Philip McShane, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998; *CWL 15: Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis,* edited by Frederick G. Lawrence, Patrick H. Byrne and Charles C. Hefling Jr*.*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. For a helpful introductory overview see Patrick Byrne, "Economic Trans­formations: The Role of Conversions and Culture in the Transformation of Economics", in Timothy P. Fallon and Philip Boo Riley, (eds.), *Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.,* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, pp. 327-348, and more recently the special issue of *Divyadaan*, noted in note 66 above. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. P. McShane, 'Features of Generalized Empirical Method', p. 566. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. Cf. Tu Wei-ming, *Way,* *Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confu­cian Intellectual,* Albany: State University of New York, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Cf. B. Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage" in Frederick Crowe, ed., *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan,* New York, Herder and Herder, 1967, p. 21 [*CWL:4*, 22]. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. The 15 largest corporations have today gross incomes greater than the gross domestic product of over 120 countries. They are patently beyond the reach of any judicial system. Union Carbide costs in relation to the Bhopal disaster were 470 million dollars and translated into 43 cents per share to the investors. Shares jumped two dollars on the day of the settlement in what was already a record profit year. The victims got 783 dollars each. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. McShane, "Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. Cf. E. Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience” in E. Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990, pp. 89-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. B. Lonergan, "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion" in *A* *Third* Col­lection, p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. E. Voegelin, *The* *Ecumenic Age,* p. 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. E. Voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture", p. 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. "The Gospel and Culture", p. 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. On this see Robert Doran, *Theology* *and the Dialectics of History,* chapters 7 to 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. I am indebted here to the helpful suggestions of P. McShane in the second part of his "Middle Kingdom: Middle Man". [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. See the heuristic sketch of Bernard McGinn, *The Foundations of Mys­ticism,* New York: Crossroad, 1991, pp. xiii-xx. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Cf. William Johnston, *The Inner* Eye of *Love,* New York, 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine* Love, London, 1966, p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953, p. 91. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. Quoted in David Mitchinson and Julian Stallabrass, *Henry Moore,* London: Academy Editions, 1992, p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. Cf. P. McShane, “Middle Kingdom: Middle Man,” pp. 25-26. In this paper McShane found the crises and disorientation of economics to be paral­leled in the field of musicology. He argues that, without some foundational appreciation of what it is to compose, to do history, to adequately appreciate, there is the central opaqueness of the truncated subject. But here again the crisis can be an invitation to the blossoming of music in the third stage of meaning. Pierre Boulez, reflecting on the sonata form, spoke of the way *Finnegan's Wake* observes itself as a novel, reflects on its own image, becomes aware that it is a novel; and this results in a logic and cohesion of this technique that is constantly on the alert, creating new universes. In the same way, Boulez saw music as being destined not solely to express' but to become aware of itself, become an object of its own reflection. But I must admit to a stubborn inability to appreciate all this in relation to Boulez's own *Piano Sonata No.2.* [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. "The Greeks needed an artistic, rhetorical, an argumentative develop­ment of language before a Greek could set up a metaphysical account of mind" (B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 261). Eric Voegelin gives a fas­cinating account of this whole development in Vol.II of his *Order and His­tory, The World of the* *Polis.* Compare Lonergan's comments on the pre-con­ditions of his own achievement in *Insight,* p. 535 [*CWL:3,* 558-9]. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. Cp. the use made by Gibson Winter of Paul Klee's *Notebooks* in clari­fying the new 'root metaphor' of artistic creation in the face of the bankruptcy of the 'organic' and 'mechanistic' root metaphors that have guided us up to now. Gibson Winter, *Liberating Creation: Foundations of Religious Social Eth­ics,* New York: Crossroad, 1981, pp. 105-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. *Feeling and Form,* p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. "Religious Experience" in *A* *Third Collection,* ed. by Fred E. Crowe (Chapman: London, 1985), p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. *The Sacred and the Profane,* New York, 1961, p. 212. Cp. *Method in Theology*, p. 266: "In undifferentiated consciousness [the gift of God's love] will express its reference to the transcendent both through sacred objects, places, times, and actions, and through the sacred offices of the shaman...". [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. See *The Sacred and the Profane,* p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. *Method in Theology*, p. 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. See his *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences, Chico: Scholars Press,* 1981; also his *Theology and the Dialectics of History,* pp.139-352. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. B. Lonergan, *A Third* Collection, p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. As far back as 1971 Philip McShane was indicating what would be required: “A full heuristic consideration of tension and pathology would require the under­standing of the human, mediated by modern science, sublated by procedural analysis, as a six-levelled hierarchy symbolically named f(pi, cj, bk, **Z**1**,** um, rn, where each of the variables denotes a level of conjugate forms, and the coin­cidental acts of one level (e.g., the level of physics, pi: i ranges over the properties of fundamental particles and multiparticles) are aggreformically [i.e., as wholes] related to the level above (e.g., the chemical: j ranges over the periodic table relations, inclusive of compound molecules that occur in chro­mosome, muscle and brain structures). Substructures (organs of digestion, of seeing, etc.) can be similarly specified. The level of wonder, um, has the fa­miliar complexity of levels of consciousness as well as the openness to the supernaturality of rn. Such an interdisciplinary structure is essential to interdis­ciplinary efforts to specify adequately, for example, claustrophobia, chemo­therapies, biorhythms, thirst, psychoneuroses, insight, serenity, mysticism” ("Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", pp.30-31). [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. Cf. Voegelin, The *Ecumenic Age,* pp 117, 207 ff., 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. For some clues see *Insight,* pp. 185, 191ff [*CWL:3*, 208, 214ff.]; *Method in Theology,* pp. 101-103. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. See R. Doran, "Jung, Gnosis, and Faith Refused" in *Cross Currents,*Fall 1993, pp. 307-323. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. Robert Doran, *Theology and the Dialectics of History,* p. 519*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. “*...*the autonomy of human consciousness is indeed subordinate, not to every object whatsoever, but to the infinite subject in whose image it has been made and whom it is bound to imitate”(*CWL 12: The Triune God: Systematics,* p. 215). [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. *Collection*, p. 115; [*CWL:4*, 109]. Cp. *Collection*, p. 249; [*CWL:4*, 230]. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. See P. McShane, "Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", p. 33 for reference. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. B.J.F. Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority", pp. 5, 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. B. Lonergan. "Theology and Praxis" in *A Third Collection*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. See Fred Lawrence, "Elements of Basic Communication" in Fred Lawrence, ed., *Lonergan Workshop 6***,** pp. 127-142, esp. p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. Voegelin's sober perspective on the life of great establishments —"they have a habit of running for two hundred and fifty years" — is put in question by the events of 1989. The Russian establishment lasted only sev­enty-two years: what does this mean for the Chinese? [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. See P. McShane, "Middle Kingdom: Middle Man", pp. 37ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. The truncated analysis protects itself from discovering that "the con­fusing error of Marx was to lump together both progress and the two prin­ciples of decline under the impressive name of dialectical materialism, to grasp that the minor principle would correct itself more rapidly through class war, and then to leap gaily to the sweeping conclusion that class war would accel­erate progress" (B. Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 235; [CWL 3: 260]). [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 234; [CWL: 3: 259] [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. Richard Kraus, Review of Jiwei Ci, *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolu­tion,* in *Pacific Affairs,*Vol. 68/3, Fall 1995, pp. 429-431. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. See Denis Goulet, "Development: Historical Task or Opening to Transcendence?" in *Cross Currents,*Summer 1996, pp. 221-230. This is the final chapter of his book, *Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice,* The Apex Press, 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. Cf. F.E. Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity,* Toronto: Regis College, 1965, pp. 190-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. Given current, near-exclusive attention to the hermeneutic of suspicion, fairness demands that a large task of future dialectic will be to reveal the *goodness* of the goings-on of the Christian West. The courageous attempt by Eric John in an eight-part series in *New Blackifiriars***,** Vol. 57, 1976, entitled "The Papacy and the Historian" was a step towards correcting the negative bias of modern historiography. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. P. McShane, “Middle Kingdom: Middle Man”, p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. As quoted in Genet, *China and the Christian Impact,* p. 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. R.S. Thomas, "Bleak Liturgies" in *Mass for Hard Times,* Newcastle: Bloodaxe Books, 1992, p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)